No. 05-08-00056-CR
Opinion Filed April 2, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F06-34704-RL.
Before Justices RICHTER, LANG, and MURPHY.
Opinion By Justice MURPHY.
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress all evidence seized during the search of his automobile, Manuel Conejo Jiron pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver of four or more grams but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine. In a single issue, appellant claims the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress because the warrantless stop of appellant's vehicle violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
The testimony at the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress related solely to the stop of appellant's vehicle. There was no testimony regarding where or how the methamphetamine was discovered.
Background
Richard Gambino, a police officer with the Grand Prairie Police Department, was the only witness at the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress. Gambino testified that on May 20, 2006, he was driving to the police station in a marked squad car. At approximately 10:30 p.m., he was on north Carrier at the intersection with Dalworth Street. The light at the intersection was yellow, turning red, and Gambino slowed down at the intersection. Appellant was driving a maroon truck east on Dalworth Street. When the light turned green, appellant "slammed" onto the accelerator and "spun" his tires through the intersection. The truck was "moving from side to side" through the intersection. There were eight to ten other vehicles at the intersection and, in Gambino's opinion, appellant was driving recklessly. The truck continued to accelerate rapidly through the intersection and exceeded the speed limit "to a point." Gambino watched appellant drive 500 to 600 yards to see if appellant would slow down after seeing Gambino. When appellant continued to accelerate rapidly, Gambino turned on his emergency lights, proceeded through the red light, and pursued appellant. After clearing the intersection, Gambino turned off the emergency lights. Gambino had to accelerate to sixty miles-per-hour to catch the truck. In that area, Dalworth Street is a two lane street zoned for thirty-five miles-per-hour. Without signaling, appellant slammed on his brakes and made a quick left turn onto Northwest 7th Street. In Gambino's opinion, it seemed appellant saw the police car and was trying to make a quick turn to get away. Appellant continued to accelerate following the turn. After appellant slowed at the stop sign at 7th Street and Hill Street, Gambino was able to catch up to appellant. Appellant did not stop completely at the stop sign. Gambino turned on his emergency lights as he approached the stop sign. Although appellant should have seen the lights, he accelerated again. Gambino then turned on his siren. Appellant stopped after driving approximately one quarter of a mile. In Gambino's opinion, appellant could have damaged vehicles or other property or injured persons in the vicinity. Gambino testified appellant was operating his vehicle with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). We do not engage in our own factual review; rather, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009). We give almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts, particularly when the trial court's findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) ( Amador I); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). We afford the same deference to mixed questions of law and fact if resolving those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador I, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not depend on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 241. When, as here, the trial court does not enter findings of fact, we infer the necessary factual findings that support the trial court's ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling, support the implied fact findings. Id. We will affirm the trial court's decision if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 403 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that the people shall be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A stop by a police officer "amounts to a sufficient intrusion on an individual's privacy to implicate the Fourth Amendment's protections." Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Appellant has not argued that Article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution affords him protection that is distinct from that of the Fourth Amendment, so we analyze the claim solely under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Manns v. State, 122 S.W.3d 171, 194 n. 97 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). When a police officer stops a defendant without a warrant, the State has the burden at a suppression hearing of proving the reasonableness of the stop. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). An officer is justified in detaining a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is violating the law. Id.; Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). "Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). The reasonable suspicion determination disregards the subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether there was an objective basis for the stop. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. Further, the reasonable suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 492-93; Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38 (recognizing "there may be instances when a person's conduct viewed in a vacuum, appears purely innocent, yet when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, those actions give rise to reasonable suspicion"). A police officer has the authority to stop and temporarily detain a driver who has violated a traffic law. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Aviles v. State, 23 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). A person commits the traffic offense of reckless driving by "driv[ing] a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.401(a) (Vernon 1999). "Willful and wanton disregard" means the "deliberate and conscious indifference to the safety of others." Brown v. State, 183 S.W.3d 728, 733 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd). Analysis
Gambino testified appellant started his vehicle by slamming on the accelerator and spinning his tires. The truck moved from side to side as it traveled through the intersection. There were a number of vehicles in the intersection. Appellant continued to accelerate to some point above the speed limit, failed to signal a quick left turn, and failed to stop at a stop sign. Appellant's driving could have damaged other vehicles or property or injured a person in the area. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Gambino's specific, articulable facts, in light of his experience and personal knowledge, together with inferences from those facts, were sufficient to support the trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion that appellant committed a traffic violation and that Gambino had authority to stop and temporarily detain appellant. The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress. We resolve appellant's sole issue against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.