Opinion
FA156058052
09-05-2017
Ocasina Jiminez v. Martin De La Cruz
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Kenneth L. Shluger, J.
Memorandum of Decision Re Motion to Open and Set Aside Judgment #134.10 and 134.20
The question presented is whether the 2017 Connecticut divorce judgment of the parties is invalidated by a 2013 divorce proceeding in the Dominican Republic?
A review of the record reveals that the parties were married on January 2, 1987 in the Dominican Republic. There are 3 children, issue of the marriage born 1989, 1996, and 1997.
The parties were divorced on January 13, 2017 pursuant to an agreement in the New Haven judicial district providing for the care and custody of the children, alimony, and property distribution. Now comes the defendant, seeking to open and set aside said judgment claiming that the parties were previously divorced in the Dominican Republic on April 22, 2013 and, therefore, this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to have entered a judgment of dissolution thereafter. A hearing was held before the undersigned on July 11, 2017.
The court has fully considered the applicable statutes as well as the evidence, applicable case law, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and arguments of counsel in reaching the decisions reflected in the orders that issue in this decision.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The court finds that the following facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. The parties were married on January 2, 1987 in the Dominican Republic.
2. There are 3 children, issue of the marriage born 1989, 1996 and 1997.
3. Beginning in 2011, the parties were having financial difficulties, particularly as it pertained to their home mortgage.
4. In 2011, the parties entered into a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy reorganization in an effort to reduce the home mortgage debt.
5. Thereafter, the parties were still having financial problems with their home mortgage and the wife proposed that they get divorced just so she could refinance the mortgage at a lower rate, with her qualifying as a single mother. The husband quit claimed his interest in the marital residence to the wife on October 15, 2012.
6. The parties participated in a divorce through paperwork filed in the Dominican Republic on March 23, 2013. The decree itself was rendered on April 22, 2013.
7. Soon thereafter, the wife was able to qualify for a mortgage modification.
8. The Dominican Republic divorce judgment (exhibit B) recites that both parties are " respectively domiciled and residents in the United States of North America and accidentally in this city of Bonao [Dominican Republic]."
9. The Dominican Republic divorce judgment purports to enter a dissolution and establish custody of the children but makes no disposition of assets or debts, life insurance, health insurance, nor does it reference alimony or child support.
10. The parties continued to live together as husband and wife, raising their children as a family, paying their bills as a family and engaging in all aspects of their marital relationship without change until 2015. In 2014, the husband gave to the wife $10,000 so she could start a business with her sister.
11. Both parties have resided continuously and been domiciled in Connecticut from at least 2012 to the present time. At no time in 2013 was either party ever present in the Dominican Republic.
12. On October 22, 2015, the wife instituted dissolution proceedings in the judicial district of New Haven and the husband vacated the marital residence.
13. The husband filed an appearance, a cross complaint and numerous pleadings in the protracted litigation, which lasted for 15 months.
14. At no time during the litigation or during the hearing at which time the dissolution agreement was entered did either party make any reference to a previous divorce in the Dominican Republic.
15. The parties were divorced on January 13, 2017 pursuant to an agreement in the New Haven judicial district.
16. From January 13, 2017 until recently, the husband abided by the terms and conditions of the New Haven judgment. It was not until the wife filed a motion for contempt on March 31, 2017 did the husband raise the question of the validity of their divorce.
The central question presented is whether the Dominican Republic divorce proceeding in which the parties participated in 2013 is recognized and binding under Connecticut law.
RECOGNITION OF A DIVORCE OBTAINED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY
" The full faith and credit clause of the constitution of the United States does not apply to a divorce obtained in a foreign country. Courts of the United States are not required by federal law to give full force and effect to a judgment granted in a foreign nation. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 [1895]; Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 [1955]; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 [1948]; Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 [1944]; 33 Fordham L.Rev. 449; 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 802. On the other hand, judgments of courts of foreign countries are recognized in the United States because of the comity due to the courts and judgments of one nation from another. Such recognition is granted to foreign judgments with due regard to international duty and convenience, on the one hand, and to rights of citizens of the United States and others under the protection of its laws, on the other hand. This principle is frequently applied in divorce cases; a decree of divorce granted in one country by a court having jurisdiction to do so will be given full force and effect in another country by comity, not only as a decree determining status, but also with respect to an award of alimony and child support. The principle of comity, however, has several important exceptions and qualifications. A decree of divorce will not be recognized by comity where it was obtained by a procedure which denies due process of law in the real sense of the term, or was obtained by fraud, or where the divorce offends the public policy of the state in which recognition is sought, or where the foreign court lacked jurisdiction. 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 964." Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540, 544-45, 295 A.2d 519 (1972).
DOMICILE
In terms of whether the court of the Dominican Republic had jurisdiction, " [a] divorce judgment is a judgment in rem. Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666, 670, 174 A.2d 122 [1961]. If a divorce judgment is pronounced by a tribunal which does not have jurisdiction to do so, it may be attacked collaterally on that ground in this country; comity will not demand its recognition. Thus, ordinarily, our courts will not recognize a divorce obtained in a foreign country if neither spouse had a [domicile] in that country. The rule that a [domicile] of at least one of the spouses is essential to give the court jurisdiction to grant a divorce applies to decrees of foreign nations as well as to decrees entered within the United States, even though a [domicile] is not required by the laws of the jurisdiction which grants the divorce. 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, s 965; see Rice v. Rice, 134 Conn. 440, 445, 58 A.2d 523 [1948], aff'd, 336 U.S. 674, 69 S.Ct. 751, 93 L.Ed. 957 [1949]; State v. Cooke, 110 Conn. 348, 351, 148 A. 385 [1930]; Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 692, 92 A. 684 [1914]. The traditional requisite for subject-matter jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings has been [domicile]. Rice v. Rice, supra . 'Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce . . . is founded on [domicile].' Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 1095, 89 L.Ed. 1577 [1945]. Regardless of its validity in the nation awarding it, the courts of this country will not generally recognize a judgment of divorce rendered by the courts of a foreign nation as valid to terminate the existence of a marriage unless, by the standards of the jurisdiction in which recognition is sought, at least one of the spouses was a good faith domiciliary in the foreign nation at the time the decree was rendered. Note, 13 A.L.R.3d 1419; see Wells v. Wells, 230 Ala. 430, 161 So. 794 [1935]; Estate of Nolan, 56 Ariz. 361, 108 P.2d 388 [1940]; Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark. 811, 94 S.W.2d 1043 [1936]; note, 192 Ark. 811, 94 S.W.2d 1043, 105 A.L.R. 817." Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, supra, 162 Conn. 545-46. See also, Juma v. Aomo, 143 Conn.App. 51, 57-58, 68 A.3d 148 (2013), wherein the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court because, inter alia, the trial court found that the divorce obtained by the defendant in Kenya was not entitled to recognition on the basis of comity because neither party was domiciled in Kenya when the divorce was filed.
It is noted, that in Spalding v. Spalding, 171 Conn. 220, 224-28, 368 A.2d 14 (1976), the court stated that Rice v. Rice, supra, 134 Conn. 441, was " a case involving the recognition of a Nevada divorce decree . . . [and that the language of Rice v. Rice, supra ] . . . equated [domicile] on the date of the decree with the proper jurisdiction for recognition under the full faith and credit clause. It must be read, however, in the light of the fact that the state referee in that case found that the complainant in the Nevada action had never acquired [domicile] in Nevada. Furthermore, in the later case of White v. White, 138 Conn. 1, 8, 81 A.2d 450 [1951], the court looked to [domicile] at the date the action in the other state began . . . Rice v. Rice, supra, is inconsistent with both Baker v. Baker, supra, [166 Conn. 476, 488, 352 A.2d 277 (1971)], and White v. White, supra, and, to the extent of the inconsistency, it is overruled. The court in the present action properly looked to [domicile] at the institution of suit . . ." (Footnotes omitted.) Spalding, supra, 228.
Domicile is defined as: " [A] person's true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to which that person intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere." Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).
As previously stated in the factual section of this memorandum of decision, the Dominican Republic divorce judgment (exhibit B) recites in pertinent part that both parties are " respectively domiciled and residents in the United States of North America and accidentally in this city of Bonao [Dominican Republic]." In addition, both parties have resided continuously in Connecticut from at least 2012 to the present time and based on the testimony of both parties, at no time in 2013 was either party ever present in the Dominican Republic when the divorce action was instituted and certainly, neither party was domiciled in the Dominican Republic when the action was instituted. In light of the fact that neither party was a good faith domiciliary of the Dominican Republic at the time the decree was instituted, this court will not recognize the validity of the divorce obtained in the Dominican Republic based on comity because the court in the Dominican Republic lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
FRAUD
In the plaintiff's reply brief in opposition to the defendant's motion to open and set aside the Connecticut divorce judgment (#141), the plaintiff argues that the judgment rendered by the court in the Dominican Republic is invalid under the law of the Dominican Republic, is inaccurate on its face, and incomplete by its terms. The plaintiff also argues that the judgment of the Dominican Republic the defendant offered as proof in support of his motion to open and set aside the Connecticut dissolution judgment " shows it to be to be either fraud or at best invalid." (Plaintiff's Reply Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Re-Open and Set Aside Judgment #141.)
Throughout this memorandum of decision, the court refers to the defendant's motion as a motion to open not a motion to reopen. " The parties, the family support magistrate and the Superior Court improperly used the designation 'motion to reopen.' We note that because the decision had not been previously opened, the appropriate term is 'motion to open, ' and we use that designation throughout this opinion. See Rodriguez v. State, 76 Conn.App. 614, 617 n.5, 820 A.2d 1097 (2003); Tutsky v. YMCA of Greenwich, 28 Conn.App. 536, 537 n.1, 612 A.2d 1222 (1992)." Ragin v. Lee, 78 Conn.App. 848, 851 n.2, 829 A.2d 93 (2003). See also Krol v. A.V. Tuchy, Inc., 135 Conn.App. 854, 859 n.8, 44 A.3d 185, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 923, 47 A.3d 882 (2012) (same).
A decree of divorce will not be recognized by comity where it was obtained by fraud. Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, supra, 162 Conn. 545.
" As our Supreme Court has explained, when a litigant seeks to enforce a foreign judgment, the burden falls to the assailant to 'prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts that demonstrate that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction.' Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 364 n.11, 2 A.3d 902 (2010); accord Donnelly v. Federal Aviation Administration, 411 F.3d 267, 270-71, 366 U.S. App.D.C. 291 (D.C.Cir. 2005) (holding that 'principles of comity suggest that [a foreign] judgment should be given weight as prima facie evidence of the facts underlying it' and that burden is on party challenging use of foreign judgment to impeach its reliability); John v. Baker, 30 P.3d 68, 72 (Alaska 2001) (party challenging validity of foreign judgment has burden of proof); Leon v. Numkena, 142 Ariz. 307, 309, 689 P.2d 566 (App. 1984) ('the burden of proof is upon the party attacking the validity of a foreign judgment'); Malik v. Malik, 99 Md.App. 521, 536, 638 A.2d 1184 (1994) ('Pakistani court's custody order is presumed to be correct, and this presumption shifts to [party challenging comity] the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that [comity is not warranted]'); In re Marriage of Red Fox, 23 Or.App. 393, 400, 542 P.2d 918 (1975) ('the burden of proof falls upon one attacking the validity of a foreign judgment'). With particular respect to allegations of fraud, it is well established that 'clear and convincing evidence of fraud is required in order successfully to attack a foreign judgment . . .' Clarkson Co., Ltd. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 631 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F.Supp.2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ('this [c]ourt holds, consistent with virtually every other court to express a view on the issue, that a party resisting enforcement of a foreign judgment on the ground of fraud in its procurement bears the burden of proving the alleged fraud')." Zitkene v. Zitkus, 140 Conn.App. 856, 867-68, 60 A.3d 322 (2013).
As argued by the plaintiff, the United States Embassy of the Dominican Republic in the United States as well and the United States Embassy of the Dominican Republic in the Dominican Republic, provide the following information regarding divorce in the Dominican Republic.
" A special divorce or 'Fast Divorce' is a quick divorce procedure for divorces by mutual consent designated especially for foreigners and Dominicans living abroad.
" As in a regular divorce procedures and [b]ecause the divorce is by mutual consent, the law requires the signing of a Formal separation agreement, [s]tating issues: such as the division of the common property, custody of the children if it's the case, and the alimony to be [p]aid by the husband to his wife and under aged children during the divorce proceedings and thereafter. This agreement must confer competence to [the] judge in the Dominican Republic. This agreement must be signed before a public notary under the jurisdiction of the marriage domicile, translated into Spanish and both the original and the translation Apostilled by the appropriate authority.
" The spouse who is not present at the hearing may execute the power of attorney in one of the following ways:
1. " Before a public notary, this must be translated into Spanish and both the original and the translation Apostilled by the appropriate authority.
2. " Before a Dominican Consular Office.
" The spouse who appears at the hearing must submit an identification document, such as passport or driver's license. Besides the separation agreement and power of attorney mentioned above, additional information may be necessary.
" Birth certificate in the case of minor children born in the marriage.
" Certified copy of the marriage certificate.
" For the divorce to be valid in the United States, it must be legalized by the Attorney General's Office and apostilled by the Foreign Ministry.
" The Embassy of the Dominican Republic understands that divorces are offered through the Internet without the requirement of the presence of at least one of the spouses in court. The Embassy warns that these divorces are illegal and are not recognized by the Dominican courts or by the courts in the United States." Embassy of the Dominican Republic in the United States, available at http://www.domrep.org/divorce.html (last visited August 24, 2017).
The Embassy of the Dominican Republic in the Dominican Republic provides similar information and makes it clear that " [t]here are two types of divorces available to foreigners in the Dominican Republic: divorce by mutual consent and divorce for cause. The majority of Dominican divorces granted to foreigners are mutual consent divorces. In such divorces, the demanding party does not have to prove a specific cause for dissolving the bond of matrimony, but rather must show mutual agreement to dissolve the marriage. Although residency is not required, at least one of the parties must appear at the hearing. An attorney authorized by power of attorney duly filed in the Civil Registry Office may represent the other party." United States Embassy in the Dominican Republic, available at https://do.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/special-family-issues/divorce-dominican-republic/ (last visited August 24, 2017).
The defendant submitted a translated copy of the Dominican Republic divorce decree which provides in pertinent part: " [O]n the Twenty-Third day of the month of [M]arch in the year Two Thousand Thirteen (2013); before me DR. RICHARD MEJIA HERNANDEZ, attorney and notary public of the municipality Bonao, duly registered in the board of attorney of the Dominican Republic . . . with professional office located . . . in this city of Bonao, appeared in person the Messer: MARTIN DE LA CRUZ ABAD & OCASINA ISABEL JIMENEZ, both Dominicans . . . respectively domiciled and resident in the United States of North America and accidentally in this city of Bonao, and the person appearing jointly have expressed [to] me the following . . . the parties formalize an inventory of their property and real [e]state, by other separate document, for the purposes of division between them . . . [T]hat during the marriage they procreated two daughters . . . both parties agreed that custody of the two daughters will be under custody of the mother . . . [T]he wife . . . will reside during the proceeding of divorce in her residence [in Meriden, CT United States of North America] . . . both grant special power as extensive and as is necessary in law to LICDO. FRANKLIN VINICIO DE LA CRUZ, attorney of the court of the Dominican Republic." (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit B, p. 2.)
" RESULTS: that on March 15 of the year 2013, the magistrate judge president of this court give a preparatory judgment authorize the divorce between the mentioned spouses and fixed the hearing for April 10, 1013, at nine hours in the morning (9:00 A.M.), to which spouses concerned should attend . (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit B, p. 3.)
RESULTS: that on April 10, 2013 appearing to this hearing the spouses in cause, duly represented by the attorney constituted which meets the above transcribe form. (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit B, p. 3.)
The first paragraph of the " decree" provides: " First: the act of Messer MARTIN DE LA CRUZ ABAD & OCASINO ISABEL JIMENEZ, that appearing in the hearing, according to established law." (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit B, p. 4.)
In addition to the above notations that the parties allegedly appeared before the notary public/attorney and the court in the Dominican Republic, the five-page translation of the decree refers to the children of the parties but only two of the three. Granted, one of the children was no longer a minor when the parties were supposedly before the court in the Dominican Republic, but the decree states that the parties " procreated" only two children. The Dominican decree also fails to provide for child support even though the two children mentioned in the Dominican decree were minors when the decree was rendered.
The Dominican Republic divorce judgment references a document that supposedly formalized an inventory of the parties' property and real estate for division between the plaintiff and defendant but said document was never submitted to this court despite repeated requests for the parties to do so. Also, the Dominican Republic divorce decree makes no reference to assets or debts, life insurance, or health insurance, nor does it reference alimony.
In the present case, both parties participated in the fraud in that neither party was in the Dominican Republic at any time in 2013 and under the law of the Dominican Republic, at least one of the parties must appear before the court. Also, as noted above, the decree from the Dominican Republic specifically states at least four different times that the parties should appear or did appear before the court in the Dominican Republic and that is simply not the case. The testimony of the parties supports the conclusion that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant went to the Dominican Republic at any time in 2013. For this reason, as well as the reason that the parties only obtained said divorce so that the wife could get a better interest rate on the mortgage as a single mother with children and obtain student aid for the children, both of which the plaintiff managed to do, this court finds the Dominican Divorce decree to be fraudulent on its face. Therefore, this court will not give the Dominican Republic divorce decree recognition under the principle of comity.
Additionally, the parties continued to live together as husband and wife, raising their children as a family, paying their bills as a family, and engaging in all aspects of their marital relationship without change until 2015. In 2014, the defendant gave the plaintiff $10,000 so she could start a business with her sister. The only reason why the parties attempted to obtain a divorce in the Dominican Republic was to try to put themselves in a better financial position by lowering the interest rate on the mortgage and obtaining student aid for their children which is certainly against the public policy of the state of Connecticut and as such, is just another reason why this court will not recognize the divorce judgment from the Dominican Republic.
DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL RECOGNITION
The defendant argues that this court should recognize the Dominican Republic's divorce decree under the doctrine of practical recognition. " In Baker [ v. Baker, 39 Conn.Supp. 66, 468 A.2d 944 (1983)], the plaintiff petitioned for and obtained a dissolution decree in a Mexican proceeding in which she appeared personally and the defendant appeared by counsel. After the Mexican judgment was rendered, both the plaintiff and the defendant married other individuals. When the plaintiff's second marriage proved unsuccessful, she brought a dissolution action in Connecticut. The Superior Court, after acknowledging the general rule barring the recognition of divorce decrees rendered in a foreign country unless the jurisdictional requirements of the recognizing state are satisfied, held that practical recognition should be given the Mexican decree because the equities and facts of the case mandated an exception to the general rule. Baker v. Baker, supra, 73.
" The concept of 'practical' recognition of a divorce decree rendered in a foreign nation where neither spouse is domiciled has been recognized by a number of courts. See, e.g., Mayer v. Mayer, 66 N.C.App. 522, 311 S.E.2d 659 (1984); see also annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1419, § 8(a) and cases cited therein. '[P]ractical recognition may be accorded such decrees by estoppel, laches, unclean hands, or similar equitable doctrine under which the party attacking the decree may be effectively barred from securing a judgment of invalidity.' Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1419, 1452. Thus, a party may be precluded from attacking a foreign divorce decree if such an attack would be inequitable under the circumstances. Scherer v. Scherer, 405 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind.App. 1980). Moreover, in a case involving a Mexican divorce, our Supreme Court has recently recognized that 'out-of-state divorces are [now] both less likely and less opprobrious, ' and that, therefore, such divorces should not lightly be overturned where 'the parties had intended to channel the dissolution of their marriage in a legitimate rather than in an illegitimate fashion.' Hayes v. Beresford, 184 Conn. 558, 567, 440 A.2d 224 (1981); see also Lavigne v. Lavigne, 3 Conn.App. 423, 488 A.2d 1290 (1985)." Bruneau v. Bruneau, 3 Conn.App. 453, 456-57, 489 A.2d 1049, 1052 (1985). The facts of Bruneau case, however, are distinguishable because the parties had been divorced for 19 years by virtue of a Mexican divorce decree when the plaintiff filed the dissolution of marriage action in Connecticut and the defendant had remarried in reliance on the Mexican decree. In the present case, the Dominican Republic divorce decree was rendered on or about April 22, 2013. The Connecticut dissolution action was instituted by the plaintiff wife on October 22, 2015. The husband filed an appearance, a cross complaint and numerous pleadings in the litigation, which lasted for 15 months. At no time during the litigation or in the hearing at which time the dissolution agreement was entered did either party make any reference to a previous divorce in the Dominican Republic. The parties were divorced on January 13, 2017, pursuant to an agreement that was incorporated in this court's dissolution judgment. The defendant abided by the terms and conditions of the Connecticut judgment and it was not until the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt on March 31, 2017, that the defendant raised the question of the validity of the Connecticut dissolution action. As the court stated in Bruneau v. Bruneau, supra, 458, " [u]nder the circumstances, to permit the [defendant] to challenge the validity of the decree would amount to allowing [him] to take advantage of a fraud in which [he] participated by being one of the parties to the [Dominican Republic] proceeding." Thus, this court will not give practical recognition to the Dominican Republic decree.
DOCTRINE OF ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
The defendant urges this court to adopt the rule utilized by the State of New York to find that jurisdiction was acquired by the Dominican Republic in accordance with the decision of Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 209 N.E.2d 709 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971, 86 S.Ct. 1861, 16 L.Ed.2d 682 (1966). The Rosenstiel case was briefly discussed by the court in Baker v. Baker, 39 Conn.Supp. 66, 68, 468 A.2d 944 (1983) wherein the court stated that " [u]nder New York law, if the jurisdictional requirements of the foreign country were satisfied at the time of the divorce decree, then New York courts will recognize the validity of the foreign decree."
" A divorce granted by a sister state will be afforded full faith and credit with regard to the termination of the marital relationship only when at least one of the parties was a domiciliary of that state (see, Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577 [(1945)]; Senor v. Senor, 272 A.D. 306, 70 N.Y.S.2d 909 [(1945)]). A divorce granted by a foreign country will be afforded comity by the State of New York where the jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal was predicated upon the consent of both parties and residency, rather than domicile, was established by a statutory " brief contact" through the appearance of one of the parties (Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, 9A Part 1 West's McKinney's Forms MFL, 7:03 [2003]; see, Greschler v. Greschler, 51 N.Y.2d 368, 434 N.Y.S.2d 194, 414 N.E.2d 694 [(1980]]; Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 209 N.E.2d 709 [(1965)], cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971, 86 S.Ct. 1861, 16 L.Ed.2d 682 [(1966)]; Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 [(1955)]; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 [(1948)]; Matter of Estate of Lovick, 201 A.D.2d 736, 608 N.Y.S.2d 310 [(1994)]; Rabbani v. Rabbani, 178 A.D.2d 637, 578 N.Y.S.2d 213 [(1991)]; Matter of Brown, 132 Misc.2d 811, 505 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1976)." Kushnick v. Kushnick, 196 Misc.2d 140, 143, 763 N.Y.S.2d 889, 892 (Sup.Ct. 2003).
The defendant argues that the parties voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic tribunal, were actively involved in the process, had knowledge of the judgment and by applying the doctrine of acquired jurisdiction, this court can enforce the divorce judgment of the Dominican Republic. This court finds no reason to adopt the doctrine of acquired jurisdiction because in the present case, the parties did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Dominican Republic. To obtain a valid divorce decree in the Dominican Republic, at least one of the parties must appear before the court. In fact, neither party was even in the Dominican Republic at any time in 2013 and as a result, the jurisdictional requirements of the Dominican Republic were not met.
CONCLUSION
For all of the forgoing reasons, this court concludes the Dominican Republic divorce proceeding in which the parties allegedly participated in 2013 should not be recognized and is not binding under Connecticut law. Indeed, it is doubtful that said decree would be recognized by the court in the Dominican Republic in light of the fact that neither party appeared before the court in the Dominican Republic at any time in 2013 and certainly not on the date the court stated that the parties should attend which was April 10, 2013. Thus, the defendant's motion to open and set aside the Connecticut dissolution judgment #134.10 and #134.20 is denied.