Opinion
C/A 3:22-289-DCC-PJG
05-02-2023
Anansa Jenkins, Plaintiff, v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of South Carolina, d/b/a Palmetto GBA, LLC, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, Anansa Jenkins, filed this employment case raising claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.; the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq.; and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), against her former employer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of South Carolina (“BCBS”). This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 14.) The motion has been fully briefed and is ready for disposition. (See ECF Nos. 14-1, 15, 19.) Having reviewed the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the court finds that the defendant's motion should be denied.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are pertinent to resolution of the defendant's motion and are accepted as true at this procedural stage. Jenkins, an African-American female, was employed by the defendant from 2015 until her resignation in February 2021 after she was repeatedly denied various promotions. After filing an internal complaint with the defendant, she initiated contact with the EEOC in July 2020, completing an intake questionnaire. After several back-and-forth revisions, she filed a formal charge on or around January 25, 2021. A few days later, she digitally signed a second charge on January 28, 2021. She received a right-to-sue letter and then initiated the instant lawsuit.
DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Standard
Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there remain no genuine issues of material fact, and the case can be decided as a matter of law. Tollison v. B & J Machinery Co., 812 F.Supp. 618, 619 (D.S.C. 1993). In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court applies the same standard as for motions made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Independence News, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 568 F.3d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 2009). However, the court may also consider the defendant's answers. See Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 347 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Void v. Orangeburg Cty. Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., Civil Action No. 5:14-cv-02157-JMC, 2015 WL 404247, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2015).
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
B. Defendant's Motion
The defendant's motion is twofold. First, the defendant seeks judgment as to certain claims it contends are procedurally barred because the plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to six specific instances alleged in her Complaint of a failure to hire or promote her. Second and independently, the defendant seeks judgment as to certain claims it argues are time barred.
As an initial matter, the court is mindful that, though the concepts are often related and sometimes intertwined, the requirements of exhaustion of administrative remedies and timeliness are distinct. While both are statutory conditions precedent to bringing an employment discrimination lawsuit based on federal statutes, they are independent requirements. Title VII's exhaustion mandates that a plaintiff first bring a charge with the EEOC or a state deferral agency before filing suit. Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 1843, 1846 (2019); Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000). The purpose of Title VII's requirement to exhaust administrative remedies has been thoroughly discussed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See generally Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 2005). Succinctly, the requirement furthers the goals of notice and conciliation. See id. (“This notice gives the employer an initial opportunity to voluntarily and independently investigate and resolve the alleged discriminatory actions . . . [and] the exhaustion requirement initiates agency-monitored settlement, the primary way that claims of discrimination are resolved.”).
Title VII's timeliness requirements serve a separate (albeit related) purpose. In South Carolina, the charge must be filed within 300 days after an “alleged unlawful employment practice” occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). “This short deadline reflects Congress' strong preference for the prompt resolution of employment discrimination allegations through voluntary conciliation and cooperation.” Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 630-31 (2007), overturned on other grounds due to legislative action, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3 (Jan. 29, 2009). “The limitations periods, while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights laws to those who promptly assert their rights, also protect employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past.” Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980).
Title VII contains two limitations periods. The first requires that an administrative charge be timely filed with the EEOC or state human affairs agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The second requires that any subsequent lawsuit be filed within 90 days of the plaintiff's receipt of the agency's right-to-sue letter. 42 U.SC. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Only the first is at issue here.
1. Procedural Bar and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Before filing suit under Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies by bringing a charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(b), (e)(1); Fort Bend Cnty., Tex., 139 S.Ct. at 1846 (Title VII); Smith, 202 F.3d at 247 (Title VII); see also Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty., Va., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012) (ADA). In the employment discrimination context, courts have interpreted statutory requirements to exhaust administrative remedies to mean that each discrete incident of discriminatory treatment must be administratively exhausted. Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002)); Jones v. U.P.S., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007). The allegations contained in the administrative charge of discrimination generally limit the scope of any subsequent judicial complaint. King v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 538 F.2d 581, 583 (4th Cir. 1976) (stating that a subsequent civil suit “may encompass only the ‘discrimination stated in the [EEOC] charge itself or developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge' ”) (quoting Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 1976)); see also Smith, 202 F.3d at 247 (“A plaintiff's EEOC charge defines the scope of her subsequent right to institute a civil suit.”). Only those claims stated in the initial administrative charge, those reasonably related to the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent lawsuit. Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirming the district court's dismissal of some of the plaintiff's claims because they were outside the scope of her original EEOC charge and were therefore time barred).
Moreover, “[a]llowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumscribe the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge, as surely as would an initial failure to file a timely EEOC charge.” Dorsey v. Pinnacle Automation Co., 278 F.3d 830, 838 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore, a discrimination suit “is limited to discrimination charged in the report to the EEOC or to discrimination actually found by the EEOC upon investigation of the original charge.” Stehle v. Gen. Mills Rest., Inc., 875 F.Supp. 320, 323 (D.S.C. 1994) (Title VII). When a discrimination claim “exceed[s] the scope of the EEOC charge and any charges that would naturally have arisen from an investigation thereof,” it is procedurally barred. Dennis v. Cnty. of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1995).
Here, the defendant argues that while the plaintiff identified by title and number some of the positions for which she was not selected, she did not do so for all of the positions she raises in her Complaint, so those claims are not exhausted. The court disagrees. In her January 25 Charge, Jenkins specifically states, “This is the seventh position in the last 12 months where white males have been selected over me.” (EEOC Charge 1/25/21, ECF No. 4-1 at 2-3.) The defendant describes this sentence as a “passing mention” or “background information,” insufficient to exhaust the claims. But the exhaustion requirement is not meant to be a “tripwire for hapless plaintiffs. While it is important to stop clever parties from circumventing statutory commands, we may not erect insurmountable barriers to litigation out of overly technical concerns.” Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594. Indeed, it is difficult to fathom how the Charge could have been any clearer. Although Jenkins gave more detail as to three of the seven positions she complains about, providing titles or position numbers, the law does not appear to require extreme detail about every alleged adverse act. Compare id. at 595 (finding the plaintiff properly exhausted her administrative remedies when the allegations in administrative documents and formal lawsuit involved the same place of work, same actor, and same type of disability discrimination, even though they differed as to the type of accommodation that was denied) with Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 509 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[I]f the factual foundation in the administrative charge is too vague to support a claim that is later presented in subsequent litigation, that claim will also be procedurally barred.”). The law requires only that the adverse acts be generally described to the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (“[A] charge is sufficient when the Commission receives from the person making the charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of.”) (emphasis added); see also Stehle, 875 F.Supp. at 323 (stating that a “civil suit under Title VII is limited to discrimination charged in the report to the EEOC or to discrimination actually found by the EEOC upon investigation of the original charge”). Here, Jenkins's Charge expressly mentions that she has been denied seven promotions in favor of white males. The court therefore concludes that these claims were “stated in the initial charge” and therefore administratively exhausted. Evans, 80 F.3d at 963.
2. Timeliness
Next the defendant argues that Jenkins's claims based on three of the positions she was not selected for are untimely because she did not file her administrative charge with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission (“SCHAC”) within the statutory 300-day time limit. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). As discussed above, before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies by bringing a charge with the EEOC or a state deferral agency like SCHAC. See Smith, 202 F.3d at 247. The statute does not explicitly define the term “charge,” see Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002), but does set forth certain guidance about the exhaustion process. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e)(1). In South Carolina, the charge must be filed within 300 days after an “alleged unlawful employment practice” occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (e). The failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC bars the claim in federal court. See Fort Bend Ctny., Tex, 139 S.Ct. at 1846 (holding that Title VII's charge-filing requirement is mandatory, although not jurisdictional).
Jenkins filed two administrative charges of discrimination. One was digitally signed on January 25, 2021, the other just a few days later on January 28. She applied for the three positions at issue-Workstation Support Manager (R1005761), Infrastructure Management Manager (R1006340), and I/S Project Manager (R1007372), in 2019. The defendants argue that these claims are outside the permissible 300-day window.
Jenkins presents two arguments in response. First, she contends that discovery is necessary to determine when the discriminatory act occurred-that is, when the defendant denied her the promotions in favor of white males-to determine whether the claims are timely. The court agrees. The record contains only the dates that Jenkins applied for the jobs; it does not specify when she was denied them. A judgment for the defendant on the pleadings as to these claims is inappropriate, as the court cannot say as a matter of law that the claims are untimely. While the timeline may indicate that they are likely untimely, a definitive determination must await a more fully developed record.
Plaintiff also argues that the claims based on these alleged adverse acts are timely because she filed her intake questionnaire on July 17, 2020. The United States Supreme Court has held that an intake questionnaire can in certain circumstances count as an administrative charge. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 404 (2008). Neither party attached the intake questionnaire to the pleadings, however, so again, this determination must await a more fully developed record. See, e.g., Seaton v. City of N. Charleston, No. 2:10-cv-03186-DCN, 2013 WL 6859050, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 30, 2013) (“[T]he limited evidence before the court raises the question whether the . . . correspondence could be deemed a charge under Holowecki. As a result, whether the limitations period in this case ran from [the intake questionnaire] or [the formal charge] is a genuine issue of material fact. The court cannot, as a matter of law, determine whether Seaton's March 2008 correspondence with the EEOC can be deemed a charge because the court has not seen that correspondence.”); but see Vaughn v. Wal-Mart, No. 10CV00031, 2010 WL 4608403, at *4 (W.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2010) (concluding that a plaintiff relying on Holowecki must produce the intake questionnaire he claims constituted a charge or he fails to carry his burden to show a timely filing).
RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff's claims based on the seven positions mentioned in her January 25, 2021 Charge are administratively exhausted. Whether they are all timely must be determined on a more fully developed record. The court therefore recommends that the defendant's motion be denied.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).