Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 14-0329 No. 1 CA-JV 14-0331
06-09-2015
JESSICA C., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.P., P.P., N.G., Appellees.
COUNSEL Maricopa County Public Advocate's Office, Mesa By Suzanne Sanchez Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By JoAnn Falgout Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Nos. JS17486 and JD23406
The Honorable Connie Contes, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Maricopa County Public Advocate's Office, Mesa
By Suzanne Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By JoAnn Falgout
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge John C. Gemmill and Judge Michael J. Brown joined. PORTLEY, Judge:
¶1 Jessica C. ("Mother") challenges the termination of her parental rights to her three children. Specifically, she argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that termination was in the children's best interests. Because the record supports the finding, we affirm.
The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of the two fathers, but neither is a party to this appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Mother is the parent of three children. The two older children, who were born in 2010 and 2012, were taken into temporary custody by the Arizona Department of Economic Security ("the Department") and, after the filing of a dependency petition, were found to be dependent in July 2013. The case plan was family reunification concurrent with severance and adoption. After a number of report and review hearings, the juvenile court changed the case plan to severance and adoption in December 2013, and the Department filed its motion to terminate Mother's parental rights to those two children.
The Department of Child Safety has replaced the Arizona Department of Economic Security. See S.B. 1001, 51st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2014). We will refer to the agency as "the Department."
¶3 Mother's third child was born in early 2014. The Department removed the child from her care and filed a petition to terminate her parental rights as to that child because Mother had a history of substance abuse, had not substantially complied with her substance abuse treatment, and had not participated in other reunification services during the related dependency case. There was a consolidated trial, and Mother's parental rights to all three children were subsequently terminated. Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights in both cases, and we have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 8-235, 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).
We have consolidated the two appeals.
We cite the current version of statutes unless otherwise noted.
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DISCUSSION
¶4 It is axiomatic that before a parent's rights to his or her child can be terminated, the juvenile court must find that one of the statutory grounds for severance is proven by clear and convincing evidence and that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the termination is in the child's best interests. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's findings, Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2, 181 P.3d 1126, 1128 (App. 2008), and will affirm unless there is no reasonable evidence to support the court's factual findings. Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 2, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998). We will not second-guess the court's findings because the judge was in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002).
¶5 The sole issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court erred by determining that termination was in the children's best interests. Accordingly, we review the record to determine whether there is evidence to support the court's finding; namely, whether there was evidence that the children would benefit by the termination or would be harmed by a continuation of the parent-child relationship. Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5, 804 P.2d 730, 734 (1990). In determining the best interests of the child, the court can also consider "whether: 1) an adoptive placement is immediately available; 2) the existing placement is meeting the needs of the child; [or] 3) the children are adoptable." Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 30 (App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
¶6 Here, the juvenile court found the statutory basis that Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of her history of chronic drug abuse. The court also found severance would be beneficial for the two older children because the parents had "failed to address their domestic violence issues, [were] continuing to struggle with their substance abuse issues, and [did] not have stable housing to care for the children." Moreover, after noting that the two older children had been in an out-of-home placement for more than fifteen months, the court found they needed permanency in a safe, stable home that is free of illegal substances, which could be achieved through adoption. Consequently, there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that severance would be beneficial and was in the best interests of the two older children.
¶7 The juvenile court also found that severance was in the best interests of the youngest child. After finding that Mother did not appear to "have the resources or skills to meet the child's basic needs" and that she did not "have a strong sense of recovery and sobriety," the court found that severance would provide the youngest child permanency in a safe, stable home that is free of illegal substances, and would further the adoption plan because the child was adoptable. Given that the existing placement was meeting the youngest child's needs and willing to adopt the child, there was sufficient evidence to support the best interests finding.
¶8 Mother, however, argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the best interests finding as to the youngest child because she was not placed with the two older children. We disagree.
¶9 Although A.R.S. § 8-513(D) requires the Department to use reasonable efforts to place a child with his or her siblings, or to allow the child to maintain contact with his or her siblings, the statute does not require such placement as a statutory condition of termination. Moreover, the placement of a child, with or without siblings, and the child's adoption are post-severance decisions that the juvenile court makes separate and apart from the termination decision. See Antonio M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 222 Ariz. 369, 371, ¶ 2, 214 P.3d 1010, 1012 (App. 2009) (noting that "the court does not weigh alternative placement possibilities to determine if severance is in the child's best interests;" instead, the court considers whether a placement is appropriate "only after finding first that [the Department] had established sufficient grounds for terminating [the parent's parental] rights") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
¶10 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgments terminating Mother's parental rights.