Since 1988, Florida law has required detention determinations to be based upon a validly prepared and scored RAI, replacing a scheme which had previously reposed broad discretion in juvenile court judges to make such determinations. See § 39.082(2), Fla. Stat. (1987); J.J. v. Fryer, 765 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("The current statutory framework supplants discretion with specific rules governing the judge and disposition . . . [with the] purpose to make the matter of juvenile detention in delinquency cases less subject to individualized variations by judges."). According to criteria set by the instrument, a child who has a score of twelve or more points qualifies for secure detention, a child who has a score of seven to eleven points qualifies for home detention, and a child who scores below seven points does not qualify for any form, of detention.

The power to place in detention those charged with or found to have committed a delinquent act is entirely statutory. See J.J. v. Fryer, 765 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); S.W. v. Woolsey, 673 So.2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Section 985.213(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), provides, with certain exceptions not applicable in this case, that:

As this court has recognized, the detention of juveniles in Florida is governed entirely by statute. M.P. v. Gardner, 838 So.2d 711, 712 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); J.J. v. Fryer, 765 So.2d 260, 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). The relevant statutes do not define the term "absconder."

See § 985.26(4), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). See also J.J. v. Fryer, 765 So.2d 260, 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("The power to place those charged with . . . a delinquent act in detention is entirely statutory in nature.") (quoting S.W. v. Woolsey, 673 So.2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)). In this case, thirty days is the applicable time period because it involves an offense that would be, if committed by an adult, "a capital felony, a life felony, a felony of the first degree, or a felony of the second degree involving violence against any individual."

A child may not be held in any kind of detention care unless the same is authorized by statute. See J.J. v. Fryer, 765 So.2d 260, 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We conclude that the trial court's oral findings were supported by competent substantial evidence.

"[P]retrial detention of juveniles is now governed entirely by statute." J.J. v. Fryer, 765 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see also S.W. v. Woolsey, 673 So.2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ("The power to place those charged with . . . a delinquent act in detention is entirely statutory in nature."). Section 985.215, Florida Statutes (2007), deals comprehensively with the subject of how a juvenile who has been arrested or charged with an offense is to be handled, including the various levels of juvenile pre-trial detention and conditions of pre-trial release, and provides only for the use of secure, non-secure, and home detention prior to trial.

As the power to place a juvenile in secure detention is entirely statutory in basis, and as our review of the reasons given for departure is de novo, we conclude that the reasons given by the trial court are not founded in the statute, and fall far short of being clear and convincing. See J.J. v. Fryer, 765 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); S.W. v. Woolsey, 673 So.2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Accordingly, we have issued the writ of habeas corpus.

If the court orders a placement more restrictive than indicated by the results of the risk assessment instrument, the court shall state, in writing, clear and convincing reasons for such placement. In response to the petition, the state correctly concedes that petitioner's argument is well-taken. J.J. v. Fryer, 765 So.2d 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); C.L.C. v. State, 863 So.2d 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); M.P. v. Gardner, 838 So.2d 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); D.B. v. State, 848 So.2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). We therefore conclude that the petition must be granted.

The trial court, however, provided clear and convincing written reasons for ordering secure detention pursuant to the "departure provision" of the juvenile detention statute. See § 985.215(2), Fla. Stat. (2003); J.J. v. Fryer, 765 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (concluding that departure provision provides "the authority to depart from an RAI and order more severe detention . . . based on `clear and convincing reasons' which the judge must state in writing") (emphasis omitted). This case is distinguished from J.W. v. Leitner, 801 So.2d 295, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), where the trial court did not attempt to avail itself of the "departure provision."