Opinion
C/A No. 1:18-2154-JFA-PJG
08-20-2018
Mickey Leonard Johnson, Plaintiff, v. John R. Harvey, III; Judge Doyet Early; Bethany Young; Dereck Bush; Mike Hunt; Judge Melanie Debose; Carl Stuart Insley, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, Mickey Leonard Johnson, a self-represented state pretrial detainee, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). In a contemporaneously issued order, the court severed several defendants in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 because Plaintiff's claims against those defendants were unrelated to the claims at issue in this case. The court directed the Clerk of Court to assign separate civil action numbers for the cases against the severed defendants. The court also directed that the instant case will only concern Plaintiff's allegations about the lawfulness of Plaintiff's arrest and current detention on state criminal charges against the above-named defendants. Having reviewed the Complaint in light of the court's order severing the parties and in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that the above-captioned case should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
The court's recommendation in this case has no bearing on Plaintiff's claims against the severed defendants.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff indicates he is currently being held in the Aiken County Detention Center on state criminal charges. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) Plaintiff claims he did not commit the offenses for which he was arrested. (Id.) Plaintiff claims Defendant Harvey, a sheriff's deputy or investigator, drafted affidavits supporting either the arrest or search of Plaintiff that was based on "made up" evidence. (Id. at 1, 3.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Judge Early is violating his rights by denying him bail despite a lack of evidence against him. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Young, the solicitor in his case, is violating his rights by keeping him detained without bail. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Bush, his public defender, is ineffective in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights because he does not have a criminal law background and he is "acting more like a prosecutor." (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendants Sheriff Hunt and Judge Debose, through their private and personal relationship, formed a conspiracy to "rubber stamp" cases in Aiken County, in violation of Plaintiff's rights. (Id. at 4-5.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Judge Insley signed a warrant based on little or no evidence "cooked up" by Sheriff Hunt and Judge Debose, in violation of Plaintiff's rights. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff seeks damages against the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id., ECF No. 1 at 8, 11.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions").
B. Analysis
Plaintiff indicates he brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A legal action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In this action, Plaintiff alleges various violations of constitutional provisions by the defendants. However, as discussed below, the court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.
1. Immune Defendants
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Early, Debose, Insley, Young, and Hunt should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and § 1915A(b)(2) because they are immune from suit. According to Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendants Early, Debose, and Insely are judges involved in Plaintiff's state criminal proceeding. It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (providing that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment of damages, for judicial actions taken within their jurisdiction); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) ("It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions."). Judicial immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith, nor will a judge "be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). Because judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages, Mireless, 502 U.S. at 11, Plaintiff's claims against these defendants are barred in the instant matter.
Plaintiff also raises claims against Defendant Young, who is the solicitor prosecuting his state criminal charges. However, solicitors are immune from suit where a plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983 for the solicitors' prosecution of the plaintiff. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) ("Solicitors are immune from §1983 claims where their challenged actions are 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.' "); see also Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 377 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining "the Imbler Court specified that absolute immunity protects prosecutors' decisions 'whether and when to prosecute' "). Here, Plaintiff's claims are related to the solicitor's request to have Plaintiff held without bail while he awaits trial on his state criminal charges. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Young should be dismissed because Defendant Young is immune from such claims. See Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 117-18 (4th Cir. 2018) (providing examples of "advocative functions" of prosecutors that trigger prosecutorial immunity).
Finally, Plaintiff raises a claim for damages against Defendant Hunt, the Aiken County Sheriff. But, in South Carolina, sheriffs are agents of the state rather than employees of the counties. See Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F. Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C. 1988) (concluding that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are agents of the state and cannot be sued in their official capacities), aff'd, 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989) (table). And, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by citizens against non-consenting states brought either in state or federal court. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Such immunity extends to arms of the state, including a state's agencies, instrumentalities and employees. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). While sovereign immunity does not bar suit where a state has given consent to be sued, or where Congress abrogates the sovereign immunity of a state, neither of those exceptions applies in the instant case. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Hunt are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 343 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).
2. Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Harvey and Bush should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As to Harvey, the investigator in Plaintiff's criminal case, Plaintiff alleges he drafted a warrant that was based on fabricated evidence. In light of its duty to liberally construe pro se pleadings, the court construes this allegation as claiming Harvey caused Plaintiff to be arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. To succeed on such a claim, Plaintiff must show that "the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in [the] plaintiff's favor." Humbert v. Mayor and City Council of Balt. City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012)). However, Plaintiff provides no facts other than this bare assertion that the warrant is based on fabricated evidence. Plaintiff provides no facts that would plausibly show that the evidence used in the warrant drafted by Harvey was false. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that would plausibly show Harvey violated Plaintiff's rights under the Fourth Amendment. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The court also notes that such a claim may be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (holding a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 where success of the action would implicitly question the validity of the conviction or duration of the sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been previously invalidated). However, the court also notes that because Plaintiff appears to have a pending state criminal matter that may involve the same issue, abstention considerations would likely require the court to stay this matter pending the outcome of the state criminal matter if Plaintiff stated viable claim in his pleading. See generally Suggs v. Brannon, 804 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1986); Stewart v. Beaufort Cty., 481 F. Supp. 2d 483 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2007) (finding Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny require courts to stay, rather than abstain and dismiss, suits for monetary relief where the same issues are pending before a state court). Because Plaintiff's claim is subject to summary dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim, the court need not stay this matter pending the outcome of Plaintiff's state criminal proceeding.
As to Defendant Bush, Plaintiff's public defender, Plaintiff claims Bush has been constitutionally deficient in his representation. However, public defenders are generally not considered state actors that are amenable to suit under § 1983. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981); see also Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no state action under § 1983 even where the plaintiff's attorney was a court-appointed public defender); Campbell v. North Carolina, No.1:12-CV-719, 2013 WL 2153110, at *2 n.1 (M.D.N.C. May 16, 2013) (collecting cases finding that federal public defenders are not amenable to suit pursuant to Bivens). And Plaintiff's allegations, which lack specificity, fail to show his claim against Bush would fall under an exception to the general rule that public defenders are not state actors amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. See e.g. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981) (administrative and investigative functions); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (conspiracy with state actors). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that would plausibly show Bush is amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Complaint in the above-captioned case be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. August 20, 2018
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).