Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5789-12T3
04-08-2015
CHARLES JOHNSON, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD, Respondent.
Charles Johnson, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Hoffman and Whipple. On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board. Charles Johnson, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Charles Johnson, an inmate at New Jersey State Prison (the "prison"), appeals from the revocation of his supervised parole release by the New Jersey State Parole Board (the "Board"). We affirm.
We discern the following facts from the record. Johnson was sentenced in 2006 after pleading guilty to second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, to an aggregate eight-year term with a mandatory eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act ("NERA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a), which included a three-year period of mandatory parole supervision upon his release from custody. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c). After his release from custody in 2012, Johnson violated the terms of mandatory parole supervision by failing to report to his parole officer, notify his parole officer of a new arrest, obtain approval to change his address, refrain from using drugs, and participate in random urine monitoring and drug counseling. As a result, a parole violation warrant was issued. The Board panel revoked Johnson's mandatory parole supervision and established a fifteen-month future eligibility term ("FET"). Johnson filed an administrative appeal to the Board, challenging the panel's decision. Upon review, the Board upheld the revocation.
On appeal, Johnson argues that the Board panel lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release. We disagree.
The scope of our review of final decisions of administrative agencies is limited. Decisions of the Board, like those of other administrative agencies, are not reversed unless they are "'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [are] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 548 n.6 (App. Div. 1988) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).
Johnson was sentenced under NERA, which included a five-year term of mandatory parole supervision. Accordingly, while under mandatory parole supervision, Johnson remained in release status in the community in the legal custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and was subject to supervision by the Board as if on parole and subject to the conditions of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c), including conditions set by the appropriate Board panel.
Johnson argues that the Board did not have jurisdiction to revoke his parole release status. A similar argument was rejected in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2603, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 497 (1972), when the Supreme Court of the United States held that due process is not violated when revocation of parole is performed by independent administrative officials rather than the judiciary, so long as it is demonstrated at a hearing that "reasonable cause exists to believe that conditions of parole have been violated[.]" States have the authority to designate a decision-maker to perform such a function. Ibid.
NERA incorporates N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51b(a), which provides that "[t]he appropriate board panel shall have the authority . . . to revoke the person's release status and return the person to custody[.]" N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.54(h) provides that "a term of parole supervision imposed by a court . . . may be revoked [by the Board] and the offender returned to custody[.]"
Furthermore, Johnson's resumption of incarceration is not a new sentence. Johnson's original sentence included a three-year term of mandatory supervision which, by its terms, includes a requirement that he serve additional time in prison if he does not comply with the terms and conditions of supervision.
The Board has the constitutional, statutory, and administrative authority to revoke an offender's supervised release status. Therefore, Johnson's argument is without merit.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION