Opinion
C. A. 6:22-cv-04180-TMC-KFM
02-23-2023
Emanuel Burnett Johnson, Plaintiff, v. Beth Lawson, Karen, Corporal Bishop, Officer Walker, Corporal Collier, Jamie Watson, Jennifer, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on November 21, 2022 (doc. 1). By order filed January 12, 2023, the plaintiff was informed that his complaint was subject to summary dismissal because it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that he could attempt to cure the defects identified in his complaint by filing an amended complaint within 14 days (doc. 13). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his case be dismissed (id. at 7-8). On February 3, 2023, the plaintiff's amended complaint was entered on the docket (doc. 18). Because the plaintiff's amended complaint likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the case.
ALLEGATIONS
This is a § 1983 action filed by a pretrial detainee regarding events that have occurred during his time in the J. Reuben Long Detention Center (“the Detention Center”) (doc. 18). The plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourteenth Amendment Rights (id. at 5). The plaintiff alleges that he began taking blood pressure medication six months before being incarcerated in the Detention Center (id. at 6). He contends that when he was incarcerated he requested blood pressure medication, but was not provided any (id.). The plaintiff contends he continued requesting blood pressure medication from Ms. Lawson, Nurse Karen, and Cpl. Bishop, but he was informed that Ms. Lawson determined that he did not require blood pressure medication (id.). The plaintiff contends that Nurse Karen noted the plaintiff's rising blood pressure, but did not provide him with medication (id. at 6-7).
One week after being incarcerated, the plaintiff contends that he was prescribed Lisinopril, which caused the plaintiff to suffer side effects (id. at 7). The plaintiff further alleges that he informed Nurse Karen and Ms. Lawson that individuals of his race were not supposed to take Lisinopril, but his medicine was not changed (id.). The plaintiff further contends that he started experiencing side effects from taking Lisinopril, but Ms. Lawson told the plaintiff he was overreacting regarding the side effects (id.). The plaintiff contends that Nurse Jennifer and Ms. Wilson indicated that the plaintiff should not be on Lisinopril, but continued to dispense it to the plaintiff at Ms. Lawson's directive and marked the plaintiff as refusing medical attention if he refused to take the Lisinopril (id. at 7-8). During this time, the plaintiff began feeling worse and requested visits from Ms. Watson, Nurse Karen, Ofc. Walker, and Cpl. Bishop, but he was not visited (id. at 8).
The plaintiff alleges on July 18, 2022, he could not get out of the bed without assistance, but Cpl. Bishop and Ofc. Walker did not call medical for the plaintiff (id.). The plaintiff alleges that when he got up to get his medicine that evening, he collapsed and injured his lower back and tailbone (id.). The plaintiff was then transported to the hospital with Cpl. Collier, and the emergency room physician indicated that the plaintiff should discontinue Lisinopril because of the side effects it can cause individuals of the plaintiff's race to suffer (id. at 9). The plaintiff was returned to the Detention Center and was provided Lisinopril by Ms. Wilson and Nurse Jennifer, but the plaintiff only took the medicine on one more occasion (id.). The plaintiff then asked Nurse Michael to change his medication and Nurse Michael noted that the plaintiff should not be taking Lisinopril and changed the plaintiff's medication (id. at 9-10).
The plaintiff alleges that his lower back aches and hurts when he walks because of his fall (id. at 10, 12). He further contends that he suffers from emotional distress and humiliation because other inmates believe he has a contagious disease (id.). For relief, the plaintiff seeks an order preventing the defendants from dispensing Lisinopril to the plaintiff or any other detainees of his race as well as to provide the plaintiff with any medical treatment he requests as well as money damages (id. at 13-14).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal. As an initial matter, to the extent the plaintiff seeks an order restricting the use of Lisinopril on the plaintiff as well as any other detainees of his race, such a request may only be considered on the plaintiff's behalf because a prisoner cannot file or maintain a lawsuit on behalf of others. See Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621,625-26 (4th Cir. 1981) (a prisoner cannot act as a “knight-errant” for others); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“it is plain error to permit [an] imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a class action.”). As such, the plaintiff's claims are considered on his own behalf only.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
The plaintiff alleges that he was denied appropriate medical care because he was not provided blood pressure medicine for one week after being incarcerated at the Detention Center and that he was then provided medicine that was not appropriate for him as an African American - Lisinopril (doc. 18 at 6-10). The standard for reviewing medical claims of pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially the same as that for a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment-deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992). Not “every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the [Constitution].” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). The government is required to provide medical care for incarcerated individuals. Id. at 103. However, to establish deliberate indifference, the treatment “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In order to state a claim, a plaintiff must show a serious medical need as well as that the defendant “knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed.” DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218-20 (4th Cir. 2016); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017)). A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position.” Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851-52 (citation omitted). “It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. Moreover, disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care do not state a Section 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.1985).
Here, the plaintiff alleges that he was denied blood pressure medicine upon incarceration at the Detention Center as well as that he was later prescribed an inappropriate medicine to treat his blood pressure (see doc. 18). As an initial matter, the plaintiff's allegation that he hurt his back when he fell and that he suffers from high blood pressure do not meet the standard of serious medical needs. Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210. Moreover, the plaintiff's allegations indicate that his blood pressure was being monitored by the defendants at the Detention Center and that once it was clear he required blood pressure medication, he was provided Lisinopril (doc. 18 at 6-10). As such, the plaintiff's allegations of deliberate indifference to medical needs are based on his preference for different treatment than he was provided; however, the plaintiff is not constitutionally entitled to the treatment of his choice. See Sharpe v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 621 Fed.Appx. 732, 733 (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished per curiam opinion) (noting that “mere disagreement between an inmate and medical staff regarding the proper course of treatment provides no basis for relief” under § 1983 (citing Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975))). Additionally, the plaintiff's assertions that the defendants should not have prescribed him Lisinopril based on his race appear, at best, to allege negligence by the defendants -especially since the plaintiff has not alleged that medical professionals are prohibited from prescribing Lisinopril for individuals of his race and his amended complaint concedes that the defendants continued monitoring his condition and providing treatment as appropriate. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (noting that mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328-36 & n.3 (1986); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1995). Indeed, questions or mistakes “of medical judgment are not subject to judicial review” in a § 1983 action. See Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 318-19 (4th Cir. 1975) (internal citation omitted). The plaintiff also requests relief this court cannot grant - seeking an order instructing the defendants to never prescribe him Lisinopril and to provide him with his treatment of choice (doc. 18 at 13-14). See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976) (noting that “the federal courts do not sit to supervise state prisons”). As such, the plaintiff's medical indifference claim is subject to summary dismissal.
Abandoned Claim
The plaintiff's amended complaint appears to abandon his supervisory liability claim because the amended complaint omits mention of the claim (see doc. 18). The plaintiff was warned that an amended complaint replaces the complaint and “should be complete in itself (doc. 13 at 7-8 (citing Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001)). As such, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the plaintiff's abandoned claim. To the extent the plaintiff did not intend to abandon this claim, for the reasons set forth in the court's prior order, the claims would still be subject to summary dismissal (see doc. 13 at 6-7).
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued January 12, 2023, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment for failure to state a claim. Despite filing an amended complaint, the plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified in the order dated January 12, 2023 (doc. 13). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without further leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).