Opinion
Record No. 1001-93-4
Decided: May 17, 1994
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WINCHESTER, John E. Wetzel, Jr., Judge
Affirmed.
(Thomas Moore Lawson; Hazel Thomas, on briefs), for appellant. Appellant submitting on briefs.
(Jeffery R. Patton, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Willis and Senior Judge Duff
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
We affirm the decision of the trial court terminating the residual parental rights of Virginia Ann Mudd Jenkins ("mother") to her daughter, Rachel Ann Jenkins ("Rachel"). Mother argues that the trial court, in reaching its decision, erred in relying upon her past relationships with her other children rather than assessing her current abilities and the efforts made by the Winchester Department of Social Services ("DSS") following Rachel's birth. We hold that the DSS demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of mother's parental rights was proper and in Rachel's best interest.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, giving it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). "Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986).
Under Code Sec. 16.1-283(B), the residual parental rights of a parent of a child found to be abused or neglected may be terminated if the court makes a three-part finding. First, the termination must be in the child's best interests. Second, the abuse or neglect must present "a serious and substantial threat" to the child's "life, health or development." Code Sec. 16.1-283(B) (1). Third, "[i]t is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child's safe return . . . within a reasonable period of time." Code Sec. 16.1-283(B) (2). See also Kaywood v. Dep't of Social Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 538, 394 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1990). Proof that the parent "suffer[s] from a . . . mental deficiency of such severity that there is no reasonable expectation that such parent will be able to undertake responsibility for the care needed by the child in accordance with his age and stage of development" constitutes prima facie evidence that the conditions have not been corrected so as to allow the child's safe return. Code Sec. 16.1-283(B) (2) (a).
The trial judge made the findings required by Code Sec. 16.1-283(B). In addition, the judge found that mother had been "unable to remedy the circumstances which resulted in the child's placement in the foster care program within twelve months." See Code Sec. 16.1-283(C) (2).
We hold that the trial court's findings are supported by the record. Mother has received extensive services from DSS and other agencies since 1977. Despite these services, her other four children suffered from such severe neglect and abuse, including multiple instances of failure to thrive, that mother's parental rights to each were terminated. Because of this history of abuse, Rachel was placed in the custody of DSS immediately after her birth and has never lived with mother.
Evidence relating to mother's other children was a relevant factor for the trial judge to consider. " '[P]ast actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.' " Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990) (quoting Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1987)). However, the record demonstrates that the trial judge made his decision after examining mother's present ability to care for Rachel.
The evidence indicated that mother was able to care for her own daily needs but that she was functioning at the highest level in which she could be expected to reach. She would never be capable of either caring for Rachel independently or responding to Rachel's needs in an age-appropriate manner. Moreover, Rachel was attached to her foster parents, and removal from that home would cause her permanent harm.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed.