Opinion
C. A. 21-1970-DCN-PJG
07-29-2022
Deborah Jean Johnson, Plaintiff, v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,[1]Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S DENIAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This social security matter is before the court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.VII.02 (D.S.C.). The plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the defendant, Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying the plaintiff's claims for social security benefits.
Part I-Plaintiff seeks:
[X] Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”): Plaintiff's age at filing: 46
[X] Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”): Date last insured: September 30, 2009
[ ] Other:
Application dates: July 27, 2012 (SSI); August 4, 2012 (DIB)
Plaintiff's Year of Birth: 1965
Plaintiff's alleged onset Dated: January 25, 2004
Part II-Social Security Disability Generally
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(5), and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i), as well as pursuant to the regulations formulated by the Commissioner, the plaintiff has the burden of proving disability, which is defined as an “inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) and/or § 416.905(a); see also Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1973). The regulations generally require the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to consider five issues in sequence, as outlined below. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)(4) and/or § 416.920(a)(4). If the ALJ can make a determination that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in this process, review does not proceed to the next step. Id.
A claimant has the initial burden of showing that he/she is unable to return to past relevant work because of his/her impairments. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. To satisfy this burden, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant has the residual functional capacity, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and impairments, to perform alternative jobs that exist in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) and/or § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B); see also McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). The Commissioner may carry this burden by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1983).
Part III-Administrative Proceedings
The court notes that this matter is before the court for a third time. In 2017, the court remanded this matter following review of the parties' briefs, C/A No. 0:15-4666-DCN. (Tr. 125770). The ALJ issued a new decision in 2019 again denying Plaintiff's applications, which Plaintiff appealed, and following a consent motion to remand, it was again remanded to the Commissioner in 2020, C/A No. 0:19-3328-DCN-PJG. (Tr. 2324.)
Date of ALJ Decision: April 22, 2021
In applying the requisite five-step sequential process, the ALJ found:
Step 1: Plaintiff was engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant time period: [] Yes [X] No
Step 2: [X] Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:
[O]besity, pancreatitis, diabetes, fibromyalgia, lupus, depression, and anxiety (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
[ ] Plaintiff does not have a severe impairment.
Step 3: [X] Plaintiff's impairment(s) does/do not meet or medically equal a Listing. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Step 4: Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity is as follows:
[S]ince January 25, 2004, claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with some non-exertional limitations. Specifically, claimant can stand, walk, and sit for 6 hours each in an 8-hour day. She cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds but she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. Claimant must avoid working at unprotected heights or around hazardous machinery. Claimant has the mental ability to perform work that needs little specific vocational preparation where the duties can be learned on the job in 30 days or less. Any time off task can be accommodated by normal employer afforded breaks (e.g., 15 minutes in the morning, a 30 minute[] lunch break, and a 15-minute break in the afternoon). Claimant must work in an environment where changes are infrequent and gradually introduced.
[ ] Plaintiff could return to his/her past relevant work.
Step 5: [ ] Plaintiff could not return to his/her past relevant work, but using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”) as a framework supports a finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x 2.
[X] With regard to her DIB claim, Plaintiff could not return to her past relevant work through her date last insured. With regard to her SSI claim, Plaintiff has no past relevant work. However, prior to September 26, 2020, the date claimant's age category changed to an individual of advanced age, there were jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, as follows:
| Position Title | DOT Code | Exertional Level | SVP Level Skilled/Unskilled | Approximate Positions Nationally |
| Wet suit gluer | 795.687-018 | Light | SVP 2/Unskilled | 222,000 |
| Bulb filler | 692.686-022 | Light | SVP 1/Unskilled | 63,000 |
| Container finisher inspector | 727.687-066 | Light | SVP 2/Unskilled | 576,000 |
[X] As to Plaintiff's SSI claim, beginning September 26, 2020, the date Plaintiff's age category changed to an individual of advanced age, a finding of “disabled” is reached by direct application of Medical-Vocational Rule 202.01.
Date of Appeals Council decision: None
Part IV-Standard of Review
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court may review the Commissioner's denial of benefits. However, this review is limited to considering whether the Commissioner's findings “are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, the court may review only whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied. See Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 267 (4th Cir. 2017); Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980). “Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019); Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015). “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence' to support the agency's factual determinations.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, the court may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, even if the court disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence. Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775.
Part V-Issues for Judicial Review
I. The ALJ's Listing analysis was not supported by substantial evidence; and
II. The ALJ's evaluation of the opinion evidence of record was not supported by substantial evidence.(Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 11 at 1.)
Oral Argument:
□ Held on.___
[X] Not necessary for recommendation.
Summary of Reasons
A. Listing 12.05
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in failing to find that she met the requirements of Listing 12.05B. At Step Three of the sequential analysis, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant's impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of one of the Listings and the claimant is therefore presumptively disabled. “For a claimant to show that her impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis added). It is not enough that the impairments have the diagnosis of a listed impairment; the claimant must also meet the criteria found in the Listing of that impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(d), 416.925(d); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987) (noting that the burden is on the claimant to establish that his impairment is disabling at Step Three); Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992) (same).
Out of an abundance of caution, the ALJ addressed the version of 12.05 in effect at the time Plaintiff filed for benefits, as well as the version in effect at the time of the ALJ's decision. (See Tr. 2268-96.) However, the parties agree for this judicial review that the revised version is applicable. (See Pl.'s Br. at 13, ECF No. 11 at 13; Def.'s Br. at 13, ECF No. 13 at 13) (citing Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders, 81 FR 66138-01 (“If a court reverses our final decision and remands a case for further administrative proceedings after the effective date of these final rules, [January 17, 2017,] we will apply these final rules to the entire period at issue in the decision we make after the court's remand.”)).
At issue here, Listing 12.05B (Intellectual disorder) is satisfied by demonstrating the following: 1. Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning evidenced by a or b:
a. A full scale (or comparable) IQ score of 70 or below on an individually administered standardized test of general intelligence; or
b. A full scale (or comparable) IQ score of 71-75 accompanied by a verbal or performance IQ score (or comparable part score) of 70 or below on an individually administered standardized test of general intelligence; and
2. Significant deficits in adaptive functioning currently manifested by extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the following areas of mental functioning:
a. Understand, remember, or apply information (see 12.00E1); or
b. Interact with others (see 12.00E2); or
c. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (see 12.00E3); or
d. Adapt or manage oneself (see 12.00E4); and
3. The evidence about your current intellectual and adaptive functioning and about the history of your disorder demonstrates or supports the conclusion that the disorder began prior to your attainment of age 22.20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.05B. The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of revised Listing 12.05B based on his finding that she did not meet the second set of criteria regarding significant deficits in adaptive functioning. Specifically, the ALJ found as follows:
In understanding, remembering, or applying information, claimant has a moderate limitation. In so finding, the undersigned has considered claimant's subjective reports of special education while in school, although these reports are not corroborated by education records in evidence. The undersigned also has considered claimant's testimony about her poor performance in school. The undersigned further notes claimant's sub-average IQ scores on the WAIS-III administered by Dr. Way, and her MMSE score of 18 reported by Dr. Spivey. (Exhibits 1F and 9F) Nonetheless, claimant was able to perform work at the level of SGA as a childcare worker for several years. Furthermore, despite claimant's intellectual disorder, anxiety, and depression, claimant made few, if any, complaints relating to treating providers of difficulty understanding, remembering, or applying information. Likewise, treating providers documented few, if any, abnormal findings relating to understanding, remembering, or applying information. Nevertheless, considering the combination of claimant's sub-average IQ scores reported by Dr. Way and her generalized complaints of depression and anxiety, the undersigned finds it reasonable to find[] she has a moderate limitation in this area. Claimant's moderate limitation in this area is accounted for in the residual functional capacity by the limitation to performing work that needs little specific vocational preparation where the duties can be learned on the job in 30 days or less.
In interacting with others, claimant has no limitation. Although claimant has made some generalized reports of depression and anxiety to her treating providers, she did not report to her providers that depression, anxiety, or her intellectual ability impaired her social functioning. The overall evidence documents few findings of abnormal mood or affect, nor does it contain observations that claimant exhibited difficulty interacting with others in a clinical setting. Claimant testified at the
February 4, 2021 hearing that she stays to herself even at home. As noted above, however, claimant has a long history of living with her son and daughter-in-law. Additionally, claimant has reported doing some shopping in stores and going to church, activities which require some social interaction.
With regard to concentration, persisting or maintaining pace, claimant has mild limitation. Claimant made few, if any, subjective reports to providers of difficulty in this area. Despite claimant's intellectual disorder, anxiety, and depression, treating providers documented few, if any, abnormal findings relating to the ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain keep pace. Claimant has reported the ability to perform a range of household chores, including shopping for groceries. Thus, the undersigned [finds] that the combination of claimant's intellectual disability, anxiety, and depression would cause only mild limitation in this area.
As for adapting or managing oneself, claimant has experienced a moderate limitation. As noted, claimant has reported the ability to perform a range of household chores, including shopping for groceries. Treating providers have not regularly documented mental status findings of abnormal insight or judgment, or other abnormal mental status findings relating to adopting or managing oneself. Taking into account claimant's generalized complaints of anxiety and depression, however, her longstanding history of treatment with psychotropic medications prescribed by her primary care providers, and her above referenced IQ score, the undersigned finds a moderate limitation in this area to be reasonable. This moderate limitation accounts for claimant's most recent testimony [o]n February 4, 2021 that she only goes to the grocery store. The moderate limitation in the area of adapting or managing oneself is account[ed] for in the residual functional capacity by the limitation to working in an environment where changes are infrequent and introduced gradually.(Tr. 2281-82.)
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's evaluation of each of these areas. As to her ability to understand, remember, and apply information, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider her need for extra help, supervision, and special conditions. Plaintiff appears to rely on the fact that previously she lived with her parents and following their passing, she remained in her parents' home with her son and daughter-in-law. Plaintiff also argues that Dr. James H. Way, a consultative examiner, found Plaintiff's scores fell in the mildly deficient range of functioning and “was skeptical as to whether she could even sustain ‘simple, rote occupational tasks.” (Pl.'s Br. at 16, ECF No. 11 at 16.) Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Cashton Spivey, a consultative examiner, found she would have difficulty managing finances and would have difficulty understanding and performing both simple and complex tasks in the workplace. She contends that it is not surprising that doctors treating her for her physical impairments did not comment on her ability to understand, remember, and apply information. As to her abilities to interact with others, which Plaintiff refers to as social functioning, Plaintiff relies on her testimony that she kept to herself and did not go out often due to her “nerves” (Tr. 209-10); indications to Dr. Way that she stopped working in part because her “nerves got real bad” (Tr. 286); and Dr. Way's notation that Plaintiff presented with a depressed effect, was anxious about testing, had issues with confidence and anxiety, and would need assistance in “overall life affairs” (Tr. 287). (See also Tr. 432-36) (reporting that she never left the house, and attended church sporadically). With regard to her concentration, persisting, or maintaining pace, Plaintiff points out that Dr. Spivey found Plaintiff's attention and concentration was fair and his notation that she may display short-term memory problems and may have difficulty managing funds accurately and independently. (Tr. 432-436.) Finally, as to Plaintiff's ability to adapt or manage oneself, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have found she was seriously limited based on her “limited work history in a seemingly sheltered setting, along with the fact that, outside of work, she has never married, lived alone, rarely drove, and could not independently manage her finances.” (Pl.'s Br. at 18, ECF No. 11 at 18.)
The Commissioner disputes that these arguments render the ALJ's decision unsupported. In addition to the evidence cited by the ALJ, the Commissioner directs the court to the fact that the ALJ addressed Plaintiff's argument that she required extra help, supervision, and special conditions based on her living with her parents and subsequently her son and daughter-in-law, by observing the testimony that Plaintiff's parents helped care for her children. The ALJ observed that such an arrangement alone would not establish deficits in adaptive functioning and “[w]hile not necessarily typical, it is not unheard of for multiple generations to live in one household or for grandparents to assist a parent in raising young children.” (Tr. 2273.) The ALJ also found it notable that since attaining the age of 22,
claimant's earning record and work history reports reflect that she worked full-time, at the level of substantial gainful activity, as a childcare attendant in a daycare center in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. (Exhibits 4D, 5D, 6D, 7D, 14D, 2E, 4E, and 7E) As noted, at the July 25, 2019 hearing, claimant acknowledged working as a childcare attendant at a daycare, reporting that she took care of children and helped cook. Although claimant reported limited driving, she testified on June 5, 2014 that she renewed her driver's license in 2006 and last drove 4 to 5 months prior to that hearing. At the July 25, 2019 hearing, she testified she quit driving, but cited “black outs” as the reason. During the time period at issue, claimant also reported doing some shopping in stores, going to church, engaging in some meal preparation cooking, performing some household chores, and being able to attend to personal needs tasks. (June 2014 Testimony and exhibits 3E, 10E, 1F, and 9F) Claimant testified at the February 4, 2021 hearing that she shops for groceries. Even though claimant reported she does not perform all of these activities regularly, she has indicated an ability to perform them, and she has made no definitive indication that her ability to engage in these activities is limited by her intellectual functioning.(Tr. 2273-74.)
The court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff's arguments and the ALJ's decision as a whole and finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's evaluation of her adaptive functioning is unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by an error of law such that remand is warranted. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ erred in failing to find she suffered from marked limitations in at least two areas or extreme limitations in one area. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00F(2) (defining a claimant's limitations as “moderate” where “functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is fair” and “marked” where “functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited” and “extreme” where one is “not able to function in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis”). The ALJ considered the evidence that Plaintiff relies on; however, he reasonably found that Plaintiff's limitations did not satisfy the second set of criteria of Listing 12.05B.
With regard to the opinions of Dr. Way and Dr. Spivey, the ALJ discounted those opinions and for the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff has similarly failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's evaluation of those opinions was unsupported by substantial evidence.
Thus, upon careful review of this evidence and the ALJ's decision as a whole, the court finds that this evidence does not render the ALJ's determinations unsupported by substantial evidence. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 (defining “substantial evidence” as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance”). Plaintiff's arguments are essentially asking the court to again analyze the facts and reweigh the evidence presented, and such action is contrary to the substantial evidence standard of review that this court is bound to apply at this stage in the proceedings. See id. (stating that the court may not “undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]”); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that it is the ALJ's responsibility, not the court's, to determine the weight of evidence and resolve conflicts of evidence); Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775 (indicating that even if the court disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that remand is warranted for further consideration of Listing 12.05.
Earlier in the decision, the ALJ also suggests that Plaintiff failed to meet the third set of criteria for Listing 12.05B. However, because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's determination that she failed to meet the set second set of criteria was unsupported by substantial evidence and Plaintiff is required to meet all three to satisfy the requirements of Listing 12.05B, the court need not reach this issue.
B. Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ's evaluation of the opinion evidence from Dr. David J. Baggett and Dr. Robert Freeman, Plaintiff's treating physicians, and from Dr. James H. Way and Dr. Cashton B. Spivey, consultative examiners.
The law applicable to Plaintiff's application provides that regardless of the source, the Commissioner will evaluate every medical opinion received. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Typically, the Social Security Administration accords greater weight to the opinion of treating medical sources because treating physicians are best able to provide “a detailed, longitudinal picture” of a claimant's alleged disability. See Id. However, “the rule does not require that the testimony be given controlling weight.” Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Instead, a treating physician's opinion is evaluated and weighed “pursuant to the following nonexclusive list: (1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the supportability of the physician's opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physician is a specialist.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527); Dowling v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 2021) (“While an ALJ is not required to set forth a detailed factor-by-factor analysis in order to discount a medical opinion from a treating physician, it must nonetheless be apparent from the ALJ's decision that he meaningfully considered each of the factors before deciding how much weight to give the opinion.”). Any other factors that may support or contradict the opinion should also be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(6). In the face of “persuasive contrary evidence,” the ALJ has the discretion to accord less than controlling weight to such an opinion. Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). Further, “if a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight.” Id. (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 590).
Moreover, ALJs are instructed to apply the above factors-including the length and nature of the source's treatment relationship with the claimant, the supportability of the opinion, the opinion's consistency with the other evidence in the record, whether the source is a specialist, and any other factors that may support or contradict the opinion-to all medical opinions, including those from consultative or one-time examiners. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Further, the reviewing court should leave untouched an ALJ's decision regarding weight afforded a medical opinion unless the ALJ failed to give sufficient reason for the weight afforded. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). In weighing these opinions, the ALJ is instructed to apply the same factors applicable to treating medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1). Importantly, more weight is generally given to the opinions of an examining source than a non-examining one. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Additionally, more weight is generally given to opinions of treating sources than non-treating sources, such as consultative examiners. Id. The regulations acknowledge that “not every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every case because the evaluation of an opinion from a medical source who is not an acceptable medical source or from a nonmedical source depends on the particular facts in each case.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1).
In determining Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ first discussed Plaintiff's testimony and then her medical records at length. In weighing the opinion evidence at issue, the ALJ found as follows:
The undersigned gives some weight to the March 10, 2004 statement of claimant's primary care provider David Baggett, M.D., at exhibit 2F. Dr. Baggett reported that claimant had been seen recently in his office and that he felt she was mentally and physically fit to work in a daycare center. Dr. Baggett did not articulate claimant's specific functional abilities, but his opinion regarding claimant's mental and physical fitness is consistent with earning records and work history reports
reflecting a history of substantial gainful employment at a daycare from 1998 to at least 2003. (Exhibits 4D-7D, 4E, and 7E) It is also consistent with Dr. Baggett's treatment notes, which document few mental status findings, other than noting claimant to be anxious, and few abnormal physical findings upon clinical examination, aside from para-lumbar tenderness and measurements consistent with obesity, findings which do not inherently demonstrate functional limitations. (Exhibit 2F)
The undersigned gives little weight to the opinions of psychological consultative examiner Dr. Way. (Exhibit 1F) Dr. Way opined that claimant would appear to require assistance with management of overall life affairs. He also opined claimant currently would be unlikely to function to perform simple, rote, occupational tasks secondary to anxiety disorder, decreased confidence, and poor coping skills. While claimant earned sub-average IQ scores on testing administered by Dr. Way, she worked at the level of substantial gainful activity for years prior to her examination. In addition, Dr. Way's observations that claimant . . . was alert, responsive, pleasant, and cooperative do not support his opinions. Likewise, claimant's adaptive functioning is inconsistent with Dr. Way's opinions. As discussed above, during the relevant time period, claimant has reported driving, doing some shopping in stores, going to church, engaging in some meal preparation/cooking, performing some household chores, and being able to attend to personal needs tasks. (June 2014 Testimony and exhibits 3E, 10E, 1F, and 9F) Furthermore, in giving little weight to Dr. Way's opinions, the undersigned notes that as of the date of this decision, claimant has not sought treatment from any private or no-cost to low-cost mental professional, and treating providers have not documented findings, either as of the date of Dr. Way's opinions or presently, which would preclude the ability to perform work within claimant's assigned residual functional capacity.
....
The undersigned gives little weight to the June 2011 and September 2012 statements of claimant's primary care provider, Robert Freeman, M.D., at exhibits 8F and 14F. Dr. Freeman reported claimant to have a worried/anxious affect and to exhibit obvious work-related limitation in function due to anxiety disorder. Dr. Freeman's treatment notes, however, do not regularly document abnormal affect or other abnormal mental status findings. Likewise, other treatment records in evidence do not regularly document abnormal mental status findings. In addition, Dr. Freeman also noted on his statement that medication had helped claimant's condition and that psychiatric treatment had not been recommended.
The undersigned gives little weight to the August 2011 opinions of psychological consultative examiner Dr. Spivey. Dr. Spivey specifically stated that his conclusion that claimant may display difficulty managing funds independently and accurately is based exclusively on her inability to perform serial 7's. He also noted that his conclusions that claimant may display difficulty performing simple and complex tasks in the workplace was based on his estimate that her general intelligence likely
fell in the borderline range. Dr. Spivey's opinions inherently imply that he had not definitively concluded she would have such limitations and that his opinions were based on his own findings. As such, it does not appear that he considered other evidence in existence at the time of his evaluation in making his conclusions. While he referenced Dr. Way's report earlier in his own report, Dr. Spivey did not specifically reference the scores claimant earned on testing with Dr. Way. Moreover, a review of treatment notes prior to and since Dr. Spivey's examination reveals few abnormal mental status findings and does not support the limitations that Dr. Spivey concluded were possible.(Tr. 2291-93.)
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision to discount these opinions. With regard to Dr. Baggett's opinion, dated two months after Plaintiff's alleged onset date and indicating that Plaintiff was mentally and physically fit to work in a daycare center, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider that Plaintiff later left that job because of her back and anxiety. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to explain how it continued to be relevant through the date of the decision. As to Dr. Freeman's opinion that Plaintiff had obvious work-related limitations, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in dismissing it due to lack of positive mental findings when as a treating physician he met the other criteria. Plaintiff appears to contend that her household chores, employment history, and failure to seek free or low-cost treatment were insufficient reasons to discount Dr. Way's opinion. With regard to Dr. Spivey Plaintiff suggests that the Commissioner should have provided Dr. Spivey additional treatment notes and that the Dr. Spivey's opinion was consistent with Dr. Way's opinion.
Upon thorough review of the parties' arguments, the ALJ's decision, and the record, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or based on an incorrect application of the law. Moreover, contrary to any assertion by Plaintiff, it is clear that the ALJ applied the relevant factors in evaluating the opinion evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); Mastro, 270 F.3d at 178 (stating that “if a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Dunn v. Colvin, 607 Fed.Appx. 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2015) (“An ALJ's determination as to the weight to be assigned to a medical opinion generally will not be disturbed absent some indication that the ALJ has dredged up ‘specious inconsistencies,' . . . or has failed to give a sufficient reason for the weight afforded a particular opinion[.]”) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the decision reflects that the ALJ offered reasonable bases in giving these opinions some or little weight. A review of the ALJ's decision as a whole reveals that the ALJ summarized and considered Plaintiff's medical records and reasonably found that the medical records undermined some of the limitations opined. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion. The better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that opinion.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion.”).
As stated above, the court may not analyze the facts and reweigh the evidence presented, as such action is contrary to the substantial evidence standard of review that this court is bound to apply at this stage in the proceedings. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 (stating that the court may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]”); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that it is the ALJ's responsibility, not the court's, to determine the weight of evidence and resolve conflicts of evidence); Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775 (indicating that even if the court disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence). Although Plaintiff may be able to point to selective evidence that could support the opinions at issue, she has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's evaluation of this opinion evidence is unsupported by substantial evidence. See Jackson v. Astrue, C/A No. 8:08-2855-JFA-BHH, 2010 WL 500449, at *10 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2010) (“[A]n ALJ is not required to provide a written evaluation of every piece of evidence, but need only ‘minimally articulate' his reasoning so as to ‘make a bridge' between the evidence and his conclusions.”) (citations omitted). “Simply because the plaintiff can produce conflicting evidence which might have resulted in a contrary interpretation is of no moment.” Owens v. Colvin, No. 0:13-CV-386-BHH, 2014 WL 7043215, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2014) (citing Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775). Accordingly, applying the substantial evidence standard, the court finds based on the existing administrative record, “it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence' to support the agency's factual determinations.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154 (citation omitted).
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that this matter be
[X] Affirmed. Plaintiff has failed to show that the Commissioner's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by an error of law.
[ ] Reversed and remanded pursuant to □ Sentence Four □ Sentence Six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration consistent with this Order.
[ ] Reversed and remanded for an award of benefits.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).