Summary
holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant when, in the thirty minutes before the stop of the defendant, they observed approximately twenty other people drive up the apartment, make contact with a person and be directed by that person to a particular apartment, remain there for less than five minutes, and then leave, and appellant followed the same pattern
Summary of this case from State v. Smith No. 05-05-00608-CR
Opinion Issued February 1, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F03-55510-QW. Affirm.
Before Chief Justice THOMAS and Justices MOSELEY and MALONEY.
Opinion By Justice MALONEY.[fn1] [fn1] The Honorable Frances J. Maloney, Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment.
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Jenard Wesley Jenkins pleaded nolo contendere to possession of cocaine in an amount less than one gram. The trial court found the evidence substantiated appellant's guilt, deferred finding him guilty, placed him on community supervision for one year, and assessed a $500 fine. The judge also certified appellant's right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. In two issues, appellant argues the trial court incorrectly denied his written motion to suppress evidence. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Albert Ruff, a Dallas Police Officer, was watching an apartment complex for drug activity. After observing a series of what he thought to be drug transactions, Ruff radioed Charlie Law, another Dallas Police Officer who was patrolling the same apartment complex, to stop appellant's vehicle. It is this stop that appellant's motion to suppress challenged as unconstitutional. After hearing testimony on the motion, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant and the State then entered into a plea bargain agreement wherein appellant would enter his plea of no contest, agree to the recommended sentence, and appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT HAVE DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE?
In two issues, appellant challenges Ruff's authority to temporarily detain appellant under the United States and the Texas Constitutions. Specifically, he argues that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was committing a crime. The State replies that appellant does not deny Ruff knew the apartment he was watching was a "known drug location." Additionally, the State contends the record shows that Ruff observed a behavior pattern which his experience gave him reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime-drug transactions-was occurring. 1. Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress that does not turn on evaluations of credibility and demeanor. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). We defer to a trial court's determining the historical facts that the record supports, particularly on credibility and demeanor. See id.; see also Leach v. State, 35 S.W.3d 232, 234-35 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). We uphold a trial court's evidentiary ruling if any valid theory exists to support that ruling, regardless of whether the State argued that theory at trial or on appeal. See Graham v. State, 893 S.W.2d 4,7 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no pet.). We review the totality of the circumstances, in light of the officer's experience, in determining whether reasonable suspicion supports a stop. See Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). 2. Applicable Law
We analyze the legality of traffic stops for Fourth Amendment purposes to determine whether the officer's acts were justified at its inception and the search or seizure was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). The Texas Constitution gives no greater protection than the United States Constitution. See Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235-236 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). Police officers may stop and briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than that required for probable cause to arrest. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-26. Officers, however, must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary has occurred, some suggestion that connects the detained person with the unusual activity, and some indication that the activity is related to a crime. See id.; Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). And, the State must elicit "specific[,] articulable facts, which, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, led [officers] to reasonably suspect that appellant `had engaged, was engaging, or was soon to engage in criminal activity.'" See Madden v. State, 177 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.], pet. granted). An officer may make a warrantless arrest for any offense that is committed in the officer's view or presence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005). We look to the facts available to the officer at the moment of stop to determine if those facts amount to more that a mere hunch or suspicion. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 242-43. The factual basis for stopping a vehicle need not arise from the officer's personal observations, but may be supplied by another's information. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972). Detailed information given with sufficient indicia of reliability-reciting specific circumstances and identifying the vehicle and location-sufficiently corroborates and justifies an officer temporarily stopping and detaining a suspect. See Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257-59 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005), cert. denied, 2006 WL 151999 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2006); Pipkin v. State, 114 S.W.3d 649, 654-55 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). 3. The Evidence
a. Albert Ruff On the date in question, Ruff was working in plain clothes, watching an apartment complex where citizens had repeatedly complained of drug activity. He testified that in a thirty-minute period, he saw about twenty people drive up, park, and "contact a particular person at the lower steps." Ruff identified that contact as the "good eye," who would then direct those persons to apartment 201. Those persons would climb the stairs, enter apartment 201, stay in the apartment for two or three minutes, and then leave the area. In Ruff's experience, this pattern of behavior was consistent with drug sales. After watching this activity for about thirty minutes, Ruff alerted uniformed officers that he would notify them of the next person he saw following the "pattern." Appellant was the next person who drove into the complex, spoke to the "good eye," went upstairs, entered apartment 201, stayed a sho of January 12, 2006 rt time, and then left the complex. Ruff then radioed the uniformed officers and described appellant's vehicle, license plate number, and conduct. b. Charlie Law
Law, a Dallas Patrol Officer, was waiting to hear from the undercover officer sitting at a reported drug site watching people come in to buy drugs. When he got the "go" from the undercover officer, he stopped appellant's vehicle. Law approached appellant's vehicle to ask for his license and registration. As Law looked down at the floorboard, he saw something that appeared to be cocaine in plastic baggies next to appellant's left foot. Law then removed appellant from the vehicle and took him to the back of his vehicle to wait for the undercover officer. c. Appellant
Appellant testified that on the night in question, he was looking for his brother who was strung out on drugs. Appellant found a girl in the neighborhood who told him he might find his brother at this particular apartment complex. She went with appellant to help locate his brother. When appellant arrived at the complex, he got out and walked through the breezeway. He never saw his brother or the good eye and never left the first floor of the apartment. 4. Application of Facts to Law
Appellant relies on Defendant's Exhibit numbers one and two — photographs of the stairway in question-to show that from Ruff's vantage point, he could not have seen appellant enter apartment 201. Additionally, appellant asserts that Ruff's testimony at the suppression hearing is contradicted by the fact that the offense report does not mention either the "good eye" or that Ruff observed appellant enter the apartment. Appellant misplaces his reliance. The evidence shows Ruff was at the apartment complex because citizens and "our neighborhood nuisance team" had reported drug activity. People would either walk up or drive up, contact a particular person at the "lower steps" who would direct the people to apartment 201. In a thirty-minute period, Ruff saw "about twenty transactions," wherein people approached the same person at the foot of the stairs, spoke briefly with him, went upstairs to apartment 201, entered the apartment, stayed about two minutes, and immediately left the area. Ruff's experience taught him these activities were consistent with drug buys. Ruff told Law that when the next person repeated this pattern, Ruff would radio the squad cars "to make contact and talk to them." When appellant repeated the "pattern," Ruff gave Law identifying information on appellant's vehicle, including the license plate number. Law stopped a van with the corresponding license plate number. Law approached the driver's side to ask for appellant's driver's license and registration and saw what appeared to be cocaine at appellant's feet. The trial court, as factfinder, apparently believed Ruff's testimony that he saw all of the observed people, including appellant, enter the apartment in question. In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, in light of Ruff's experience and observations, together with the rational inferences from these facts, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have determined Ruff had reasonable suspicion that appellant had been engaged in a drug transaction. Therefore, the trial court correctly denied appellant's motion to suppress. We resolve appellant's issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.