Opinion
F082868
11-29-2021
In re D.F.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. D.D., Objector and Appellant. J.C., Petitioner and Respondent,
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant. Law Offices of Lindsey A. Bannerman and Lindsey A. Bannerman, for Petitioner and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. No. FL15937 Laura Leslie Krieg, Judge.
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Law Offices of Lindsey A. Bannerman and Lindsey A. Bannerman, for Petitioner and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT[*]
J.C. (respondent) filed a petition seeking to have his stepson, D.F.D., declared free from parental custody and control of D.F.D.'s biological father, D.D., under Family Code sections 7822 (abandonment) and 7825 (felony conviction, the facts of which prove unfitness to have future custody and control of the child). The court granted the petition under both grounds. D.D. (appellant) appeals, contending insufficient evidence supports the court's findings. We affirm.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondent in this matter is married to D.F.D.'s biological mother, L.C. On February 7, 2019, respondent filed a petition to declare D.F.D. free from parental custody and control of appellant so respondent could adopt him. The petition alleged (1) that appellant had left D.F.D. in the care of L.C. and had had no contact with him with the intent to abandon him (§ 7822) and (2) that appellant had been convicted of felonies, the facts of which were "of such a nature so as to prove the unfitness of [appellant] to have the future custody and control" of D.F.D. (§ 7825)). The court held a contested hearing on the petition on February 3 and 4, 2021.
L.C. met appellant in Tennessee where he was stationed in the army. They dated for three years and married in April 2011, shortly after which appellant was honorably discharged. In July 2011, law enforcement served a search warrant and seized appellant's computer based on suspicion of child pornography possession. Appellant was arrested and released on bail. Appellant led L.C. to believe the case was "unimportant" and that his roommates had used his computer. The two thereafter moved to Florida where appellant's mother lived.
L.C. became pregnant with D.F.D. and subsequently, in August 2013, appellant underwent a jury trial in Tennessee and was found guilty of 39 felony counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, having over 50 videos and 4, 000 images of child pornography on his computer from May 2011 to June 2011. He was immediately taken into custody and was required to register as a sex offender in the State of Tennessee.
D.F.D. was born in October 2013. Later that month, L.C. brought D.F.D. to appellant's sentencing hearing, where appellant had a five-minute video call with D.F.D. This was the only time appellant ever saw D.F.D. Appellant was sentenced to 13 years in prison, with a parole eligibility date in 2022. Appellant maintained his innocence throughout the trial, as well as the underlying termination proceedings. Appellant brought an unsuccessful appeal, and at the time of the underlying proceedings, had a petition for writ of habeas corpus pending.
In November 2013, L.C. moved to California to be closer to her family. She filed for divorce from appellant in January 2014, and the divorce was finalized in October 2014. Appellant agreed to L.C. being awarded sole legal and physical custody of D.F.D., with her having discretion over whether appellant had visitation. Appellant stated he agreed to the custody and visitation arrangement because L.C. told him she needed sole custody in order to make medical decisions for D.F.D. There was no child support order. Thereafter, appellant never attempted to file a request for an order to modify custody, visitation, or child support. L.C. testified that appellant had been emotionally abusive toward her during their relationship, including an incident where he waved a loaded handgun in her face while intoxicated.
In March 2014, L.C. began dating respondent, and they married in November 2015. L.C. testified that respondent had acted as a father figure for D.F.D., including supporting him through health issues earlier in his life. Respondent testified that he introduced D.F.D. as his son and wished to adopt him.
Appellant had no restrictions on phone or mail communication at any time during his incarceration. When appellant first went to prison, he wrote letters to L.C. via her parents' post office box, and, according to L.C., would also call L.C. "50 times a day." L.C. testified the nature of the calls was "not healthy" and not about D.F.D. Appellant asked L.C. inappropriate questions about a miscarriage she had suffered as well as inappropriate questions about her sexual relations. Sometime in 2014, L.C. asked appellant not to call as often but he continued to do so. In 2016, L.C. changed her phone number and cut off telephone contact with appellant. According to appellant, appellant would call to speak to D.F.D. before L.C. changed her phone number, but L.C. would either not respond or D.F.D. would be asleep. Appellant denied interrogating L.C. about her life when he called.
Appellant testified that when he first went to prison, he wrote stories for D.F.D. and sent them to L.C. Appellant tried to send D.F.D cards "as best as [he] could," and in 2014 or 2015, he would read stories for D.F.D. to his mother, who would record them into books. Appellant testified he made arrangements through the Angel Tree Project through a church for D.F.D. to receive Christmas presents though L.C. did not recall receiving these presents. Appellant also testified he sent D.F.D. letters on his birthdays, Christmas, and Thanksgiving, but they got returned, so he began sending them to his mother to send to L.C. L.C. communicated with appellant's mother somewhat regularly via email, and appellant's mother and stepfather often sent gifts to D.F.D. L.C. stated that the communication appellant's mother sent on behalf of appellant, however, contained statements directed towards her, such as calling L.C. his soul mate, which she found inappropriate, and she requested appellant's mother stop sending her things from appellant in order to establish a healthy boundary. In March 2018, L.C. ended the relationship between herself and appellant's mother altogether.
Though L.C. took steps to cut off communication with appellant via telephone and through appellant's mother, she testified appellant was always free to contact D.F.D. through L.C. via mail, and L.C. took no steps to prevent him from mailing her anything directly through her parents' post office box, which never changed during the time relevant to the proceedings. L.C. testified that from 2016 through 2018, she received no written communication from appellant, though in 2019, he wrote a letter to her and respondent asking them to reconsider the petition to terminate his parental rights. The letter was sent to her and respondent's home though L.C. never gave appellant her address.
Appellant was always employed full time during his incarceration. At one point, he got a job that paid $1 per hour and in November 2017, sent a check to his mother made out to L.C. in the amount of $50. According to appellant's mother, she forwarded L.C. the check, but L.C. told her she did not want or need appellant's money. L.C. testified she never received the check. Appellant did not want to keep sending L.C. money if she was not going to cash the checks, so he did not attempt to send any more money. He quit the job that made $1 per hour because he had disagreements with his supervisor, and instead obtained a job where he made 50 cents per hour.
After appellant was incarcerated, L.C. had access to appellant's bank account into which the Veteran's Administration (VA) deposited disability benefits and into which appellant's father deposited money for her use, from which she made some withdrawals. The disability benefits ceased when the VA learned appellant was in prison. The deposits from appellant's father stopped in 2015. L.C. testified that appellant provided no financial support from 2015 through 2019.
Appellant testified he would not abandon D.F.D. in "a million years." Appellant stated that if respondent's petition were denied, he "would do anything and everything [for D.F.D.] … whatever [L.C.] allows me to do, I would do, and then above and beyond." In July 2017, appellant took a parenting class. Appellant testified he did not file any requests for an order to modify visitation or establish child support because he did not think he would be able to as he was incarcerated. Appellant admitted that at some point he stopped sending letters and calling because he did not want to harass L.C.
D.F.D. told the investigating social worker he did not know appellant. He expressed "without hesitation" that he desired to be adopted by respondent. Though he demonstrated a limited understanding of the nature of the proceedings due to his age, he understood they were necessary in order for him to be adopted. He stated, with a smile, he wanted to have respondent's last name.
The court took the matter under submission and issued a written ruling on April 13, 2021. The court found by clear and convincing evidence appellant abandoned D.F.D. within the meaning of section 7822. The court noted appellant's actions of possessing child pornography and his subsequent incarceration were not excuses for "not supporting, or making any more than token efforts at having communication with his child, for the statutory period and beyond." The court noted that while L.C. changed her phone number, appellant "admit[ted] that he did nothing to assert his rights in family law court or other court proceeding." The court further found that appellant only attempted to send one check for D.F.D. in 2017 and "even if the court gives credit to [appellant] for the withdrawals made by [L.C.] from the [bank] account that [appellant's family member] put money into, the court finds those withdrawals to be insufficient for the statutory time period as they stopped completely in January of 2015." The court further stated that appellant had seen D.F.D. only once for a few minutes before being transported to prison, and that D.F.D. had no memory of appellant and wished to be adopted by respondent. The court concluded it was in D.F.D's best interest to be adopted by respondent.
The court also found appellant had been convicted of 39 felony counts of sexual exploitation of a minor for possessing over 50 videos and 4, 000 images of minors engaged in sexual activity or simulating sexual activity. The court noted appellant provided no evidence that he had undergone any sex offender treatment and that the facts of his case show a sexual attraction to minors. The court concluded those facts were of a nature that prove unfitness of appellant to have future custody and control of D.F.D.
The court accordingly granted respondent's petition to free D.F.D from the parental custody and control of appellant.
DISCUSSION
Section 7800 et seq. governs proceedings to have a minor child declared free from a parent's custody and control. (§ 7802; Adoption of Allison C. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1009 (Allison C.).) "A declaration of freedom from parental custody and control … terminates all parental rights and responsibilities with regard to the child." (§ 7803.)
A court may declare a child free from parental custody and control if the parent has abandoned the child. (§ 7822; Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1010.) Abandonment may occur when "[o]ne parent has left the child in the care and custody of the other parent for a period of one year without any provision for the child's support, or without communication from the parent, with the intent on the part of the parent to abandon the child." (§ 7822, subd. (a)(3).)" 'The … failure to provide support, or failure to communicate is presumptive evidence of the intent to abandon. If the parent … ha[s] made only token efforts to support or communicate with the child, the court may declare the child abandoned by the parent ….'" (§ 7822, subd. (b).) "The parent need not intend to abandon the child permanently; rather, it is sufficient that the parent had the intent to abandon the child during the statutory period." (In re Amy A. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 63, 68.) It is not required that the statutory period be the period immediately preceding the filing of the petition. (Adoption of A.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 912, 922 (A. B.).)
We review the family court's findings under section 7822 for substantial evidence, bearing in mind the clear and convincing standard of proof. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)" 'An appellate court is not empowered to disturb a decree adjudging that a minor is an abandoned child if the evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding of fact as to the abandonment.'" (In re Brittany H. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 533, 549.) Abandonment and intent are questions of fact for the trial judge and the trial judge's decision, when supported by substantial evidence, is binding upon the reviewing court. (Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011.) "In determining if substantial evidence exists, we consider the evidence in a manner that favors the order being challenged." (A.B., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 922.) We do not evaluate "the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in the evidence or determine the weight of the evidence." (In re E.M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 828, 839.) On appeal, the appellant bears the burden of establishing insufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings. (Ibid.)
Appellant first contends he did not leave D.F.D. within the meaning of the statute because his absence from D.F.D.'s life was due to his incarceration and did not constitute a voluntary desertion. We conclude the evidence supports a finding appellant "left" D.F.D. (§ 7822.)
As a threshold matter, we note a parent's incarceration" 'does not, in and of itself, provide a legal defense to abandonment .…'" (Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1012.) Rather, "[A] parent voluntarily abandons their parental role if they choose to commit criminal acts that result in incarceration." (In re H.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 42, 51 (H.D.); see Allison C., at p. 1012.)
Here, appellant's voluntary actions of possessing child pornography resulted in his incarceration. We acknowledge that appellant disputes his conviction; however, his conviction was the result of a jury finding him guilty of the offenses, evidence which was before the trial court and constitutes substantial evidence that appellant committed the crimes for which he was convicted. Further, during the marriage dissolution proceedings, appellant voluntarily agreed to L.C. having sole legal and physical custody of D.F.D. with no visitation except at L.C.'s discretion. (See H.D., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 51 ["Leaving a child in the care of another does not require a literal physical desertion; instead '[c]ase law consistently focuses on the voluntary nature of a parent's abandonment of the parental role ….' ")
Moreover, even in situations when a child is effectively "taken" from a parent by court order, voluntary inaction on the part of the parent can convert a "taking" to a "leaving" with intent to abandon the child. (In re Marriage of Jill & Victor D. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 491, 504-505.) Indeed, "[n]umerous appellate decisions have long agreed that the leaving-with-intent-to-abandon-the-child requirement of section 7822 can be established by evidence of a parent's voluntary inaction after an order granting primary care and custody to the other parent." (Id. at p. 505.)
Though there was no judicial "taking" here as appellant voluntarily agreed to the order, even assuming for the sake of appellant's argument that appellant did not leave D.F.D. when he committed the acts that led to his incarceration and that the custody and visitation order did constitute a "taking," the record supports appellant's subsequent "voluntary inaction" eventually converted it to a "leaving." The record demonstrates L.C. cut off several avenues of communication with appellant and did not facilitate regular communication between appellant and D.F.D. Thus, had appellant wanted to have communication with D.F.D., he would have needed to file a request for an order establishing such. The evidence is uncontroverted, however, that appellant failed to seek to modify the agreement. Appellant's failure to make any attempt to establish some contact through family court in light of L.C.'s position on visitation reasonably constitutes "inaction" supporting the trial court's finding appellant "left" D.F.D. in L.C.'s custody. The trial court's finding appellant "left" D.F.D. is supported by substantial evidence.
Next, appellant contends, in the alternative, that the evidence did not support a finding appellant intended to abandon D.F.D. Here, the parties agree appellant had no communication with and provided no support for D.F.D. for the statutory period, triggering the presumption under section 7822, subdivision (b) that appellant had the intent to abandon D.F.D. The trial court found appellant's efforts to communicate and support D.F.D. were "token" under the circumstances of the case and therefore that appellant did not overcome the presumption.
Section 7822 expressly provides that only token efforts to support or communicate with the child do not disturb the presumption of an intent to abandon. (§ 7822, subd. (b); see In re B.J.B. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1201, 1212.) The question of "whether the statutory presumption has been overcome satisfactorily" is a question of fact within the trial court's province. (In re Marriage of Jill & Victor D., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.) Accordingly," '[w]hen the evidence permits the conclusion of only token efforts to communicate with the child,' the' "findings and order of the trial court under [the abandonment statute] must be sustained,"' unless' "the presumption of abandonment raised by [token efforts to communicate] has been overcome as a matter of law.…" '" (Ibid.) In determining a parent's intent to abandon, the trial court "must objectively measure the parent's conduct, 'consider[ing] not only the number and frequency of his or her efforts to communicate with the child, but the genuineness of' the parent's efforts." (A.B., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 923.)
The question here is whether the trial court's finding that appellant's efforts to communicate with D.F.D. were "token" is supported by the evidence. We conclude that it is. We acknowledge appellant's circumstances allowed for very limited communication and support, complicated both by his incarceration and his strained relationship with L.C. We keep these factors in mind in evaluating the trial court's determination.
We note that appellant appeared to be very active in the beginning of his incarceration by attempting to communicate with L.C. by phone and by mail though the evidence is conflicting as to whether appellant's intent was to maintain a relationship with L.C. or establish one with D.F.D. Appellant also attempted to send one check to his mother for the benefit of L.C. and D.F.D., and the evidence is, again, conflicting as to whether L.C. returned it or simply never received it. The evidence is uncontroverted, however, that as time went by, L.C. became more adamant about not wanting to communicate with appellant and eventually allowed no phone contact nor mail contact through appellant's mother. According to L.C., this was based in part on her perception appellant was inappropriate in his communication with her rather than focused on D.F.D. We acknowledge that L.C.'s attempts to cut off contact with appellant, whether justified or not, affected appellant's ability to communicate with D.F.D. According to L.C., however, appellant was free to write to D.F.D. directly through her parents' post office box but did not do so from 2016 through 2019.
Further, in light of these circumstances, one of appellant's options, and perhaps his best option for attempting to communicate with D.F.D., was filing a request for an order through family court. That he made no attempt to do so is established by uncontroverted evidence. The trial court questioned appellant thoroughly on his reasons for this failure:
"THE COURT: [] Did you attempt to have the family law court intervene on your behalf in any way? Did you attempt to file anything in family court regarding visitation and/or support?
"[APPELLANT]: I thought about it several times; however, with me being locked up, I didn't know if I was even allowed to do that.
"THE COURT: Did you make any inquiries as to whether you were allowed to do that?
"[APPELLANT]: No. I thought I'd have to be released in order for me to do any kind of visitation or try to get anything done that way.
"THE COURT: And you are aware that you can participate in court proceedings, even though you're incarcerated, correct?
"[APPELLANT]: I knew that I was able to call in; however I didn't know that-if I was going to file any paperwork. As to try to get custody or visitation, I didn't know if that was actually going to be allowed, being the fact that I am still incarcerated, and I thought it would have to wait until I got out.
"THE COURT: Did you attempt to speak to an attorney about filing any proceedings in family law court regarding visitation or support for your son at any time since you've been incarcerated?
"[APPELLANT]: No. This is the first attorney that I have dealing with any of this right now.
"THE COURT: And you hired this attorney after the petition to terminate your parental rights was filed; is that correct?
"[APPELLANT]: Correct."
In light of appellant's answers to the trial court's examination, the trial court could reasonably conclude appellant did not make an adequate effort to establish visitation rights and/or a support order, which, based on the circumstances, was likely one of the only ways he was going to be able to communicate with D.F.D. The evidence supported a finding that appellant was aware of how to contact attorneys and that he could participate in legal proceedings from prison, as he had a criminal attorney and had filed both an appeal and a habeas petition in connection with his criminal case. He had also hired an attorney for the underlying termination proceedings and actively participated in the proceedings underlying this appeal. He had no restrictions on phone or mail and was in regular communication with his mother. Appellant admitted he did not even inquire as to what his options in family court were and suggested he did not plan to until he was released from custody, which supports the presumption of intent to abandon at least until appellant's release. We again point out the intent to abandon does not need to be permanent; there is evidence supporting the trial court's finding for at least the statutory period of one year.
We reject appellant's suggestion that any effort to assert his rights in family court would have been "futile" because L.C. would not have cooperated with a court order. Such a suggestion is speculative and not supported by the record, as there is no evidence L.C. would have violated a court order.
Based on appellant's failure to even inquire as to his rights and remedies in family court, especially in light of his minimum nine and a half years of incarceration, the trial court was reasonable in finding appellant's attempts at communicating with D.F.D. were "token" under the totality of the circumstances. Appellant does not contend, and we do not find, based on the above reasons, that the presumption was overcome as a matter of law. We must therefore defer to the trial court's finding and, accordingly, conclude it did not err by relying on the presumption.
Appellant's comparison of the present case to H.D., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th 42 does not alter our conclusion. In H.D., the father, the respondent, went to court ex parte to obtain custody based on the mother, the appellant's "active alcohol and methamphetamine addictions." (Id. at p. 51.) The appellant admitted that a few months prior to the respondent's request that she had stopped trying to contact the children because the respondent was not allowing contact due to her addictions. She instead decided to focus on getting healthy and fighting for custody in family court. (Id. at p. 46.) The appellant agreed to the custody order and to seek treatment for her addictions; she thereafter immediately sought treatment, got sober, and returned to court for modification of the custody order. (Ibid.) The appellant failed to communicate or support her daughters for the statutory period while she was in treatment and working on her sobriety. (Id. at p. 52.) She testified she let the father assume custody "only for so long as it took her to treat her addictions and return to family court to seek modification of the custody arrangement. (Ibid.) Several family members corroborated this testimony. (Ibid.) The trial court found the appellant had abandoned her children, relying solely on the presumption. (Id. at p. 53.)
The appellate court in H.D. reversed, finding the court erred by relying on the presumption and "ignor[ing] the overwhelming undisputed evidence [the appellant] actually never intended to abandon her daughters and was actively working to reunite with them." (H.D., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 53.) The appellate court noted the "weightiest evidence of intent … was [the appellant's] actions[, as a]fter becoming and remaining sober, [the appellant] wasted no time in returning to family court and seeking to regain custody." (Id. at p.52.)
H.D. is distinguishable from the present case. In H.D., the appellant made a conscious decision to take steps to better her life and her ability to parent her children, and her failure to contact or support her children was a direct result of this decision. In contrast, in the present case, there is no evidence on the record that appellant's failure to communicate with or support D.F.D. was done with D.F.D.'s interest in mind. Rather, it appears appellant's stated reasons for the failure were that L.C. did not adequately facilitate or encourage communication or support and further that he did not know or attempt to find out what remedies he had in family court. This is unlike the appellant in H.D., who instead of conceding to the respondent's decision not to allow contact without further action, decided to do what was necessary to obtain custody and visitation rights through court.
Finally, appellant contends the court inappropriately considered D.F.D.'s best interests in determining whether the statutory requirements of abandonment had been met. We disagree.
While sections 7822 and 7825 do not reference the best interests of the child, the purpose of the statutory scheme is to "serve the welfare and best interest of a child" (§ 7800), and it is to be "liberally construed to serve and protect the interests and welfare of the child" (§ 7801). In conducting hearings pursuant to both section 7822 and 7825, the court "shall consider the wishes of the child, bearing in mind the age of the child, and shall act in the best interest of the child." (§ 7890.)
The best interests of a child are "paramount in interpreting and implementing the statutory scheme" governing when and how to free a child from parental custody and control. (Neumann v. Melgar (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 152, 162.) Thus, the best interests of the child is always an overarching concern where, as here, a petitioner has presented clear and convincing evidence satisfying one of the statutes. (See In re Baby Boy S. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 925, 933 ["Absent intent on the part of the parents to abandon the child, as the court found here, the best interests and welfare criteria are simply not applicable."].)
Appellant argues that because the trial court asked questions about how D.F.D.'s best interests would be served by its ruling on the petition during his trial counsel's argument, the trial court's consideration of D.F.D.'s best interests was "premature" as it had not made a finding a statutory ground for termination had been met. We are not convinced. The trial court established at the beginning of the hearing and just before closing arguments that it would not be ruling from the bench and instead taking the matter under submission and issuing a written ruling. As the trial court would be taking the matter under submission and was required under the statutory scheme to consider D.F.D.'s best interests in the event it found the statutory requirements for freedom of parental custody and control had been met, it was reasonable for the trial court to ask questions related to D.F.D.'s best interest prior to ruling.
(1) "THE COURT: I know [appellant] maintains his innocence; however, he did have a jury trial and was convicted of 39 counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. That's very concerning to the court, coupled with the fact that he has never had any relationship with [D.F.D.] [¶] [D.F.D.] has no memory of him. He has never met him. He, for all intents and purposes, has been raised by [respondent]. Tell me how it's in the best interest of [D.F.D.] at this point in his life to uproot his stability in this stable home and allow some kind of relationship to occur with [appellant] who I recognize parental rights are one of our most fundamental rights; however, rights can be taken away from us for terrible choices that we make or terrible circumstances that we find ourselves in, and I do not want to undermine the fact that [appellant] has his parental rights currently. [¶] However, I need you to address how you think it's in the best interest of [D.F.D.] for the court not to terminate [appellant's] parental rights based on his 39 felony convictions of sexual exploitation of a minor based on the fact that he has no relationship with [D.F.D.] at all, [D.F.D.] does not know him, he has never spent any time with [D.F.D.], and largely because he has placed himself in the circumstance he finds himself. [¶] [Respondent] has raised [D.F.D.], so I do need you to address how [appellant's] criminal history and the circumstances he finds himself in still point to the best interests of the court uprooting everything [D.F.D.] knows at this moment and placing him in a situation where he has a significant relationship with [appellant;]" and [¶] … [¶] (2) "THE COURT: Well, [counsel], would you agree that a 12-year-old boy, that's the time of life that it's fundamental in development in learning how to be a man, and you're telling me that a child who has been with [respondent] for 12 years at the age of 12 should be uprooted and told, you need to have a relationship with this person who you don't even know, and that's in his best interest at the age of 12?" Appellant takes issue with the following comments by the trial court during argument:
In its written ruling, the court correctly set forth the statutory requirements, stated it had found respondent met his burden, analyzed each of the factors, and in the last paragraph, appropriately noted how D.F.D.'s best interests would be served by the termination of parental rights. We find no "premature" or inappropriate reliance on D.F.D.'s best interests.
We find the evidence supports the court's finding of abandonment and thus termination was proper under section 7822. As such, we need not address appellant's contention insufficient evidence supported the trial court's findings under section 7825. (See In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1384 [affirmance is proper if the judgment is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court's April 13, 2021 order granting respondent's petition to free D.F.D. from parental custody and control of appellant is affirmed.
[*] Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Peña, J. and DeSantos, J.