In support, the District cites only two decisions, one of which did not rule on the issue at all, but instead assumed without deciding that homeless shelters do qualify as dwellings under the Act, while expressing some doubt about that point. See Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C.1991). The other decision found that a particular homeless shelter did not qualify as a “dwelling” based on ten context-specific factors regarding the terms of residence at that shelter—information that was presented at summary judgment.
The District and COH argue that this Court should instead rely on two cases that concluded that temporary homeless shelters were not “dwellings.” The first case, Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1991), is not persuasive, since it merely expressed “doubt” that an emergency overnight shelter would qualify as a dwelling, and then assumed without deciding that it did so for purposes of its analysis. Id. at 4
The District and COH argue that this Court should instead rely on two cases that concluded that temporary homeless shelters were not "dwellings." The first case, Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991), is not persuasive, since it merely expressed "doubt" that an emergency overnight shelter would qualify as a dwelling, and then assumed without deciding that it did so for purposes of its analysis. Id. at 4.
" Id. In Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991), the District Court for the District of Columbia found it doubtful that an emergency overnight shelter would be subject to the FHA: The Act, in terms, protects only "buyers" and "renters" from unlawful discrimination.
In Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991), the District Court for the District of Columbia found it doubtful that an emergency overnight shelter would be subject to the FHA: The Act, in terms, protects only "buyers" and "renters" from unlawful discrimination.
Other courts had considered the issue, but there was no consensus on the FHA's applicability to such shelters. Compare Woods v. Foster, 884 F.Supp. 1169, 1173-74 (N.D.Ill. 1995) (shelter was a dwelling because the homeless have no other place to which to return), with Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991) (shelter was likely not a dwelling but a "place of overnight repose and safety"). As far as Chatterton and Birdsall knew, the BRM was most likely to use the facility only as a short-term, emergency homeless shelter.
(noting that it did not need to decide the statutory interpretation question under the FHA because the FHA's religious exemption allows religious organizations to limit access to their charitable services to people who practice the same religion). In the district court opinion, the Intermountain court relied on two out-of-circuit cases that held that the homeless shelters at issue in those cases were not “dwellings” under the FHA because “the individuals who stayed at the shelter had no other place to ‘return to' or reside, Woods v. Foster, 884 F.Supp. 1169, 1173-74 (N.D.Ill.1995), or because the FHA “protects only ‘buyers' and ‘renters' from unlawful discrimination” and the plaintiffs were neither, Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C.1991). See Intermountain, 717 F.Supp.2d at 1110-11.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991) (doubting whether an “‘emergency overnight shelter,' . . . i.e., a place of overnight repose and safety for persons whose only alternative is to sleep in alleys or doorways, can be characterized as a ‘dwelling' within the meaning of the Act, even if it may seem like home to them”). Here, defendant Naomi's House and the homeless shelter at issue in Intermountain share many similarities.
That the legitimate conditions of a DMH service may cause that service to be more readily available to individuals with one type of disability than to those with another does not change this conclusion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 4-7 (D.D.C. 1991) (judicial determination of degree to which a governmental body must provide for homeless and mentally ill would constitute "massive judicial intrusion" on legitimately derived governmental authority). There is no requirement that the DMH give absolute priority to its most difficult clients.