Johnson v. Angels

6 Citing cases

  1. Myers v. Doherty

    21 Civ. 219 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2021)

    In Johnson v. Angels, the court denied a motion to dismiss where the complaint alleged racially segregated bathroom facilities, a racially offensive portrait in the plaintiffs office, and the repeated use of racially offensive language and slurs in the plaintiffs workplace. 125 F.Supp.3d 562, 567-68 (M.D. N.C. 2015). There is no remotely similar factual analog here.

  2. Life Ins. Co. v. Hills

    1:19CV128 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 20, 2020)

    Mrs. Hills' Motion is considered despite her failure to comply with Local Rule 7.3(a), which requires a motion to be filed separately from its supporting brief. See L.R. Civ. P. 7.3(a); see also Johnson v. Angels, 125 F. Supp. 3d 562, 564 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (determining that although defendant failed to set out its motion as a separate pleading, the court had discretion when deciding whether to consider the motion). I.

  3. James v. Univ. of N.C. Health Care Hosp.

    1:18CV339 (M.D.N.C. Sep. 20, 2018)   Cited 6 times
    Dismissing an action when the plaintiff named "University of North Carolina Health Care Hospital" instead of "University of North Carolina Health Care System" as a defendant

    For example, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant's alleged physical assaults were coupled with racially offensive language. See e.g., Johnson v. Angels, 125 F. Supp. 3d 562, 569 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (internal citations omitted) ("[C]ases involving such racial epithets as precisely the type of case where harassment, even if "isolated," "can properly be deemed to be 'extremely serious' " and capable of altering the terms and conditions of employment."). Plaintiff asks the Court to accept the unequal treatment of hypothetical patients in one classroom presentation (see Compl. ¶ 5), in addition to the simple fact that Plaintiff is African-American and the alleged abusers are all Caucasian, (Docket Entry 12 at 8-9), as allegations sufficient to find it plausible that the conduct alleged was based on race.

  4. CIP Constr. Co. v. W. Sur. Co.

    1:18cv58 (M.D.N.C. Jul. 20, 2018)   Cited 5 times

    Even though the manner in which Western made its alternative request did not comport with Local Rule 7.3(a), the court will nevertheless consider the merits of this motion because Western clarified its requested alternative relief in its reply brief and CIPC has been afforded an opportunity to respond. See Johnson v. Angels, 125 F. Supp. 3d 562, 564 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (considering the merits of motions despite defendant's failure to follow Local Rule 7.3(a), where defendants clarified their requested relief in a supporting brief and plaintiff had an opportunity to respond). Moreover, even in the absence of any motion, consideration of a stay always falls within the court's inherent power to act sua sponte.

  5. Walton v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.

    No. 5:17-CV-00085-BR (E.D.N.C. Sep. 13, 2017)   Cited 1 times
    Dismissing claim of hostile work environment based on age where the alleged offensive conduct was sexual in nature, and there were no allegations from which the court could infer that the offensive conduct was motivated by the plaintiff's age

    Although plaintiff claims that Englander made unwelcome comments, and that Wilson supported these comments, she does not allege that the subject matter of these comments related in any way to her termination or that either Englander or Wilson were involved in her termination. See Green v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 832 F. Supp. 1032, 1039 (E.D. Va. 1993) (concluding that gender-based comments made by plaintiff's manager to another employee were "not indicative of any intention by [the manager] to make any decision in any manner unfavorable to women generally or to [plaintiff] in particular"), aff'd 23 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Johnson v. Angels, 125 F. Supp. 3d 562, 567 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff's discriminatory discharge claim because she failed to allege any facts to suggest a nexus between her discharge and racially discriminatory remarks made by company's executive director). The court therefore finds that plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that her termination was motivated by her age or sex.

  6. Calloway v. Durham Cnty. Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ.

    1:15CV187 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    While Plaintiff cites Prince-Garrison v. Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 317 F. App'x 351 (4th Cir. 2009), for the proposition that a prima facie standard is not required, (Pl.'s Mem. (Doc. 19) at 7), the case states in full that, while a "civil rights plaintiff need not plead facts that constitute a prima facie case under the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, in order to survive a motion to dismiss[,] . . . the plaintiff retains the burden to allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of her claim." 317 F. App'x at 353 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Angels, No. 1:14-cv-1087, 2015 WL 5009276, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 21, 2015) (citing McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585). Thus, a complaint must "state[] a plausible claim for relief" that "permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct" based upon "its judicial experience and common sense."