Opinion
5:22-cv-984 (MAD/TWD)
11-07-2022
DAYVID JIMINEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF COHOES POLICE DEPT., et al., Defendants.
DAYVID JIMINEZ 055-769-136 Plaintiff, pro se Buffalo Federal Detention Facility 4250 Federal Drive Batavia, NY 14020
DAYVID JIMINEZ 055-769-136 Plaintiff, pro se Buffalo Federal Detention Facility 4250 Federal Drive Batavia, NY 14020
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dayvid Jiminez (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action pro se on or about September 19, 2022, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Cohoes Police Department, Officer J. Murphy in his official capacity, Officer John Doe 1 in his official capacity, and Officer John Doe 2 in his official capacity (collectively, “Defendants”). (See Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.) On September 20, 2022, Judge Mae A. D'Agostino denied Plaintiff's in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application as incomplete, ordered the administrative closure of the matter, and permitted Plaintiff to reopen the matter by timely filing a complete IFP application and inmate authorization form. (Dkt. No. 5.) Plaintiff subsequently requested leave to amend the Complaint, which the undersigned denied without prejudice due to the case being administratively closed. (See Dkt. Nos. 6-7.) The case was reopened on October 4, 2022, when Plaintiff filed a complete IFP application and inmate authorization form. (See Dkt. Nos. 9-11.)
The Clerk sent Plaintiff's IFP application and Complaint to the undersigned for initial review. Plaintiff's IFP application is hereby GRANTED for purposes of this review. (Dkt. No. 9.) The undersigned now considers the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
The following recitation of facts is drawn from the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of initial review. See, e.g., LaTouche v. Rockland County, No. 22-CV-1437 (LTS), 2022 WL 953111, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022); Walker v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-5240 (PKC) (LB), 2021 WL 1838277, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2021).
On May 3, 2022, Plaintiff “was pulled over and was given a ticket for” failing to signal, and because he was racially profiled. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.) During the stop, Officer Murphy handcuffed and arrested Plaintiff “for a[n] immigration civil warrant.” See id. at 5; see also id. at 6 (“Officers from the City of Cohoes Police Department, effectuated an arrest pursuant to ICE administrative warrants.”). Officer Murphy subsequently brought Plaintiff to the precinct, and “John Doe searched and seiz[ed] [his] vehicle.” See id. at 5. Plaintiff is “now in ICE custody as a result of a police officer calling the Department of Homeland Security.” See id. at 6.
Plaintiff claims these events violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id. at 3. He avers these violations caused him “pain and suffering, emotional distress, los[s] of freedom, los[s] of time with [his] children, and an increase in depression and anxiety about returning to a country he is “afraid to go back to.” See id. at 4.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court must conduct an initial review of complaints filed in forma pauperis, and “complaints in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (governing complaints filed in forma pauperis); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (governing complaints filed by prisoners against the government). When reviewing these types of complaints, this Court must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Allen v. Stringer, No. 20-3953, 2021 WL 4472667, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (applying Section 1915(e)(2)(B)); Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying Section 1915A).
Plaintiff is a “prisoner” as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). (See Dkt. No. 9 at 1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c) (defining “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”).)
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all alterations, internal quotation marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. See, e.g., Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 2020).
This Court must exercise caution when determining whether to sua sponte dismiss a pro se complaint on the grounds that it is frivolous. See Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983). “An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). “A claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Id.
When undertaking this initial review, the Court must construe pro se pleadings with the utmost leniency. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding that a pro se litigant's complaint is to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
The undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with leave to amend because it is frivolous, it fails to state a claim, and the individual Defendants are not liable for Section 1983 suits advanced against them in their official capacities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
First, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim is frivolous because a dispositive defense exists on the face of the Complaint. See Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437. The constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved-“the Fourth Amendment's concern with reasonableness allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.” See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996) (emphasis in original). “As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Id. at 810. There is “probable cause to stop and arrest” an individual, like Plaintiff, when an officer “directly observe[s] him violating the traffic laws by not signaling lane changes.” United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782 (2d Cir. 1994); see generally N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1163(a) (requiring motorists to use a signal before turning or changing lanes). Here, Plaintiff concedes Officer Murphy pulled him over for failing to signal. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Murphy is accordingly frivolous because a dispositive defense (i.e., there was probable cause for the traffic stop) appears on the face of the Complaint. See, e.g., Aikman v. Cnty. of Westchester, 491 F.Supp.2d 374, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing the claimant's Fourth Amendment racial profile claim where the officers “had probable cause to believe [he] violated New York traffic laws”); Viator v. City of Rochester, No. 02-CV-6453, 2005 WL 1876064, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2005) (dismissing the claimant's Fourth Amendment racial profile claim because the officer observed him fail to signal in violation of New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(a)). The undersigned accordingly recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment traffic stop claim on the grounds that it is frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Second, Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient factual content to allow this Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. For purposes of Plaintiff's post-traffic-stop Fourth Amendment claims, he has failed to set forth a short and plain statement stating who did what to him, when they did it, and how he was injured. See id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Absent these basic details, Plaintiff's Complaint has failed to give Defendants fair notice of what his post-trafficstop Fourth Amendment claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Accepting the facts alleged in Plaintiff's entire Complaint as true and construing all reasonable inferences in his favor, Hernandez, 18 F.3d at 136, the Court is left with “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The undersigned accordingly recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's posttraffic-stop Fourth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim-asserted against the City of Cohoes Police Department and each officer in their official capacities-appears to advance a municipal liability claim. (See Dkt. No. 1; see generally Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978) (explaining “official-capacity suits generally represent . . . another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”).) “To hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir. 2020). Accordingly, “[a] municipality cannot be made liable under § 1983 by application of the doctrine of respondeat superior, but rather the plaintiff must demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the alleged injury.” Id. Here, Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead any of the three elements required to prove municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compare Id. with Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff failed to allege the City of Cohoes Police Department racially profiled pursuant to an official policy or custom. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Nor does he allege such a policy caused a deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id. The undersigned accordingly recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Finally, the individual Defendants are not liable for suits advanced against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their official capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (“There is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell, supra, local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.”). Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the individual Defendants acting in their official capacities are effectively claims against the City of Cohoes. See id. at 165-67; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n.55. The official capacity claims against the individual defendants should accordingly be dismissed as redundant. See, e.g., New York Youth Club v. Town of Harrison, 150 F.Supp.3d 264, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (dismissing as redundant claims asserted against individual defendants in their official capacities); Riley v. Town of Bethlehem, 44 F.Supp.2d 451, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (same). The undersigned accordingly recommends that the Court dismiss the official capacity claims against the individual defendants as redundant and therefore frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 1.)
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 9) is GRANTED solely for purposes of initial review; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report
Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).