Opinion
March 20, 1995
Appeal from the Court of Claims (Corbett, J.).
Ordered that the judgments are affirmed, with one bill of costs.
To recover damages for malicious prosecution, it is necessary to show an absence of probable cause to make the arrest and to maintain the subsequent criminal proceeding (see, Weingarten v Halfpenny Auto Parts, 138 A.D.2d 373, 374; see also, Colon v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78, 82). "Probable cause consists of such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances to believe plaintiff guilty" (Colon v. City of New York, supra, at 82).
We agree with the trial court that the evidence presented at the trial in the present cases establishes that the motor vehicle inspection stickers that were removed from the claimants' automobiles were forged. Therefore, there was probable cause to arrest each claimant for criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree even though each one denied knowing that the stickers had been forged. While an essential element of the crime of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree is knowledge that the instrument is forged (see, People v. Johnson, 65 N.Y.2d 556, 560-561), and the claimants in the present cases have consistently denied that they knew the stickers on their automobiles were forged, the evidence needed to establish probable cause to justify an arrest need not be the same as that needed to warrant a conviction (see, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149; People v. Miner, 42 N.Y.2d 937, 938; People v. Sanders, 79 A.D.2d 688, 690). Thus, the trial court properly dismissed the claimants' malicious prosecution claims since there was probable cause for the commencement and continuation of the criminal proceedings against the claimants (see, Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 457). Moreover, no unequivocal, exonerating evidence became available to the State after the claimants' arrests and before the charges against the claimants were dropped because the People were not ready for trial in a timely manner (see, e.g., Brown v City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 893, 894; Feinberg v. Saks Co., 56 N.Y.2d 206, 211).
Likewise, the claimants' false arrest and false imprisonment claims were properly dismissed since the claimants' arrests were based on probable cause (see, Broughton v. State of New York, supra; Minott v. City of New York, 203 A.D.2d 265; Kramer v City of New York, 173 A.D.2d 155). Bracken, J.P., O'Brien, Santucci and Florio, JJ., concur.