Opinion
No. 1-756 / 00-0945.
Filed January 9, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wright County, ALLAN L. GOODE, Judge.
The petitioner appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the department's refusal to rescind the revocation of the petitioner's driver's license pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.13(6) (Supp. 1999). AFFIRMED.
David R. Johnson and Robert B. Kay of Brinton, Bordwell Johnson, Clarion, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David A. Ferree, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Noel C. Hindt, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Should weretroactively apply a law mandating reinstatement of a drivers license where a court in a parallel criminal proceeding has suppressed the chemical test for intoxication? The district court on judicial review of a department of transportation ruling said no. We agree and, accordingly, affirm.
James Johnson was arrested for operating while intoxicated. His subsequent failure of a chemical test triggered both administrative and criminal proceedings. In the administrative proceeding, the Iowa Department of Transportation revoked Johnson's drivers license. In the criminal proceeding, the district court granted Johnson's motion to suppress the test result.
After obtaining the suppression ruling, Johnson sought to have his license reinstated, citing Iowa Code section 321J.13(4) (1997). The department of transportation denied the request, the district court on judicial review reversed, and the Iowa Supreme Court on further judicial review reversed again, effectively reinstating the department's revocation. Johnson v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 602 N.W.2d 185 (Iowa 1999). The court noted that the legislature repealed Iowa Code section 321J.13(4) seventeen days before Johnson obtained his suppression order. The court concluded "Johnson had no vested or accrued right to rescission of his driver's license revocation at the time of the repeal of section 321J.13(4)."
Former code section 321J.13(4) provided:
A person whose motor vehicle license or operating privilege has been or is being revoked under section 321J.9 or 321J.12 may reopen a department hearing on the revocation if the person submits a petition stating that new evidence has been discovered which provides grounds for rescission of the revocation, or prevail at the hearing to rescind the revocation, if the person submits a petition stating that a criminal action on a charge of a violation of section 321J.2 filed as a result of the same circumstance which resulted in the revocation has resulted in a decision in which the court has held that the peace officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of section 321J.2 or 321J.2A had occurred to support a request for or to administer a chemical test or which has held the chemical test to be otherwise inadmissible or invalid. Such a decision by the court is binding on the department and the department shall rescind the revocation.
The litigation did not end there. By the time the Iowa Supreme Court issued its final ruling on the effect of Johnson's suppression order, the legislature had reversed course again and approved an amendment to Iowa Code chapter 321J that substantially tracked former Iowa Code section 321J.13(4). See Iowa Code § 321J.13(6) (Supp. 1999). With an effective date of April 7, 1999, the new provision once more requires the department to give effect to criminal suppression orders in license revocation proceedings. See 99 Acts, Ch. 13, Senate File 203, §§ 22, 29.
Johnson again applied to have his license reinstated, claiming the new law should apply retroactively to suppression orders obtained prior to its effective date. The department and the district court on judicial review rejected his contention and so do we.
We presume statutes apply only to actions that arise after the effective date of the statute, unless the legislature expressly indicates they are to apply retroactively. Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Iowa 1995). Iowa Code section 321J.13(6) does not expressly state that it applies to suppression orders obtained prior to the effective date of April 7, 1999. See Wieslander v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 596 N.W.2d 516, 525 (Iowa 1999). Therefore, we conclude it applies only prospectively.
AFFIRMED.