Opinion
A165916 A166082
04-25-2024
Adoption of D.D., A Minor. v. C.D., Defendant and Appellant. J.J. et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, C.D. et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. C.D., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. Nos. FAD008387, FAD008268)
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or should know, "the facts of the case and its procedural history." (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.).
HITE, J. [*]
C.D., who is the biological mother of D.D., appeals from an order terminating her parental rights pursuant to Probate Code section 1516.5 and Family Code section 7822. Because there was no error under the latter statute, we affirm.
In her opening brief, C.D. argued the trial court erred in terminating parental rights under Probate Code section 1516.5, challenging two aspects of the guardianship underlying the trial court's finding that the "child ha[d] been in the physical custody of the guardian for a period of not less than two years." (Prob. Code, § 1516.5, subd. (a)(2).) One of the problems C.D. ascribed to the underlying guardianship was that failing to notify her of the guardianship proceedings resulted in a guardianship order that was procured by extrinsic fraud. Respondents J.J. and H.F. - D.D.'s guardians - filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as non-justiciable, observing that the termination of C.D.'s parental rights also rested on the trial court's findings under Family Code section 7822, and that those findings were not disputed in C.D.'s opening brief.
We ordered C.D. to file a supplemental opening brief challenging the validity of the trial court's order insofar as it rested on section 7822, while also allowing for the filing of a second motion to dismiss in the wake of that supplemental briefing. In C.D.'s supplemental opening brief, she argued that the problems with the underlying guardianship case rendered respondents' legal guardianship void, and that respondents therefore lacked standing to bring any action under section 7822.
Respondents then filed a second motion to dismiss, contending that C.D.'s challenge to the legal guardianship was untimely and that the appeal was still non-justiciable. In her opposition, C.D. noted that an order procured by extrinsic fraud may be subject to collateral attack where a direct attack would be untimely, and that she had already argued that the legal guardianship was procured by extrinsic fraud. (See Moghaddam v. Bone (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 283, 289, fn. 5.) Thus, addressing the contentions of the motion to dismiss would require us to reach the merits of two of this appeal's principal questions: whether there was extrinsic fraud, and if so, what consequences would follow. Accordingly, we denied the motion. (See Jenks v. Lurie (1925) 195 Cal. 582, 583-584.) In turn, respondents filed a brief addressing those principal questions and appellant elected not to file any reply.
We conclude that if there was any extrinsic fraud in the guardianship proceedings, it did not deprive respondents of the requisite standing to initiate an action under section 7822. As respondents observe, any "interested person" has standing to file a section 7822 petition. (§ 7841, subd. (a).) "An 'interested person' is one who has a direct interest in the action, and includes, but is not limited to, a person who has filed, or who intends to file within a period of 6 months, an adoption petition under" section 8802. (§ 7841, subd. (b).) Here, as C.D. acknowledges, respondents filed their section 7822 petition concurrently with an adoption petition under section 8802. Even if we were to determine retrospectively that respondents legally lacked standing to file the adoption petition, that would not change the historical fact that they did file the petition. Further, assuming for the sake of argument that respondents' alleged lack of standing means that they do not fit squarely within the category of "person[s] who ha[ve] filed" an adoption petition, the statute expressly provides that "interested person[s]" are "not limited to" the listed categories. (§ 7841, subd. (b).) And as people who at least putatively filed an adoption petition, respondents are interested persons, however the statute's illustrative example of "person[s] who ha[ve] filed . . . an adoption petition" might otherwise be construed. (Ibid.)
Moreover, the standing requirements at issue here are to "be liberally construed to serve and protect the interests and welfare of the child." (§ 7801.) The purpose of section 7822 is to provide for the termination of the parental rights where a parent has abandoned their child. Adopting a narrower construction of the standing requirements to file a section 7822 petition would increase the difficulty of terminating parental rights in those situations, subjecting more children to parents who have already abandoned them. Such a construction would not "serve and protect the interests and welfare of the child." (§ 7801.)
In sum, the trial court's order terminating parental rights rested on two independent grounds: that the child would benefit from adoption by his guardian under Probate Code section 1516.5, and that the child had been abandoned under section 7822. Having rejected C.D.'s only argument relevant to the section 7822 finding, we conclude that her rights would remain terminated under section 7822 even if her arguments concerning the Probate Code section 1516.5 finding were meritorious. For that reason, we deem those arguments moot.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order terminating C.D.'s parental rights.
We concur: STREETER, Acting P. J., GOLDMAN, J.
[*] Judge of the Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.