Opinion
02 Civ. 5545 (RWS)
November 7, 2003
RUBEN JENARO-GARCIA, Bronx, NY, Plaintiff Pro Se
JOHN E. GURA, JR., ESQ., New York, NY, Of Counsel, for Defendant
OPINION
Plaintiff pro se Ruben Jenaro-Garcia ("Jenaro-Garcia") brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of defendant Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner"), denying plaintiff's request for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). The Commissioner has moved for judgment on the pleadings, seeking an affirmance of the Commissioner's decision.
For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's motion is granted.
Prior Proceedings
On June 16, 1987, Jenaro-Garcia filed applications for disability insurance benefits and SSI, which were denied by the Commissioner. Jenaro-Garcia then filed a separate SSI application on December 21, 1989, which was granted as of the application date, apparently due to a finding of disability. The June 16, 1987, applications were reopened pursuant to the order in the class action Stiebercrer v. Sullivan, 801 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). On October 2, 2000, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") decided to uphold its earlier determination.
Jenaro-Garcia filed a timely request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") which was held on November 21, 2001. On November 30, 2001, the ALJ denied Jenaro-Garcia's claim due to a finding that he had not been disabled at all relevant times. On April 26, 2002, the Appeals Council denied Jenaro-Garcia's request for review and the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Jenaro-Garcia filed suit before the Honorable John S. Martin on July 18, 2002. The Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings was submitted on April 30, 2003, and no opposition was presented by Jenaro-Garcia. The motion was deemed fully submitted upon the transfer of the case to this Court on July 30, 2003.
Facts
Jenaro-Garcia was denied disability insurance benefits from December 1, 1985, the alleged onset of his disability (Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 2), until March 31, 1987, the date he was last insured for disability insurance benefits. Jenaro-Garcia was denied SSI from June 16, 1987, the date of his application, until November 1989, the month before he began receiving SSI benefits. Thus, the relevant period of review is between December 1, 1985, and November 1989. SSI benefits are not payable for any month before the month in which the application is filed. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.335.
Jenaro-Garcia testified at his administrative hearing that he was born on November 17, 1930, and has a third or fourth grade education. Jenaro-Garcia last worked in 1981, loading and unloading trucks. He stated that he had back and leg pain and had back surgery in 1984. Jenaro-Garcia also stated that his condition limited his ability to walk to four to five blocks and his ability to stand to one or two hours. He could sit for one hour continuously and could lift objects weighing up to ten pounds. Jenaro-Garcia testified that he had developed non-insulin dependent diabetes and high blood pressure in approximately 1998.
During the relevant time, Jenaro-Garcia's only source of medical care was St. Barnabas Hospital. Jenaro-Garcia told the ALJ that he did not have any relevant medical records in his possession. Paul Gaudio, the director of the hospital's medical records department, wrote a letter to the SSA dated July 21, 2000, stating that records concerning Jenaro-Garcia's treatment from 1981 through 1989 were destroyed pursuant to relevant law, regulations, and hospital policy.
The Commissioner's Finding Must Be Upheld
The issue here is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's finding that Jenaro-Garcia is not disabled, as that term is defined in the Act, for the period for which he seeks benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), 1382c(a)(3) (defining disability).
I. Standard of Review
In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court is generally limited to considering the factual allegations set forth in the complaint and corresponding answer. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings only if it is clear that no material issues of fact remain to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Juster Assocs. v. Rutland, 901 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1990); Adames v. Chater, No. 95 Civ. 9384, 1996 WL 306549 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Madonna v. United States, 783 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
The Act provides that the "findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). Thus, the Commissioner's determination must be upheld if the Court finds there is substantial evidence supporting it, even if there is also substantial evidence for the plaintiff's position. Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990); Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982); see DeChirico v. Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177, 1182 (2d Cir. 1998) (Commissioner's decision affirmed where substantial evidence for both sides).
Substantial evidence in this context has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. at 1427, quoting Consolidated Edison co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998).
In addressing the present motion, the Court is mindful that the plaintiff is proceeding pro se and that his submissions should be held "`to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. . . .'" Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176 (1980) (per curiam) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595 (1972)); see also Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d 21, 22 (2d Cir. 1993). Indeed, district courts should "read the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.'" McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the Court is also aware that pro se status "Moes not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (quotations omitted).
II. Burden of Proof
In order to establish disability under the Act, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing: (1) that he was unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment that could have been expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, and (2) that the existence of such impairment was demonstrated by evidence supported by data obtained by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation for adjudication of disability claims, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has articulated as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a "listed" impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform. . . . [T]he claimant bears the burden of proof as to the first four steps, while the [Commissioner] must prove the final one.Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); accord DeChirico, 134 F.3d at 1179-80.
If a finding of disability or non-disability can be made at any point in the sequential analysis, the Commissioner will not review the claim further. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a).
III. Jenaro-Garcia Has Failed to Demonstrate that He Had a Severe Impairment
After determining that Jenaro-Garcia was not engaged in substantial gainful activity at the relevant time, the ALJ then determined that Jenaro-Garcia had failed to meet his burden of proof by demonstrating that he had a severe impairment or combination of impairments during the period under review. See Berry, 675 F.2d at 467 ("the claimant bears the burden as to the first four steps [of the sequential evaluation").
Jenaro-Garcia presented no medical evidence for the period under review.
An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require. An individual's statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this section; there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment.42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); Peterson v. Gardner, 391 F. Supp.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1968); Keller v. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, No. 01 Civ. 4334, 2002 WL 31778867, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2002).
Congress requires the Commissioner to develop a complete medical record and make every reasonable effort to obtain all medical evidence from the treating physician (see 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B) and 1382c(a)(3)(E)). The Commissioner fulfilled this obligation in contacting Jenaro-Garcia's only source of medical care.
Because Jenaro-Garcia did not meet his burden of demonstrating disability during the relevant time, the Commissioner properly denied his claim.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's determination is affirmed.
It is so ordered.