Opinion
22A-EV-2459
02-14-2023
Darleana Johnson, Appellant-Defendant, v. Housing Authority of South Bend, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Attorney for Appellant Kent Hull South Bend, Indiana. Attorneys for Appellee Tramel R. Raggs Jewell Harris, Jr. Harris Law Firm, P.C. Crown Point, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court The Honorable Matthew R. Raper, Magistrate The Honorable Eric J. Tamashasky, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 71D06-2204-EV-622
Attorney for Appellant
Kent Hull
South Bend, Indiana.
Attorneys for Appellee
Tramel R. Raggs
Jewell Harris, Jr.
Harris Law Firm, P.C.
Crown Point, Indiana.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FOLEY, JUDGE.
[¶1] This is the second appeal arising from the eviction of Darleana Johnson. After the small claims court ordered final possession of Johnson's residence to the Housing Authority of South Bend, and Johnson appealed the order, the small claims court held a damages trial on September 20, 2022. Consequently, the trial court ordered Johnson-now represented by counsel-to pay $1,075.00 in owed rent.
Both appeals stem from proceedings under one common trial cause number. The companion appeal is filed under 22A-EV-1751.
[¶2] This second appeal stems from the damages that the small claims court awarded as a consequence of the final possession order that we have, in the companion appeal, reversed. "'The long-standing rule in Indiana courts has been that a case is deemed moot when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties before the court.'" T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Matter of Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991)). "When the controversy at issue has been ended or settled, or somehow disposed of so as to render it unnecessary to decide the question involved, the case will be dismissed." Id. We cannot meaningfully review a damages award predicated on a liability that no longer stands. Thus, the second appeal is hereby dismissed, and we need not reach its merits.
[¶3] Dismissed.
Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.