(Citation omitted.) Jernigan v. State, 239 Ga. App. 65, 67 ( 517 SE2d 370) (1999).Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 62 (2) (b) (iii) ( 663 SE2d 189) (2008).
And, in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss, we will affirm the ruling absent an abuse of discretion. See Jernigan v. State, 239 Ga. App. 65 ( 517 SE2d 370) (1999). 407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972).
Thus, we consider the remaining factors to determine if Ingram's constitutional right to speedy trial was denied. See Boseman, supra at 732 (1) (a) (27-month delay is presumptively prejudicial); Jernigan v. State, 239 Ga. App. 65, 66 ( 517 SE2d 370) (1999) (17-month delay raises presumption of prejudice); see also Perry v. Mitchell, 253 Ga. 593, 594 ( 322 SE2d 273) (1984) (delay of two years is deplorable). See Barker, supra at 530.
[Cit.]" Jernigan v. State, 239 Ga. App. 65, 67 ( 517 SE2d 370) (1999). The most important component of the prejudice factor is whether the delay has impaired Frazier's defense. Mullinax v. State, 273 Ga. 756, 759 (2) ( 545 SE2d 891) (2001); see Boseman, supra, 263 Ga. at 734 (2). Since Frazier was released on bond on the date of his arrest and did not present evidence of specific anxiety or concern, this is the only component of the prejudice factor claimed by Frazier.
[Cit.]" Jernigan v. State, 239 Ga. App. 65, 67 ( 517 SE2d 370) (1999). A court determines prejudicial delay by considering three interests that the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing undue anxiety and concern to the defendant, and reducing the possibility of impairing the defense.
The fact that Allen "never filed a demand for a speedy trial suggests that [he] was not suffering anxiety or stress from the delay," (citation omitted.) Jernigan v. State, 239 Ga. App. 65, 67 ( 517 SE2d 370) (1999), at least not such anxiety that he wanted to get the trial over with. In fact, as noted in our discussion of the reason for the delay, Allen filed the plea in bar that delayed his trial for almost a year.
" Nelloms v. State.Jernigan v. State, 239 Ga. App. 65, 67 ( 517 S.E.2d 370) (1999).Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 898(2) ( 252 S.E.2d 397) (1979).
Compare State v. Allgood, 252 Ga. App. 638, 641 ( 556 S.E.2d 857) (2001) (speedy trial rights violated based on length of delay, the lack of reason for delay and the death of a material witness); State v. Bazemore, 249 Ga. App. 584, 586-87(1) ( 549 S.E.2d 426) (2001) (speedy trial rights violated based on length of unexplained delays and defense's inability to locate material witness). See Jernigan v. State, 239 Ga. App. 65, 67 ( 517 S.E.2d 370) (1999). After balancing all of the Barker factors, we find the trial court did not err when it denied Carraway's motion for discharge and acquittal.
[Cit.]" Jernigan v. State, 239 Ga. App. 65, 67 ( 517 S.E.2d 370) (1999). Here, Weldon presented no evidence that any of his witnesses who testified at the first trial were unavailable, only that memories might deteriorate.
Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 782, 783 ( 534 S.E.2d 796) (2000). On appeal, the denial of a defendant's constitutional speedy trial cleim is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jernigan v. State, 239 Ga. App. 65 ( 517 S.E.2d 370) (1999). (a) The length of the delay.