We conclude individually and collectively, these acts do not satisfy the statutory requirements to support a finding of harassment, as there is no evidence to suggest defendant acted with the conscious objective to harass plaintiff. See J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J. Super. 525, 527-28 (App. Div. 1997) (holding vulgarity and anger inappropriately expressed by kicking a garbage can in the presence of the parties' young children was not harassment); see also State v. Duncan, 376 N.J. Super. 253, 262-64 (App. Div. 2005) (noting purposeful is the most difficult of all mental states to prove).

Div. 1994), and in these circumstances — late arrival — there is nothing to suggest that defendant acted with that purpose. J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J. Super. 525, 527-28 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that vulgarity and anger inappropriately expressed by kicking a garbage can in the presence of the parties' young children was not harassment). By plaintiff's account, defendant placed the second phone call to apologize for the first.

Here, the court recognized that many of the incidents between the parties arose from parenting disagreements and amounted to "domestic contretemps" rather than "matters of consequence." J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J.Super. 525, 527 (App. Div. 1997) (citing N.B. v. T.B., 297 N.J.Super. 35, 40-41 (App. Div. 1997)) (quoting Corrente, 281 N.J.Super. at 250) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the judge aptly noted, these parties "have problems with respect to insurance, a serious need for treatment and evaluations of the children, and a custody parenting problem, and it's horrif[ying] that there's no clear solution at this juncture."

We also reject defendant's argument his conduct was part of mere "ordinary domestic contretemps," Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 250 (App. Div. 1995), and were "trivial and petty communications between separated" parties, J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J. Super. 525, 532 (App. Div. 1997). Of course, ordinary disputes between parties do not constitute domestic violence and therefore do not warrant issuance of an FRO. J.D., 207 N.J. at 475-76.

However, we review legal conclusions de novo. J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J. Super. 525, 530 (App. Div. 1997). In the absence of sufficient factual findings, we cannot defer to a trial court's legal conclusions about whether domestic violence has occurred.

Such severe and persistent conduct was neither "trivial and petty communications" nor an isolated outburst of transitory anger. J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J. Super. 525, 532 (App. Div. 1997). We will not disturb the judge's findings that defendant's behavior "constitute[d] harassment within the meaning of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:33-4, [because] she made communications for the purpose of harassing [plaintiff] with the intent to cause alarm."

Defendant's threat to kill plaintiff was not a "trivial and petty communication[]." See J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J. Super. 525, 532 (App. Div. 1997). This was also not a "single outburst" that was "the product of transitory anger" and therefore insufficient to establish an intent to harass.

Following a bench trial, we "normally defer to the trial judge with respect to findings of fact based upon the credibility of witnesses." J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J. Super. 525, 530 (App. Div. 1997). The Court, however, owes no such deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, which are reviewed de novo.

Defendant's conduct is a far cry from the generic "domestic contretemps" that we have found to be the unfortunate by-product of bitter litigation. See J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J. Super. 525, 527, 532 (App. Div. l997); Peranio v. Peranio, 280 N.J. Super. 47, 56-57 (App. Div. 1995).

In discussing the evidence necessary to establish such intent, the trial court relied upon cases in which a single outburst was deemed to be the product of transitory anger and insufficient to establish the requisite intent. See State v. L.C., 283 N.J.Super. 441, 662 A.2d 577 (App.Div. 1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 325, 670 A.2d 1066 (1996); Peranio v. Peranio, 280 N.J.Super. 47, 654 A.2d 495 (App.Div. 1995); see also J.N.S. v. D.B.S., 302 N.J.Super. 525, 695 A.2d 730 (App.Div. 1997). However, we note that each of these cases was decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman, which clarified that "the `serious annoyance' required by subsection (c) [should not] be engrafted into the `annoyance' required under subsection (a)."