Johnson v. Dixon

9 Citing cases

  1. Boykin v. Gray

    895 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D.D.C. 2012)   Cited 29 times
    Rejecting District's reliance on Johnson and Intermountain, and holding that the FHA was not categorically inapplicable to homeless shelters

    In support, the District cites only two decisions, one of which did not rule on the issue at all, but instead assumed without deciding that homeless shelters do qualify as dwellings under the Act, while expressing some doubt about that point. See Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C.1991). The other decision found that a particular homeless shelter did not qualify as a “dwelling” based on ten context-specific factors regarding the terms of residence at that shelter—information that was presented at summary judgment.

  2. Hunter v. Dist. of Columbia, Corp.

    64 F. Supp. 3d 158 (D.D.C. 2014)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that homeless shelter was a public accommodation under D.C. Code

    The District and COH argue that this Court should instead rely on two cases that concluded that temporary homeless shelters were not “dwellings.” The first case, Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1991), is not persuasive, since it merely expressed “doubt” that an emergency overnight shelter would qualify as a dwelling, and then assumed without deciding that it did so for purposes of its analysis. Id. at 4

  3. Hunter v. Dist. of Columbia

    Civil Action No. 12-1960 (GK) (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2014)

    The District and COH argue that this Court should instead rely on two cases that concluded that temporary homeless shelters were not "dwellings." The first case, Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991), is not persuasive, since it merely expressed "doubt" that an emergency overnight shelter would qualify as a dwelling, and then assumed without deciding that it did so for purposes of its analysis. Id. at 4.

  4. Intermountain Fair Housing Council v. Boise Rescue Mission Ministries

    717 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Idaho 2010)   Cited 8 times
    Relying in part on fact that residents of shelter in question “generally are allowed to stay for a maximum of seventeen consecutive nights”

    " Id. In Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991), the District Court for the District of Columbia found it doubtful that an emergency overnight shelter would be subject to the FHA: The Act, in terms, protects only "buyers" and "renters" from unlawful discrimination.

  5. Intermountain Fair Housing Council v. Boise Rescue Mission Ministries

    655 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Idaho 2009)   Cited 1 times

    In Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991), the District Court for the District of Columbia found it doubtful that an emergency overnight shelter would be subject to the FHA: The Act, in terms, protects only "buyers" and "renters" from unlawful discrimination.

  6. Community House v. City of Boise, Idaho

    623 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2010)   Cited 253 times
    Holding that qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a defense to liability

    Other courts had considered the issue, but there was no consensus on the FHA's applicability to such shelters. Compare Woods v. Foster, 884 F.Supp. 1169, 1173-74 (N.D.Ill. 1995) (shelter was a dwelling because the homeless have no other place to which to return), with Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991) (shelter was likely not a dwelling but a "place of overnight repose and safety"). As far as Chatterton and Birdsall knew, the BRM was most likely to use the facility only as a short-term, emergency homeless shelter.

  7. West v. City of San Francisco

    21-cv-02370-EMC (N.D. Cal. May. 17, 2022)   Cited 6 times

    (noting that it did not need to decide the statutory interpretation question under the FHA because the FHA's religious exemption allows religious organizations to limit access to their charitable services to people who practice the same religion). In the district court opinion, the Intermountain court relied on two out-of-circuit cases that held that the homeless shelters at issue in those cases were not “dwellings” under the FHA because “the individuals who stayed at the shelter had no other place to ‘return to' or reside, Woods v. Foster, 884 F.Supp. 1169, 1173-74 (N.D.Ill.1995), or because the FHA “protects only ‘buyers' and ‘renters' from unlawful discrimination” and the plaintiffs were neither, Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C.1991). See Intermountain, 717 F.Supp.2d at 1110-11.

  8. McGee v. House

    1:18-cv-00768-NE-SAB (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991) (doubting whether an “‘emergency overnight shelter,' . . . i.e., a place of overnight repose and safety for persons whose only alternative is to sleep in alleys or doorways, can be characterized as a ‘dwelling' within the meaning of the Act, even if it may seem like home to them”). Here, defendant Naomi's House and the homeless shelter at issue in Intermountain share many similarities.

  9. Williams v. Secr. of Executive Office of Human Serv

    414 Mass. 551 (Mass. 1993)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that the state department of mental health's policy denying some mentally ill persons integrated housing opportunities does not violate ADA

    That the legitimate conditions of a DMH service may cause that service to be more readily available to individuals with one type of disability than to those with another does not change this conclusion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 4-7 (D.D.C. 1991) (judicial determination of degree to which a governmental body must provide for homeless and mentally ill would constitute "massive judicial intrusion" on legitimately derived governmental authority). There is no requirement that the DMH give absolute priority to its most difficult clients.