Summary
In Johnson v Broder, 112 A.D.3d 788 (2d. Dept. 2013), the Court noted "A cause of action seeking reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213(6), which begins to run on the date the mistake was made."
Summary of this case from Champion Mortg. Co. v. AntoineOpinion
2013-12-18
Steve JOHNSON, appellant, v. Paul G. BRODER, respondent, et al., defendant.
Reilly & Reilly, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (John J. Reilly and David T. Reilly of counsel), for appellant. Twomey, Latham, Shea, Kelley, Dubin & Quartararo, LLP, Riverhead, N.Y. (Kathryn Dalli and Barbara Hall of counsel), for respondent.
Reilly & Reilly, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (John J. Reilly and David T. Reilly of counsel), for appellant. Twomey, Latham, Shea, Kelley, Dubin & Quartararo, LLP, Riverhead, N.Y. (Kathryn Dalli and Barbara Hall of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, SHERI S. ROMAN, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
In an action to reform a deed, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Farneti, J.), dated July 12, 2012, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Paul G. Broder which was for summary judgment dismissing, as time-barred, so much of the complaint insofar as asserted against him as was predicated upon an alleged mutual mistake.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
“A cause of action seeking reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213(6), which begins to run on the date the mistake was made” (Taintor v. Taintor, 50 A.D.3d 887, 888, 855 N.Y.S.2d 642). In this case, the defendant Paul G. Broder established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing, as time-barred, so much of the complaint insofar as asserted against him as was predicated upon an alleged mutual mistake by submitting evidence that the alleged mistake occurred in 1979 and the plaintiff did not commence this action until 2011 ( see id. at 889, 855 N.Y.S.2d 642). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( cf. Hart v. Blabey, 287 N.Y. 257, 262–263, 39 N.E.2d 230).
The plaintiff, in his notice of appeal, limited the scope of his appeal to so much of the order as granted that branch of Broder's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing, as time-barred, so much of the complaint insofar as asserted against him as was predicated upon an alleged mutual mistake. Thus, the plaintiff's contention on appeal that the Supreme Court improperly denied his cross motion is not properly before this Court ( seeCPLR 5515 [1]; Hatem v. Hatem, 83 A.D.3d 663, 919 N.Y.S.2d 901).