extension of the State's immunity as discussed in Joan [sic] and Larson.Espinal, op. at 3 (citing John v. Hoag, 500 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus Cnty. 1986), and Larson, 337 U.S. at 689) (internal citations omitted). We believe that Espinal supports our conclusion that sovereign immunity does not bar City Human Rights Law suits against state employees.

83 Misc. at 328, 144 N.Y.S. at 886. Cf. John v. Hoag, 131 Misc.2d 458, 466-68, 500 N.Y.S.2d 950, 956-57 (1986) (stating rule set out in Jimerson but distinguishing it on the grounds that no formal complaint had been filed in the Peacemakers Court since there was no action pending in that court). In sum, the Court finds that, in the instant situation, the State Court was required to follow the rule of abstention in favor of tribal court jurisdiction set out in LaPlante and National Farmers Union and should have abstained in favor of the Peacemakers Court proceeding.

er civil actions and proceedings, as now or hereafter defined by the laws of such State" ( 25 USC § 233; see Snyder v Abrams, 214 AD2d 991, 991; Matter of Anichinapeo v Bennett Sons, 65 AD2d 105, 106-107, lv denied 46 NY2d 709, cert denied 444 US 830; see also Indian Law § 5). While the federal statute shall not be construed "to prevent such courts from recognizing and giving effect to any tribal law or custom which may be proven to the satisfaction of such courts" ( 25 USC § 233; see Matter of District Attorney of Suffolk County v Nelson, 68 Misc 2d 614, 618; Bennett v Fink Constr. Co., 47 Misc 2d 283, 284-285), the burden of proving the existence of applicable tribal law falls on the party seeking to apply that law ( see People v Anderson, 137 AD2d 259, 269). Unless applicable tribal law is proven to the court's satisfaction, "the civil laws of New York apply to St. Regis Indians except as limited" by the federal statute itself ( State Tax Commn. v Barnes, 14 Misc 2d 311, 313; see John v Hoag, 131 Misc 2d 458, 468-469 [applying New York tort law in action between two Indians]). Defendants have not proffered any St. Regis Mohawk tribal law concerning liability for injured workers. Thus, we apply the civil laws of New York to this action.

The first counterclaim attempted to allege plaintiff's tortious interference with defendants' agreement with the contractor. The elements of this cause of action are (1) existence of a valid contract, (2) knowledge of the contract on plaintiff's part, (3) plaintiff's intentional interference with the contract, (4) lack of reasonable justification, and (5) damages (Alvord Swift v Muller Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276, 281-282; John v. Hoag, 131 Misc.2d 458, 468-469). The interference required must be intentional, not merely negligent (Alvord Swift v. Muller Constr. Co., supra, at 281-282).