Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 30-2008-00112448, David R. Chaffee, Judge.
Steven J. Renick for Petitioners.
Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, Timothy P. McDonald and K. Michele Williams for Real Parties in Interest.
OPINION
ARONSON, J.
This case arises out of a traffic accident in which Elise Mann rear-ended the R. family’s vehicle, injuring the father, the mother, and two teenaged children. The most significant injuries were to the 14-year-old girl, Jennifer R. The R. family filed a complaint as an unlimited civil action against Mann for personal injuries in September 2008. In September 2009, the trial court set a hearing sua sponte to reclassify the case as a limited civil action (one with a value of less than $25,000) under Code of Civil Procedure section 403.040, subdivision (a).
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
The R.’s opposed the motion by arguing the value of the case could exceed $25,000. They submitted a declaration explaining that Jennifer incurred $4,122 in out-of-pocket medical expenses, but the actual expenses were estimated to be between $5,000 and $6,500 when they included the amounts their insurers had paid. Jennifer suffered neck and back pain, which resolved after about six months. She also suffered a severe laceration to the bridge of her nose, requiring 20 stitches, and left a scar that made her very self-conscious for the first year after the accident. Now, three years after the accident, it is “a visible line running diagonally across the bridge of her nose into her left eyebrow.” A plastic surgeon concluded that further attempts to reduce the scar “would likely only make it worse.” Jennifer is a student at the Orange County High School of the Arts, studying at the Music and Theatre Conservatory, and aspires to be an actress. The R.’s expect to present expert testimony at trial that she “has a realistic potential to have a career as an actress” and that “the presence of a visible scar on Jennifer’s face would interfere with and diminish her marketability as an actress.”
The proceedings were not reported. The minute order states the trial court read the opposition to the motion, heard oral argument from both sides, and ordered the case reclassified to limited jurisdiction. The R.’s filed this petition for a peremptory writ of mandate, seeking relief from the reclassification order. (§ 403.080.) At our invitation, the real parties in interest filed opposition to the petition.
Discussion
Section 403.040, subdivision (a), provides that a court may reclassify an erroneously classified case on its own motion at any time. “A ‘limited civil case’ includes, inter alia, a case at law ‘in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less.’ (§ 86, subd. (a)(1).) ‘A civil action or proceeding other than a limited civil case may be referred to as an unlimited civil case.’ (§ 88.)” (Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 230 (Stern).)
The governing standard for reclassifying unlimited to limited jurisdiction is found in Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257. There, the Supreme Court stated the trial court must conclude that resolution of the action will “necessarily” fall short of the jurisdictional minimum before transferring a case from limited to unlimited jurisdiction, analogizing the “necessarily” test to the “‘legal certainty’” test utilized in the federal courts. (Id. at p. 270, original italics.) Appellate courts have underscored the high threshold set by Walker: “[The plaintiff] may well not prevail on the factual disputes regarding the extent of his injuries.... But a [Walker] hearing is not to be perceived as a minitrial or an opportunity for a trial judge to put forth a well-educated guess of a verdict. The unlikeliness of a judgment in excess of $25,000 is not the test. The trial court reviews the record to determine whether the result is obtainable. Simply stated, the trial court looks to the possibility of a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict, not to its probability.” (Maldonado v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 397, 402, original italics; see also Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 270; Stern, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 231; Singer v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1317; Andre v. Superior Court (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 11, 19.) We review a trial court’s reclassification order for an abuse of discretion. (Walker, at p. 272.)
Mann characterizes the R.’s case as a “minor, soft-tissue injury case,” pointing to the relatively low amount of medical costs, and attempts to minimize the severity of Jennifer’s scar. But personal injury damages are not merely comprised of medical costs. They include loss of future earnings and pain and suffering, neither of which can be precisely measured. It is possible that a jury, when evaluating whether and to what extent Jennifer’s facial scar impaired a promising acting career and inflicted physical and emotional trauma on a young adolescent, could find damages in excess of $25,000. The trial court therefore abused its discretion In reclassifying the case to limited jurisdiction.
We have complied with the procedural requirements for the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance (see § 1088; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171) and we conclude that no purpose would be served by issuance of an alternative writ. Therefore, we issue a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance directing the trial court to vacate its order reclassifying the case.
Disposition
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue compelling respondent superior court to vacate its order reclassifying the case to limited jurisdiction. This court’s order staying proceedings in the trial court shall remain in effect until the finality of this opinion.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., IKOLA, J.