Jennings v. Stewart

Full title: James JENNINGS, Plaintiff, v. Ben STEWART, in his official capacity as…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division.

Date published: May 21, 2020

461 F. Supp. 3d 1198 (N.D. Fla. 2020)

Opinion

Case No. 4:20-cv-58-AW-MAF

05-21-2020

James JENNINGS, Plaintiff, v. Ben STEWART, in his official capacity as Sheriff, Madison County, Jared Lauth, individually, and Bobby Boatwright, individually, Defendants.

Marie A. Mattox, Cynthia Ann Myers, Marie A. Mattox PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff. Matthew Joseph Carson, Michael Patrick Spellman, Sniffen & Spellman PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants.

Allen Winsor, United States District Judge

Marie A. Mattox, Cynthia Ann Myers, Marie A. Mattox PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff.

Matthew Joseph Carson, Michael Patrick Spellman, Sniffen & Spellman PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Allen Winsor, United States District Judge

This is a section 1983 civil rights action. James Jennings has sued Madison County Sheriff Ben Stewart and two sergeants in the Sheriff's Office: Jared Lauth and Bobby Boatwright. ECF No. 12 (Am. Compl.). Jennings asserts six counts against the Sheriff (Counts I, IV, VII, VIII, IX, X¹ ), two against Lauth (Counts II, V), and two against Boatwright (Counts III, VI). Am Compl. The Sheriff now moves to dismiss all counts against him for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 16.

1 The complaint incorrectly labels the final count "IX" instead of "X."

I. STANDARD

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Facial plausibility requires "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

At this stage, the court accepts all the factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations support a plausible claim. Id. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. But "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; see also Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ("[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." (marks and citation omitted)). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court construes the facts in a "light most favorable to the plaintiff." Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010).

II. FACTS

The Madison County Sheriff's Office runs a county drug task force unit. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Lauth and Boatwright work for the Sheriff's Office and are sergeants on the task force. ¶¶ 5-6. Jennings has had several encounters with Lauth, Boatwright, and the Sheriff's Office, and in his telling, they all routinely violated his rights.

For one, Lauth and Boatwright pulled Jennings over in 2016 for a cracked windshield. ¶ 8. During that traffic stop, Boatwright arrested Jennings for drug possession. ¶ 10. In March and April of 2016, the Sheriff questioned Jennings about a shooting death that occurred at his neighbor's house. ¶ 12. After Jennings provided no useful information, the Sheriff conducted surveillance on his house and stopped Jennings's guests several times when they left his home. ¶ 14. Later in 2016, Lauth stopped Jennings for riding a scooter without a helmet. ¶¶ 15, 30. Lauth then searched Jennings, which led to another arrest for drug possession. ¶¶ 16-19. After Jennings spent the night in the Madison County Jail, Boatwright—who had transported Jennings to jail—found oxycodone tablets in the back of his patrol car. ¶¶ 20, 21. Boatwright assumed the tablets were Jennings's, which led to yet another drug arrest. ¶¶ 22-23.

Jennings alleges that Boatwright acted with "malicious purpose" by charging him for the oxycodone possession, "which he knew would not stick." ¶ 26. And that by separately charging Jennings for the oxycodone, Boatwright was setting up Jennings for a harsher penalty and two separate cases on his record. ¶ 28. The prosecutor abandoned both cases, after a judge found the initial stop unlawful and suppressed the evidence. ¶¶ 31-33.

III. ANALYSIS

Although the Sheriff is subject to suit under § 1983,² he cannot be liable for Lauth's or Boatwright's actions on a respondeat superior theory. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ("[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents."). To impose liability on a government entity, the plaintiff must show "(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation." McDowell v. Brown , 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

2 County sheriffs in Florida are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ortega v. Schramm , 922 F.2d 684, 694 (11th Cir. 1991). "In contrast to individual capacity suits, when an officer is sued under Section 1983 in his or her official capacity, the suit is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Busby v. City of Orlando , 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (marks and citation omitted).

A plaintiff can establish a policy or custom by identifying a deprivation of constitutional rights "by either an express policy or a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom and usage with the force of law." Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty. , 285 F.3d 962, 966 (11th Cir. 2002) (marks and citation omitted). But in any case, the policy or custom must have been the "moving force of the constitutional violation." Young v. City of Augusta , 59 F.3d 1160, 1171 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 820, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) ). Since all six claims seek to impose liability on the Sheriff based on his officers' actions, they can only succeed if they satisfy Monell . See 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018.

A. Counts I and IV

The Sheriff argues that Jennings's false arrest claim (Count I) and a search and seizure claim (Count IV) rely on a combination of conclusory and improper respondeat superior allegations. ECF No. 16 at 6. As to those two counts, the complaint alleges that the Sheriff's failure to implement adequate hiring, supervisory, and internal procedures—as well as his failure to supervise, train, investigate, and discipline Lauth, Boatman, and others—represents "either an improper policy or the absence of a policy." Compl. ¶¶ 43-44, 74-75. But Jennings offers no other facts to make the existence of such policies plausible. Instead, the claims rest on conclusory allegations and the officers' conduct itself. There are not enough facts alleged "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) ; see also McCants v. City of Mobile , 752 F. App'x 744, 748 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding a complaint's allegations insufficient to establish Monell liability because they were conclusory and without support).

Moreover, these counts cannot rest on Jennings's claim that there existed a "de facto policy," see ECF No. 19 at 16, based "on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law," Craig v. Floyd Cty. , 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown , 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) ). Other than his own experience, Jennings offers only a broad and conclusory assertion that "frequent and customary actions like those set forth herein" demonstrate a de facto policy. Compl. ¶ 74. But there are no facts to support an inference that such an informal policy existed and that, if it did, it caused the claimed violations. See Craig , 643 F.3d at 1311 ("A single incident of a constitutional violation is insufficient to prove a policy or custom even when the incident involves several employees of the municipality."); Marantes v. Miami-Dade Cty. , 649 F. App'x 665, 673 (11th Cir. 2016).

Jennings's failure-to-train-or-supervise theory fares no better. The Sheriff "is not automatically liable under section 1983 even if it inadequately trained or supervised its police officers and those officers violated [a plaintiff's] constitutional rights." Gold v. City of Miami , 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). Liability attaches on this theory "[o]nly where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality." City of Canton v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) ; see also Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown , 520 U.S. 397, 415, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). A plaintiff establishes such deliberate indifference by demonstrating that the locality knew of a need for training or supervision but deliberately decided against taking action. Gold , 151 F.3d at 1350. This typically requires "[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees." Connick v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 62, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) ; see also Daniel v. Hancock Cty. Sch. Dist. , 626 F. App'x 825, 834 (11th Cir. 2015). But Jennings has not pleaded any facts to suggest that the Sheriff was deliberately indifferent to a need for training or supervision. Counts I and IV will be dismissed.

B. Counts VII, VIII, IX, and X

Counts VII, VIII, IX, and X all assert claims against the Sheriff for "supervisory liability for failure to correct" constitutional violations. Compl. ¶¶ 92-124. Count VII seeks to hold the Sheriff liable for false arrest "concerning the actions of Defendant Lauth." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92-99. Count VIII does the same but for Boatwright. ¶¶ 100-08. And Counts IX and X do the same for unconstitutional search and seizure "concerning the actions of" Lauth and Boatwrights, respectively. ¶¶ 109-24. Jennings presents his claims as actions for "supervisory liability"³ because the Sheriff failed to correct his subordinates' behavior. ECF No. 19 at 23.

3 This was also a basis for Counts I and IV. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44, 75.

The Sheriff argues that "failure to correct" is not a separate, cognizable cause of action under section § 1983 ; that it is just a subset of Monell liability. ECF No. 16 at 16. And, since Jennings sues the Sheriff in his official capacity, this is true: a failure to correct is just another way to establish Monell liability based on a custom or policy. See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka , 261 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[A] municipality's failure to correct the constitutionally offensive actions of its employees can rise to the level of a custom or policy ‘if the municipality tacitly authorizes these actions or displays deliberate indifference’ towards the misconduct." (quoting Brooks v. Scheib , 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1987) )). And to the extent that Jennings's "failure to correct" claims include slightly different allegations, they nonetheless fail for the same reasons his "failure to supervise" theory fails in Counts I and IV: he has not pleaded any facts to suggest that the Sheriff was deliberately indifferent to a need to correct. See Gold , 151 F.3d at 1350.

Jennings alleges that during the Sheriff's tenure there has been "a history of widespread abuse" in the form of "improper and unjustified" illegal arrests⁴ and search and seizures⁵ that put the Sheriff on notice that Boatman, Lauth, and other deputies were likely to violate citizens' rights. These allegations, however, largely amount to legal conclusions not entitled to presumptive truth. See Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). And the allegations that are not legal conclusions provide insufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim. Id. Since the claims focus only on Jennings's false arrest and unconstitutional search and seizure and fail to identify a pattern of similar violations, they do not state claims against the Sheriff for supervisory liability for failure to correct. See Daniel , 626 F. App'x at 834–35. Jennings's complaint also alleges that the Sheriff has a "policy or custom" of eliciting false arrests and illegal searches. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 95, 103, 112, 120. But the complaint offers no facts to support these conclusions. See McCants , 752 F. App'x at 748. Counts VII, VIII, IX, and X will be dismissed.

4 As alleged in Counts VII and VIII. ¶¶ 95, 103.

5 As alleged in Counts IX and X. ¶¶ 112, 120.
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IV. CONCLUSION.

The Sheriff's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED. Counts I, IV, VII, VIII, IX, and X are dismissed. Jennings may file a second amended complaint within 14 days.

SO ORDERED on May 21, 2020.