The Court agrees that the degree of success obtained is a relevant factor that the Court may consider in determining the amount of the fee to be awarded, and therefore it will be discussed further below. See Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The degree of success a plaintiff obtains is one of the most important factors to be considered in determining whether the attorneys' fees requested by the plaintiff are reasonable."). However, the suggestion that Amazon's degree of success was so small that no fees are warranted at all does not comport with reality.
Sanction award of $100,000.00, plus all attorney fees and costs, including court reporter fees incurred by the Plaintiff in discovery-related to the discovery of By-Laws, and an evidentiary Order prohibiting the Defendant from asserting at the time of trial that the "personnel committee" had authority under the Defendant's By-Laws to fire the Plaintiff. Such a sanction order including a separate sanction award and attorney fees and costs has been approved in Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656 (7th Cir 1999). In Johnson, the Court awarded a separate sanction fee of $100,000.00 plus attorney fees and costs.
We review those sanctions for an abuse of discretion, recognizing that the district courts have “wide latitude in fashioning appropriate sanctions.” Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.1999). Under this standard, we will affirm any sanctions that were reasonable under the circumstances, even if we might have resolved the matter differently in the first instance. Id., citing Williams v. Chicago Board of Education, 155 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir.1998).
" Id. "District courts possess wide latitude in fashioning appropriate sanctions and evaluating the reasonableness of attorney's fees requested." Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1999). Both Defendant Buncich and Forgey argue that they are the prevailing parties in the motion to compel and are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(B).
SeeHensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433-434. See, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 574-575 (1992) (usingHensley as a starting point to find that attorney fees for nominal damages award should not be granted); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 567-569 (holding that, where plaintiffs obtain excellent results, attorney fees should be awarded for work done on related but unsuccessful claims); Gastineau v. Wright, 592 F.3d 747, 748-749 (7th Cir. 2010); Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1101-1102 (7th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 1999); Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 557-559 (7th Cir. 1999);Strange v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia, 129 F.3d 943, 945-946 (7th Cir. 1997); Spellan v. Board of Educ. for Dist. 111, 59 F.3d 642, 645-646 (1995); Estate of Borst v. O'Brien, 979 F.2d 511, 515-516 (7th Cir. 1992); Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 988-989 (7th Cir. 1988);Spanish Action Comm. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 811 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 1987); Tomazzoli v. Sheedy, 804 F.2d 93, 97 (7th Cir. 1986);Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 652-653 (7th Cir. 1985). After determining a lodestar, the court may adjust the lodestar according to various factors, one of the most important of which is the relation between hours reasonably expended and the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiffs in the litigation.
Moreover, the evidence at trial established that the City's counsel authorized City personnel to sign and serve false sworn interrogatory answers during discovery in this case (Pl.'s Ex. 4-A; Tr. 1000-06; Pl.'s Ex. 6-A; Tr. 1108-11), as well as false sworn answers to certain of Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests to Admit (Pl.'s Exs. 5-A 5-B; Tr. 1131-41), thus requiring L L to spend more time to ferret out the truth. As the Seventh Circuit aptly observed in Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 1999), "[A] party's uncooperativeness with pretrial proceedings will increase the amount of time that the opposing attorney must devote to the case, an increase that will then be reflected in the petition for attorneys' fees." During the trial, the City's counsel's dilatory tactics continued when they delayed in providing this court with documents as ordered. (Tr. 88-91.)
District courts possess "wide latitude in . . . evaluating the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees requested." Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1999). In determining the amount of attorneys' fees to award to the counsel for the prevailing party, the burden is on the party seeking the award to substantiate the hours worked and the rate claimed, and present sufficient evidence from which the trial court can render a decision as to their reasonableness.
Similarly, Pecore and Waniger challenge the district court's refusal to impose Rule 37 sanctions against the government. We review both of the district court's decisions for an abuse of discretion. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559–60, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (reasoning that in EAJA cases, “the district court may have insights not conveyed by the record, into such matters as whether particular evidence was worthy of being relied upon, or whether critical facts could easily have been verified by the Government.”); Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.1999) (finding that Rule 37 decisions are reviewed deferentially because “[d]istrict courts possess wide latitude in fashioning appropriate sanctions and evaluating the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees requested”). A. EAJA Attorney's Fees
We review a district court's entry of sanctions under FED. R. CIV. P. 37, and the penalty itself, for an abuse of discretion. In re Thomas Consol. Indus., Inc., 456 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1999) ("District courts possess wide latitude in fashioning appropriate sanctions and evaluating the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees requested."). The court sanctioned SRZ for failing to comply in good faith with its order to comply with an interrogatory requiring counsel to identify the documents they planned to rely on at trial to support Muzikowski's claims.
"District courts possess wide latitude in fashioning appropriate sanctions," and this court will not disturb the decisions unless they are unreasonable. Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1999). RSC agreed to the schedule according to which IPSOS made its pretrial disclosures.