Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2018-0049
08-06-2018
JEREMIAH C., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY AND D.C., Appellee.
COUNSEL Rosemary Gordon Pánuco, Tucson Counsel for Appellant Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By Laura J. Huff, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
No. S1100JD201700140
The Honorable Daniel A. Washburn, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Rosemary Gordon Pánuco, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
By Laura J. Huff, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Espinosa concurred.
EPPICH, Judge:
¶1 Jeremiah C. appeals from the juvenile court's order finding his son, D.C., born January 2007, dependent. We affirm.
¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to affirming the court's findings. Willie G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, ¶ 21 (App. 2005). The Department of Child Safety filed a dependency petition as to D.C. in May 2017, alleging he was dependent due to abuse or neglect by the mother, Cassandra, and due to abandonment and neglect by Jeremiah, based on his having abandoned the child and failing to protect him from Cassandra. At an initial dependency hearing, Jeremiah asserted paternity had not been established and he was attempting to obtain genetic testing in a Gila County paternity action. After some discussion, the juvenile court concluded paternity had been established "through custody orders" in the Gila County action. But, the court allowed for genetic testing to be arranged.
¶3 In October 2017, Jeremiah filed a "[m]otion to disestablish paternity" to D.C. after genetic testing concluded he was not D.C.'s biological father. In the motion, he claimed he had not signed D.C.'s birth certificate, but that "some other person" had signed "with his name." The juvenile court issued an order stating that Jeremiah was not D.C.'s biological father and "withdrawing any presumption or finding of paternity of [D.C.] to Jeremiah . . . pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-814." After further discussion about the status of the Gila County action, however, the court set aside the order. It subsequently determined that the Gila County court had established paternity and that Jeremiah had the opportunity "to participate and to address the allegation of fraud" regarding the birth certificate in that proceeding. Therefore, in December 2017 it denied the motion to disestablish paternity and to dismiss Jeremiah from the dependency. The court advised Jeremiah to "address the matter of paternity in Gila County," noting that if paternity were disestablished there, it "would be willing to dismiss [Jeremiah] from th[e] Dependency Petition."
¶4 At the contested dependency hearing in March 2018, Jeremiah advised the juvenile court that he had filed a motion in Gila County, but had not yet received a ruling. Because he had not, however, requested a continuance of the dependency hearing, the court conducted the hearing, and ultimately found D.C. dependent as to Jeremiah on grounds of neglect and abandonment. The Gila County court has since denied Jeremiah's motion to disestablish paternity.
¶5 On appeal Jeremiah argues D.C. cannot be found dependent as to him because "he is not 'a parent' for a Section 8 dependency case." Relying on DNA testing showing he is not D.C.'s biological father, he argues the definition of "parent" set forth in A.R.S. § 8-531(10) should apply to dependency proceedings and that because he is not "the natural or adoptive . . . father of a child," D.C. cannot be dependent as to him.
¶6 We review a dependency adjudication for an abuse of discretion, "deferring to the juvenile court's ability to weigh and analyze the evidence." Shella H. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, ¶ 13 (App. 2016). Accordingly, "[w]e will only disturb a dependency adjudication if no reasonable evidence supports it." Id. "[W]e do not re-weigh the evidence on review." Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12 (App. 2002). We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Mara M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 201 Ariz. 503, ¶ 15 (App. 2002).
¶7 "When construing a statute, we first look at the plain wording of the statute." Mario G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 282, ¶ 14 (App. 2011). "When a 'statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction' unless application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or absurd results." Id., quoting Hayes v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268 (1994).
¶8 As relevant here, A.R.S. § 8-201(15) defines a "[d]ependent child" as one "[i]n need of proper and effective parental care and control and who has no parent or guardian," one "who is not provided with the necessities of life," or one "whose home is unfit by reason of abuse, neglect, cruelty or depravity by a parent, a guardian or any other person having custody or care of the child." Thus, contrary to Jeremiah's foundational assertion, not all grounds for a dependency finding require action or lack of action by a "parent." Indeed, a child may be dependent solely on the basis of being destitute, regardless of whether a parent is the one who has left them so. § 8-201(15)(a)(ii). Likewise, a child may be dependent if abused or neglected by "any other person having custody or care of the child." § 8-201(15)(a)(iii). On the plain language of the statute, we therefore
reject Jeremiah's underlying contention that a child cannot be found dependent as to one who is not a parent.
¶9 We are also not persuaded by Jeremiah's assertion that we must apply the definition of "parent" set forth in § 8-531(10), to dependency proceedings. Those definitions are specifically noted to apply "[i]n this article," that is Title 8, Chapter 4, Article 5, which applies to the termination of parent-child relationships. See also A.R.S. § 8-501(A)(10) (defining "parent" in Article 4 of Chapter 4). In contrast, the definitions set forth in § 8-201 are noted to apply in Title 8, "Child Safety," as a whole. And, Article 8 of Chapter 4, which addresses "Dependent Children," includes its own section of definitions, and does not include a definition of parent. See A.R.S. § 8-801. Had the legislature wished to limit dependency to only biological and adoptive parents, it certainly could have done so. See Hosp. Corp. of Nw., Inc. v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 195 Ariz. 383, ¶ 13 (App. 1999) ("[W]e give words reasonable and ordinary meaning when the legislature could have limited the words if it intended a different meaning."), citing State v. French, 166 Ariz. 247, 249 (App. 1990); see also Andrew R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 453, ¶ 23 (App. 2010). Because it did not, we decline to so limit the statute, particularly in view of the broad grounds for dependency provided.
¶10 Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court's order adjudicating D.C. dependent.