Opinion
E073790
01-13-2020
J.B. et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Bruce C. Williams for Petitioner J.B. Anastasia M. Georggin for Petitioner B.B. No appearance for Respondent. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Anna M. Marchand, and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1900201) OPINION ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Matthew C. Perantoni, Judge. Petitions denied. Bruce C. Williams for Petitioner J.B. Anastasia M. Georggin for Petitioner B.B. No appearance for Respondent. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Anna M. Marchand, and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
I
INTRODUCTION
Petitioners B.B. (Mother) and J.B. (Father) have a history with child protective services due to neglect and physical abuse of their children, resulting in the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (IDCFS) and the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) removing the children from their care. Mother and Father seek extraordinary writs to vacate the orders of the juvenile court denying them reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 and setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.)
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
Both parents argue that the juvenile court erred in admitting evidence from the Illinois case, including court documents and statements by an Illinois social worker. Mother additionally contends (1) the juvenile court erred in sustaining the first amended petition and finding the children have suffered or will suffer serious physical harm; (2) the court abused its discretion in denying services to her; and (3) the court abused its discretion in finding reunification services was not in the children's best interest. Father joins in the writ filed by Mother. The parents have also requested a temporary stay of the section 366.26 hearing. Finding no merit to the asserted claims, we deny Mother and Father's writ petitions. We also deny their requests for a temporary stay.
The parents' children in the IDCFS cases are not subjects in this appeal. This appeal only involves the twins, Jz.B. and Jv.B.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. IDCFS Case
Mother has six children, 13-year-old L.G., eight-year-old S.B., five-year-old Jgs.B., four-year-old Jgh.B., and 14-month-old twins Jz.B. and Jv.B. The family initially came to the attention of IDCFS in 2011, due to physical abuse and neglect, when S.B., then three months old, was admitted to the hospital for non-organic failure to thrive. A skeletal survey revealed S.B. had numerous fractures and the parents' explanation of the injuries were inconsistent with the medical findings. S.B. also had severed toes. Specifically, the skeletal survey showed S.B. had a broken clavicle and bruising on her foot, and a second skeletal survey showed a possible skull fracture and metatarsal fracture. It was determined that S.B.'s bone fractures did not occur at birth or at the time of her other foot injuries. S.B.'s foot injuries were also not the result of a dog's nail severing them as explained by the parents, but more likely resulting from her toes being crushed or yanked. In April 2011, IDCFS took S.B. into protective custody and placed her in foster care.
Mother also had an older child, L.G., who lived with the maternal grandmother. Mother was married, but estranged from her husband, who had reportedly stopped contact with Mother during her pregnancy with S.B. A paternity test revealed Father was not S.B.'s biological father, and in June 2011, Father was dismissed from S.B.'s case without services.
In July 2011, Mother was found to be "'unfit'" based on S.B. being born positive for cannabis, S.B.'s non-organic failure to thrive, and S.B. having a severe toe injury resulting in partial loss of toes and multiple fractures with no explanation. Additionally, Mother had lied to the Illinois social worker about her cannabis use. Mother had a history of mental health issues, including hearing voices, depression, and cutting herself. S.B. was declared a dependent of the court and Mother was provided with reunification services.
In February 2012, Father was found to be an "'unfit'" parent involving another child, Illinois case No. 11JA180. In September 2013, Mother and Father were found to be "'unfit'" parents involving their other children, Illinois case No. 11JA52, and it was determined both parents had not completed their reunification services.
A court report dated March 5, 2019, indicated that Mother and Father had not made satisfactory progress towards their case plan. The parents also had not visited their children, or contacted IDCFS, since August 2018.
On April 10, 2019, a petition to terminate Mother and Father's parental rights was filed in Peoria County, Illinois, and the hearing was scheduled for May 13, 2019.
B. DPSS Case
On April 1, 2019, DPSS received a referral with allegations that the parents had lost custody of their four children in the state of Illinois, and Mother had since given birth to twins in California. DPSS social worker spoke with an IDCFS social worker, who reported that family members confirmed the parents had fled to California to give birth to the twins to avoid IDCFS intervention. The IDCFS social worker also confirmed that the parents had an open case in Illinois and that the four older children had been removed from parental custody twice due to physical abuse and were in a permanent placement. Further, it was reported that Father's visits with his five-year-old child, Jgs.B., had been terminated, because the child expressed fear of being abused by Father. When Jgs.B. was removed from parental care, he had "bruising and cuts on his face, as well as cigarette burns on his ankles."
DPSS was concerned that the twins were at substantial risk of suffering similar abuse from the parents and that the parents might flee the jurisdiction with the children. DPSS made several attempts to locate the parents and the twins. On April 14, 2019, Father called DPSS, and said the children were safe, but declined to meet the social worker in person. The social worker encouraged him to make the children available to DPSS. However, he refused to disclose his current residence. He stated that he "studied the law during the seven years that he was involved in the child welfare case in Illinois." He also stated that he was "'tired of dealing with DCFS'" and that was the reason why he and Mother left Illinois.
Father called back later to report that the paternal grandmother would bring the twins to the DPSS office. Mother was "'upset'" and did not want to speak with the social worker. The paternal grandmother surrendered the children to DPSS on April 15, 2019. Both twins were free of any visible marks or bruises. However, upon arrival, the children and their belongings "reeked of smoke, and their diapers were drenched in urine, as urine dripped from the children when" they were taken from their car seats. One of the twins "appeared to be in discomfort, as her stomach was extremely hard, she was gassy, and remained tense." Father reported the child was constipated.
When interviewed on April 16, 2019, Father stated that S.B.'s foot injuries were caused by a dog landing on her foot while chasing a mouse. He claimed that S.B. "was taken into custody, because their stories were inconsistent with the injuries." He also said that his parental rights were terminated to another child, J.W., who has a different mother, in 2012 or 2013, after he failed to reunify with the child. Father was offered reunification services at least three times but was unable to complete and/or benefit from his services.
Father stated that the children he has with Mother were removed from their care in 2015, returned to them in 2016 on family maintenance, and again removed and returned to their care in 2017. He explained that in 2017, the children were removed for suspicion of physical abuse, after one of the children had accidentally hit himself in the face with handcuffs, leaving a bruise. However, the children were returned to parental care after one month. The children were once again removed in May 2017 when the parents lost housing, and their visitation was reduced to once a month. Father acknowledged that he had not visited the children since August 2018 when he moved to California. Father also explained that his visitation with Jgs.B. was terminated, because the child was fearful of him, and had adverse effects following visitation.
In addition, Father reported a serious criminal history, both as a minor and as an adult. He was charged with lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14 years of age in 2001 and arrested in 2005 for rape by force with a knife. He was also arrested in 2012 or 2013 for trespassing, and in 2014 for fleeing the scene of an accident. He denied abusing drugs and alcohol, but reported that he was previously ordered to submit to random drug tests in his Illinois dependency case. He also denied any domestic violence between him and Mother, but said that Mother had been a victim of domestic violence in a previous relationship and, therefore, he was ordered to complete domestic violence counseling.
Mother was also interviewed on April 16, 2019. She stated that she lived with Father but did not want to disclose their address. She was unemployed and received SSI benefits due to a learning disability. She stopped visiting and communicating with her four children in Illinois when she moved to California in August 2018. Mother explained that S.B. and L.G. were initially removed from her care when S.B. was injured by their dog in 2011, and that Jgs.B. and Jgh.B. were removed when they were born due to her open dependency case with her other two children. Mother also stated that she was ordered to complete parenting classes and domestic violence counseling and to submit to random drug testing twice a month. She denied using drugs, and reported receiving completion certificates for her services, but left them in Illinois and did not have access to them. She further said that she and Father had completed all required services on their case plan, but the children were not returned to them because they did not have stable housing. She denied that she and Father attempted to flee Illinois due to their open dependency case. Mother was arrested in 2011 for aggravated battery.
The parents also had a prior child welfare history in the state of California. Kern County received two referrals alleging general neglect in January 2019. The referrals stated that the parents moved to Kern County for Mother to give birth to avoid "CPS in Illinois." It was also reported that in April 2011, Father "bit off the toe of his 3 months old baby, and the children were removed from the parents. In April 2016, the children were returned to the parents. In January 2017, the children were again removed from the parents because [Father] physically beat one of the children. The parents moved to Kern County so the twins would not be removed from them." The dispositions were inconclusive, because the Kern County social worker was unable to make contact with the family, despite making five attempts, including attempts by certified mail, telephone, and in person to the family home. The telephone number the social worker called was the same number listed as Father's contact number in the current case.
On April 17, 2019, DPSS filed a petition on behalf of the twins pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect).
On April 18, 2019, at the detention hearing, the juvenile court formally detained the children. The parents were present and were appointed counsel to represent them. Their attorneys each made oral motions for demurrer, which the juvenile court denied. The court noted that there was substantial evidence the parents were likely to flee the jurisdiction. The court found Father to be the presumed father of the twins and provided the parents with services pending further proceedings, including supervised visits twice a week.
In its jurisdictional/dispositional report, DPSS recommended the juvenile court deny services to the parents pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6), (b)(10), and (b)(11). DPSS attached to its report copies of the Illinois juvenile petition dated April 19, 2011, the "Petition to Termination of Parental Rights[] dated April 10, 2019," and a copy of the permanency review order dated September 20, 2017. DPSS noted that the parents had received extensive reunification services in Illinois for seven years, but had failed to benefit from the services, resulting in a hearing set to terminate their parental rights. DPSS also recommended that the twins not be returned to parental care due to their siblings' injuries and the parents' lack of participation in seven years of reunification services.
Mother admitted to being in services in Illinois for "eight years" and felt that therapy was no longer beneficial. Mother also stated that she had "'been in all these services for years and still don't have my kids back.'" The parents reported that this is not their first "'time around'" with DPSS. Father admitted that he had "'been through this process before for a long time.'" He indicated that he had received services but had failed to benefit from those services as evidenced by him not having custody of the twins' siblings.
On April 22, 2019, the twins participated in a child abuse neglect (CAN) examination and had a "'normal exam.'" The examining doctor, however, noted that a "'normal exam does not rule out past abuse.'" The doctor concluded that the evaluation was suspicious for physical abuse, noting mild deforming to Jz.B.'s right and left ulna that were questionable for old healed fractures. No acute or subacute fractures were noted. The CAN examination for Jv.B. showed congenital abnormality of her L2 vertebra. Nonetheless, the children were developing appropriately. The parents had participated in seven visits with the twins and had been observed to be attentive to their needs.
On May 20, 2019, the court continued the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing at the request of county counsel to obtain and provide additional discovery.
On June 7, 2019, DPSS reported that in April it had obtained case documents as to the open child welfare case in Illinois for the twins' two siblings and two half siblings from the IDCFS social worker. The documents showed the parents' level of progress in court-ordered services and the outcomes of their juvenile court proceedings. The records indicated that Mother had made three suicide attempts, she appeared to be limited in her intellectual functioning, she had a significant history of trauma and trauma symptoms, and she was very vulnerable to maltreatment. Mother showed "significant depressive symptoms, mood instability, and reported hearing and seeing things, though it is not clear" whether they were hallucinatory experiences. Mother sought "emotional support in relationships that [were] unsatisfying and place[ed] her and her children's safety at risk."
As to Father, the Illinois reports indicated that he had paranoia, grandiosity, and unusual views. In addition, Father's criminal history related to sexual assault and rape, combined with the severe and unexplained nature of S.B.'s injuries suggested that he posed a safety risk to the children. DPSS attached to the report a police report, dated April 7, 2006. The police report indicated that Father was arrested for attempted rape and was ordered to participate in a sex offender's class, for which no completion date was reported. When questioned about his sexual abuse charges, Father stated "'sexual abuse is a tricky subject'" and continued to deny the charges. Mother did not see anything wrong with Father, because the people in her life have been "'alcoholics, abusive and isolating.'" DPSS was concerned with leaving the twins with Father, given his failure to participate in a sex offender's class.
The records also provided more information concerning S.B.'s injuries. The bruises and lacerations on S.B. were deemed to be inflicted due to child abuse and were inflicted over a period of time. S.B.'s failure to thrive was non-organic due to neglect and inadequate feeding by her parents. Mother appeared to make excuses justifying Father's actions, instead of focusing on the safety of her children. The parents were suspected of having physical and mental illnesses, as well as substance abuse issues that affected their ability to supervise, protect, and care for their children.
On June 17, 2019, the juvenile court continued the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, finding exceptional circumstances to continue the hearing beyond the 60 days from removal due to the need to obtain additional discovery from the state of Illinois.
In their report filed on June 26, 2019, DPSS outlined the predisposition services offered to the parents and the twins. The parents enrolled in a parenting program, Father participated in counseling, and Mother was pending a mental health assessment. Jv.B. was referred for occupational and physical therapy due to issues with feeding and reflux. DPSS also noted that it had received two court orders from the IDCFS social worker that showed Mother and Father's parental rights had been terminated in June 2019 for the twins' four siblings. All certified court orders in the Illinois dependency matter regarding the four siblings had been received and were provided to the parents' and the twins' attorneys on or about June 24, 2019. These documents were also filed with the juvenile court on July 2, 2019.
On July 22, 2019, DPSS reported that the parents were participating in their services and visits with no concerns. DPSS also submitted file-stamped copies of the siblings' "Best Interest" hearing reports and provided them to all counsel. The Best Interest hearing reports noted that Mother had not completed counseling, drug screens, and a parenting program. She, however, had completed a domestic violence program in June 2015. As to Father, the Best Interest hearing reports indicated Father had not completed a substance abuse evaluation or substance abuse screens. However, he had completed counseling, a parenting program, and a domestic violence program. The Best Interest reports also noted that Father had not corrected the conditions that led to his children being removed from his care. DPSS submitted certified copies of the Illinois dependency court's orders terminating the parents' parental rights for their four children. The parents had received over six years of reunification services that resulted in the termination of their parental rights.
On August 5, 2019, counsel for parents filed joint hearsay objections to evidence submitted in DPSS's reports. The parents objected to all evidence from Illinois due to hearsay, due process, lack of foundation, and lack of authentication. DPSS's counsel filed a brief opposing the parents' hearsay objections.
On August 30, 2019, DPSS updated the court as to the parents' services and visitation with their nine-month-old twins. The parents were attending their services, but they did not appear to be benefitting from their services. In addition, while the parents attended visits, they did not appear receptive to one of their twins' medical concerns of having excessive reflux issues and had to be redirected from giving juice to the twins per their doctors' orders.
On September 5, 2019, DPSS filed a first amended petition on behalf of the twins pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), to note that the parents' parental rights had been terminated in June 2019 in the siblings' cases.
The contested jurisdictional hearing began on September 23, 2019, with argument on the parents' hearsay objections. DPSS's counsel requested the court admit the Illinois records into evidence and argued that the certification "makes clear that they are official" records and the records are complete and reliable. Father's counsel's main objection was that the parents did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the preparer of the reports to find out if the records were complete and, therefore, the parents' due process rights were being denied. Father's counsel also argued that in order for the records to be admitted into evidence, the social worker must be a licensed social worker under the California Business and Professions Code. Mother's counsel argued that admitting the records from the Illinois cases violated their due process rights, the opportunity to cross-examine the preparer of the reports, the documents lacked foundation, and the documents contained hearsay statements. Minors' counsel argued that the parents had already corroborated the Illinois records in their admissions to DPSS.
After noting it had read and considered the hearsay objections and responses, the juvenile court overruled the objections and admitted the records and documents from Illinois. The court found that the reports and documents from Illinois were admissible pursuant to section 355.1, subdivision (b), and Evidence Code section 310. The court also concluded that the records were "certainly corroborating evidence as to all of the statements made to the social worker in California" and the court had "no doubt as to the reliability of these documents." The court noted that the parents left the state of Illinois for the purpose of evading further action and believed the disentitlement doctrine also applied "to some extent." The court entered the certified documents, the social workers' reports, and the court documents concerning the Illinois matters into evidence.
Following testimony from the detention and jurisdictional social workers, admission of exhibits, and argument from counsel, the juvenile court found true the allegations in the first amended petition. The court explained: "These children were not detained because they were gassy, wet and smokey. They were detained because of an ongoing case in another state, Illinois, that involved serious physical injuries to a sibling that includes multiple fractured and severed toes, as well as allegations of physical abuse towards another child in that state. Also, the reason for the detention was the current ongoing dependency case in that state in which the parents were receiving services. It looks like a case that lasted for approximately six or seven years, and it appears to the Court as though the parents left that state in order to avoid these children being taken into custody by child welfare in that state when they were born." The contested dispositional hearing was thereafter continued.
The continued contested dispositional hearing was held on September 26, 2019. At that time, counsel presented argument, and the parents filed completion certificates in a parenting program. Following argument, the juvenile court declared the twins dependents of the court, removed them from the physical custody of the parents, and denied both parents reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (b)(11). The court found by clear and convincing evidence that providing services to the parents was not in the children's best interest. The court thereafter set a section 366.26 hearing and provided the parents with supervised visitation a minimum of twice per month.
On September 30, 2019, the parents individually filed notices of intent to file writ petition pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.452.
III
DISCUSSION
A. Admission of Evidence from the Illinois Case
Mother and Father argue the juvenile court erred in admitting evidence of records, court documents, and statements by an IDCFS social worker concerning the dependency matter in Illinois under section 355, subdivision (c)(1), because hearsay statements cannot form the sole basis of any jurisdictional finding, unless they fall under one of the exceptions.
Under Evidence Code section 310, all questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, are to be decided by the trial court. In juvenile dependency proceedings, evidence will not be excluded simply because it is prejudicial to the parent, except under "'highly unusual circumstances.'" (In re Marianne R. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 423, 428.) On appeal, the reviewing court will not overturn the juvenile court's admissibility finding unless it has abused its discretion. (In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15, 35.)
"'When ruling in dependency proceedings, the welfare of the minor is the paramount concern of the court. [Citation.] The purpose of these proceedings is not to punish the parent, but to protect the child. [Citation.] As a person, the child's future is as vitally affected as is that of the parties competing for his or her custody. [Citation.] Consequently, a trial court should not restrict or prevent testimony on formalistic grounds. On the contrary, the court should avail itself of all evidence which might bear on the child's best interest. [Citation.]'" (In re B.D. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 975, 983 (B.D.).)
As our Supreme Court has stated, "When . . . a juvenile court hears a dependency case under section 300 . . . , the court deals with children who have been seriously abused, abandoned, or neglected. The juvenile court has a special responsibility to the child as parens patriae and must look to the totality of a child's circumstances when making decisions regarding the child." (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 201.)
Section 300 provides the grounds for adjudging a child a dependent of the juvenile court. At the jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court first considers whether the child falls within any of the categories enumerated by section 300. (§ 355, subd. (a).) "The petitioner in a dependency proceeding must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child who is the subject of a petition comes under the juvenile court's jurisdiction." (In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 859.) "Any legally admissible evidence that is relevant to the circumstances or acts that are alleged to bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissible and may be received in evidence." (§ 355, subd. (a).) Social worker reports and hearsay evidence contained in them are "admissible and constitute[ ] competent evidence upon which a finding of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 300 may be based." (§ 355, subd. (b).)
Nevertheless, if "a party to the jurisdictional hearing raises a timely objection to the admission of specific hearsay evidence contained in a social study, the specific hearsay evidence shall not be sufficient by itself to support a jurisdictional finding or any ultimate fact upon which a jurisdictional finding is based," absent certain exceptions, including that the hearsay declarant is available for cross-examination. (§ 355, subd. (c)(1).) Although section 355 limits "'the extent to which . . . social study hearsay evidence can be relied on exclusively, there is no limitation, except for fraud, deceit, or undue influence, on the admission of hearsay evidence.'" (B.D., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 983.)
Thus, a section 355 objection does not render hearsay statements in a social worker's report inadmissible. (B.D., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 980-981, 984.) Rather, "corroborating evidence . . . which . . . support[s] the witnesses' hearsay statements sufficiently to sustain a jurisdictional finding" also must exist. (Id. at p. 984.) "Corroborating evidence is '[e]vidence supplementary to that already given and tending to strengthen or confirm it. Additional evidence of a different character to the same point.' [Citation.] In this context, corroborating evidence is that which supports a logical and reasonable inference that the act described in the hearsay statement occurred." (Ibid.)
The standard for sufficient corroboration with respect to dependency jurisdictional findings "is analogous to the rule in criminal law requiring independent corroborative proof of accomplice testimony. [Citation.]" (In re Christian P. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 437, 448, citing B.D., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 984-985.) Therefore, corroborating evidence may be slight so long as it connects the parent with the alleged abuse, and it need not go so far as to establish by itself, without the aid of the hearsay testimony, that the parent committed the alleged conduct. (Christian P., at p. 448; B.D., at p. 984.) "Moreover, defendant's own testimony and inferences therefrom, as well as the inferences from the circumstances surrounding the entire transaction, may be sufficient corroborative testimony. [Citations.]" (B.D., at pp. 984-985.)
B.D., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 975, is instructive. There, section 300, 342, and 387 petitions were filed on behalf of the mother's children after she allegedly struck her toddler at a train station. (B.D., at pp. 979-980.) Invoking section 355, the mother objected to the admission of all witness statements in the detention and jurisdictional/dispositional reports regarding the incident, including statements from unrelated individuals who observed the alleged incident at the train station. (B.D., at p. 981.) As in this case, no independent witnesses testified at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. (Id. at p. 982.) The juvenile court dismissed the section 300 petitions finding no independent evidence to corroborate the witness statements. (Ibid.)
The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding the juvenile court failed to consider independent evidence in the record that could have corroborated the witness statements. (B.D., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 985, 987.) Specifically, the court found the mother's own statements that she had "'tapped'" her child on the back of the head, and that a woman had approached her in the station about hitting her child, were consistent with the hearsay statements, by three of the witnesses, that mother had struck her child in the back of the head. (Id. at p. 985.) Thus, the trial court could have considered the mother's own statements, which provided "some corroboration of the witnesses' statements." (Ibid.) The mother also had provided inconsistent explanations as to the cause of her child's bloody nose following the incident. (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded that, had the juvenile court considered the mother's statements, it could have found them false and misleading, and if so, "this could also provide corroboration of the witnesses' statements." (Ibid.)
Additional evidence included a police report that noted officers' observations of a bump on the child's forehead and medical reports indicating the child had a bruise and a bloody nose. (B.D., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 980, 985.) The Court of Appeal explained that, while innocent explanations could account for those injuries, they did not "eliminate the marks as potentially corroborative evidence of the witnesses' statements[;] rather those innocent explanations go to their weight." (Id. at p. 985.)
Here, the available independent evidence is similar. The parents objected to the admission into evidence of hearsay statements concerning the Illinois matter attached to the DPSS's reports on section 355 grounds. However, independent evidence corroborated the fact that the parents had an open dependency case in Illinois. The juvenile court thus could consider this evidence to determine if the twins were subject to its jurisdiction under section 300. (B.D., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 986 [finding hearsay evidence "could be considered[;] it just could not, by itself, form the basis for a jurisdictional finding"].) As in B.D., the parents' own statements provided corroborating evidence of the allegations contained in the first amended petition. The first amended petition alleged that the parents had an open dependency case with IDCFS as to the twins' siblings, the parents were provided with extensive services, and the parents failed to reunify with their children, resulting in the termination of their parental rights. Father admitted that he had "'been through this process before for a long time'" and had received services from which he had failed to benefit as evidenced by him not having custody of the twins' siblings. Father also asserted that he had "studied the law during the seven years that he was involved in the child welfare case in Illinois," and that he was "'tired of dealing with DCFS,'" which was the reason why he and Mother left Illinois.
Father also admitted that S.B. "was taken into custody, because their stories were inconsistent with the injuries." He further stated that their children were removed again for suspicion of physical abuse, after one of the children accidentally hit himself in the face with handcuffs, leaving a bruise, and that the children were returned to their care after one month but were removed again in May 2017 when the parents lost housing. Father also acknowledged that the parents' visitation was reduced to once a month and that he had not visited his children in Illinois since August 2018. He explained that his visitation with Jgs.B. was terminated, because the child was fearful of Father, and had adverse effects following visitation. In addition, he stated that his parental rights were terminated to another child, J.W., in 2012 or 2013, after he failed to reunify with her. In these admissions to DPSS, Father corroborated the statements contained in the Illinois dependency matters.
Mother also made numerous statements that corroborated the evidence contained in the reports and documents of the Illinois cases. She stated that she has six children, four of whom are in foster care in Illinois. She also explained that she stopped visiting and communicating with the children when she moved to California in August 2018, and that her children, S.B. and L.G., were initially removed due to S.B. being injured by their dog in 2011. Mother also asserted that her other two children were removed when they were born due to the parents' open dependency case. She further disclosed receiving "'eight years'" of services in Illinois and felt that therapy was no longer beneficial. She noted that she had "'been in all these services for years and still [didn't] have [her] kids back.'" She stated that she was ordered to complete parenting and domestic violence counseling and to submit to random drug testing twice a month. She reported receiving completion certificates for her services but left them in Illinois and did not have access to them. Mother's statements corroborated the Illinois records.
The parents' admissions constitute independent evidence that corroborated the allegations in the first amended petition. Although the parents maintained they did not injure S.B. and that the children were once again removed from their care because they lost housing, those explanations relate to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility or its potential to corroborate the allegations in the first amended petition. The juvenile court here properly found that the Illinois records were corroborated by the parents' statements to DPSS and were reliable. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the social workers' statements, certified documents, social worker reports, and court documents regarding the Illinois dependency matters.
Mother also asserts that the court erred in applying the disentitlement doctrine in admitting the social workers' statements and records regarding the Illinois matters. Because we find the juvenile court properly admitted the evidence relating to the Illinois matters based on the parents' admissions constituting independent corroborating evidence, we need not address this contention.
B. Jurisdictional Findings
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in sustaining the first amended petition under section 300, subdivision (b), because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding the twins had suffered or will suffer serious physical harm or illness. Father joins in Mother's argument.
We review a juvenile court's jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Substantial evidence is "evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value." (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.) Under this standard of review, we examine the whole record in a light most favorable to the findings and conclusions of the juvenile court and defer to the juvenile court on issues of credibility of the evidence and witnesses. (In re A.J. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103.) We determine only whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the juvenile court's order, resolving all conflicts in support of its determination and drawing all reasonable inferences to uphold its ruling. (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1124.) If there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's order, we must uphold the order even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion. (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 168.)
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), under which the first amended petition here was brought, authorizes a juvenile court to exercise dependency jurisdiction over a child in relevant part if "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . ." (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) A child comes within this statutory definition if there is "'(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) "serious [ ] harm or illness" to the minor, or a "substantial risk" of such harm or illness.'" (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 628, italics omitted.) In re R.T. made clear section 300, subdivision (b)(1), does not require neglectful conduct, but merely a "'failure or inability . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.'" (Id. at p. 629.)
In arguing that substantial evidence does not support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), Mother points to the fact that the children were free of any visible marks or bruises when they were taken into protective custody, the children appeared happy and alert during the CAN examination, and the CAN examination revealed the children had normal bone formation and no evidence of fractures.
Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's conclusion that the twins were at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness because two of their siblings had suffered serious physical harm while in the parents' custody. The family initially came to the attention of IDCFS in 2011, due to physical abuse and neglect, when the twins' half sibling S.B., then three months old, was admitted to the hospital for non-organic failure to thrive. A skeletal survey revealed S.B. had numerous fractures and the parents' explanation of the injuries were inconsistent with the medical findings. Specifically, the skeletal survey showed S.B. had a broken clavicle and bruising on her foot, and a second skeletal survey showed a possible skull fracture and metatarsal fracture. It determined that S.B.'s bone fractures did not occur at birth or at the time of her foot injuries. S.B.'s foot injuries were also not the result of a dog's nail severing them as explained by the parents, but more likely resulting from her toes being crushed or yanked. The doctors attempted to sew S.B.'s toes back on, but the big toe later fell off at the joint. In addition, the parents reported that they waited approximately 12 hours until feeding the child, although directives were given to feed the child every three hours due to her medical condition.
The twins' sibling Jgs.B. also suffered physical injury while in the care of the parents. When the child was removed, he had "bruising and cuts on his face, as well as cigarette burns on his ankles." In fact, Father's visits with Jgs.B. were terminated, because the child expressed fear of being abused by the father.
The record also demonstrates that the parents evaded child protective services contact for approximately eight months. Family members reported that the parents fled to California to give birth to the twins and to avoid IDCFS intervention, because their other children were removed twice for abuse from the parents. Father also reported he was "'tired of dealing with DCFS'" and that was the reason the parents left Illinois. After the parents left Illinois, they settled in Kern County in order for Mother to give birth to "avoid contact with CPS in Illinois." While in California, the parents continued to avoid child protective services, despite social workers making numerous attempts to contact them.
Moreover, although no acute or subacute fractures were noted, the CAN examination revealed that one of the twins, Jz.B., had a "mild deformity to right [and] left ulna," which were "questionable for old healed fractures." Regarding the other twin, Jv.B., the CAN examination showed "congenital abnormality of [her] L2" vertebra. The CAN examining doctor also noted on both reports that a "normal exam does not rule out past abuse." Therefore, not only were the twins at risk of suffering serious physical harm, but one of the twins had actually suffered physical harm. Furthermore, the twins were still under one year old, which means they are children of tender years, and thus risk to them is rebuttably presumed. (In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219 [children six years old or younger are considered children of "'tender years'" and "'the finding of substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of harm'"].)
Based on Jz.B.'s old, healed fractures, to S.B.'s fractures, and the physical injuries to Jgs.B., substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the children were at a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b).
C. Denial of Services
Mother also contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in bypassing her reunification services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (b)(11) (hereafter section 361.5(b)(6) and (b)(11)), and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Father joins in the argument.
Section 361.5, subdivision (a), generally mandates that reunification services are to be provided whenever a child is removed from the parent's custody. However, subdivision (b) of section 361.5 sets forth a number of circumstances in which reunification services may be bypassed. "These bypass provisions represent the Legislature's recognition that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under certain circumstances. [Citation.]" (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 597.) It is also the "intent of the Legislature, especially with regard to young children, . . . that the dependency process proceed with deliberate speed and without undue delay." (Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.) The bypass finding must be made "by clear and convincing evidence." (§ 361.5, subd. (b).)
We review an order denying reunification services under subdivision (b) of section 361.5 for substantial evidence. (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96; R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 914 [§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11)]; In re D.H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 807, 815 [§ 361.5, subds. (b)(10) & (11)]; contra, In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164-1165 [applying the abuse of discretion standard of review to the bypass provisions of § 361.5, subd. (b)]; In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 109 (Lana S.) [same].) Under such circumstances, we do not make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. (A.A. v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 237, 242.) Rather, we "review the entire record in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings to determine if there is substantial evidence in the record to support those findings." (Ibid.)
In this case, the juvenile court ordered that reunification services were not to be provided to Mother and Father pursuant to section 361.5(b)(6) and (11). "[O]nly one valid ground is necessary to support a juvenile court's decision to bypass a parent for reunification services." (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 324; accord, Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121 (Jennifer S.).) We will focus on section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), under which reunification services need not be provided if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) "the parental rights of a parent over any sibling or half sibling of the child had been permanently severed, . . . and [(2)] . . . , according to the findings of the court, this parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from the parent." (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11); see K.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1393 (K.C.); D.F. v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 664, 669-672 [reunification services need not be provided to a parent whose parental rights to a sibling or half sibling of the dependent child were terminated, regardless of whether that termination order was entered in California or elsewhere].) This statute "recognizes the problem of recidivism by the parent despite reunification efforts." (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478.)
With respect to the second prong of the section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), requirements for bypass, "[t]he 'reasonable effort to treat' standard 'is not synonymous with "cure."'" (K.C., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.) "To be reasonable, the parent's efforts must be more than 'lackadaisical or half-hearted.'" (Ibid.) Instead, it "focuses on the extent of a parent's efforts, not whether he or she has attained 'a certain level of progress.'" (R.T. v. Superior Court, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 914.) However, "[w]e do not read the 'reasonable effort' language in the bypass provisions to mean that any effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to address the problems leading to removal will constitute a reasonable effort and as such render these provisions inapplicable. It is certainly appropriate for the juvenile court to consider the duration, extent and context of the parent's efforts, as well as any other factors relating to the quality and quantity of those efforts, when evaluating the effort for reasonableness. And while the degree of progress is not the focus of the inquiry, a parent's progress, or lack of progress, both in the short and long term, may be considered to the extent it bears on the reasonableness of the effort made." (Ibid.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the denial of reunification services for Mother and Father pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11). There is no dispute that Mother's parental rights were terminated as to four of her other children. There is also no dispute that Father's parental rights were terminated as to three of his other children. In addition, Mother's claim that she made substantial efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of the children lacks merit. (See K.C., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1393-1394.)
The parents received extensive services during their dependency in Illinois, but their services and parental rights were terminated in the Illinois matters. The older four children were removed twice for physical abuse from the parents. Although the record indicates the parents had made some effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the twins' siblings from their care by the time of the dispositional hearing, and even after receiving over six years of reunification services, the parents still had not demonstrated they had benefitted from the services they had received. In fact, the parents admitted that they had not benefitted from the services received. Further, there is no evidence that Mother had made any effort to address her mental health issues. There is also no evidence that Father had participated in a sex offender program which he was ordered to do after he was arrested for rape. In addition, the parents continued to deny any responsibility for the serious physical injuries S.B. sustained while in their custody, instead continuing to blame her severe toe injuries on a dog. Moreover, the CAN examination of Jz.B. showed that his right and left ulna were questionable for old healed fractures, indicating past abuse, neglect, and/or delay in seeking medical treatment for his injuries. The parents presented no evidence that granting them reunification services for the twins would prevent them from inflicting severe physical harm on the twins. "[T]here are no services that will prevent reabuse by a parent who refuses to acknowledge the abuse in the first place." (In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1077.) Contrary to Mother's assertion, substantial evidence shows that the parents had not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the twins' siblings from their care.
Mother argues that the parents did not receive due process because the IDCFS social worker allowed the dependency court in Illinois to proceed without due process, the Illinois orders terminating their parental rights were by default, and the Illinois orders were defective for lack of notice to the parents. However, the record shows that the parents had actual notice of the hearing in Illinois to terminate their parental rights and that the parents could have participated in the Illinois proceedings but failed to do so.
"'Notice is both a constitutional and statutory imperative. In juvenile dependency proceedings, due process requires parents be given notice that is reasonably calculated to advise them an action is pending and afford them an opportunity to defend.' [Citation.] 'The child welfare agency must act with diligence to locate a missing parent. [Citation.] Reasonable diligence denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and an inquiry conducted in good faith. [Citation.] [¶] However, there is no due process violation when there has been a good faith attempt to provide notice to a parent who is transient and whose whereabouts are unknown for the majority of the proceedings. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Thus, where a parent cannot be located notwithstanding a reasonable search effort, the failure to give actual notice will not render the proceedings invalid. [Citation.]" (In re J.H. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174, 182 (J.H.).)
" 'It is not always possible to litigate a dependency case with all parties present. The law recognizes this and requires only reasonable efforts to search for and notice missing parents. Where reasonable efforts have been made, a dependency case properly proceeds. If a missing parent later surfaces, it does not automatically follow that the best interests of the child will be promoted by going back to square one and relitigating the case. Children need stability and permanence in their lives, not protracted legal proceedings that prolong uncertainty for them. Further, the very nature of determining a child's best interests calls for a case-by-case analysis, not a mechanical rule.' [Citation.]" (J.H., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 182-183.)
In this case, the parents were present in the Illinois dependency court on May 16, 2018, when the court set a hearing to terminate their parental rights. The hearings were continued several times, but by then the parents had fled Illinois and did not disclose their new address in California. Additionally, IDCFS properly served the parents by publication. Moreover, information about the Illinois hearing to terminate the parents' parental rights was mentioned in nearly every social worker's report filed by DPSS. The record indicates that the parents had notice of the Illinois matters and the hearing where their parental rights would be terminated. The parents also had many opportunities to participate in the legal proceedings in Illinois but declined to do so.
Mother's reliance on In re Megan P. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 480 (Megan P.) is unavailing. In that case, the juvenile court denied the request for continuance, found the father had received sufficient notice of the hearing, and terminated the father's parental rights. (Id. at pp. 487-488.) There, the department knew the father's name and that he was living in Indiana. The department, however, misspelled the father's name when conducting the search and failed to search for him in Indiana. In addition, the father was paying child support to a local district attorney's office, but the department failed to check the records of the other state agency. (Id. at pp. 482, 484-487.) The father was eventually located, and his attorney requested a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing. (Id. at pp. 487-488.) The appellate court found the due diligence search by the department to be inadequate, and that the juvenile court erred in terminating the father's parental rights without giving him an opportunity to be heard. (Id. at pp. 489-490.)
The facts in this case are completely distinguishable. The parents here were present when the Illinois court set a hearing to terminate their parental rights. And after the parents fled to California and their whereabouts were unknown, IDCFS served the parents by publication. Moreover, information about the Illinois hearing to terminate their parental rights was mentioned in nearly every social worker's report filed by DPSS. The parents were clearly aware of the Illinois matter and the recommendation to terminate their parental rights in the twins' siblings' cases. The parents apparently knew the requirements of their case plan in order to reunify with their children, but instead chose to flee to California. Hence, unlike the father in Megan P., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 480, where the father was clearly unaware of the dependency matter, the parents here were aware of the Illinois dependency matters and given opportunities to be present and present defenses before their parental rights were terminated in the siblings' cases.
Based on the foregoing, we find the juvenile court's decision to bypass reunification services for the parents pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), was sufficiently supported by the evidence. (See Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1121-1124; K.C., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394.)
D. Best Interest of the Children
Mother also contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding reunification was not in the children's best interest. Father joins in her argument.
"[T]he court [also] retains authority to order services if it finds by clear and convincing evidence they would be in the children's best interests. [Citation.] In making its determination, the court may consider the 'failure of the parent to respond to previous services.' [Citation.]" (Lana S., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.) The parent "has the burden of proving [his or] her children would benefit from the provision of court-ordered services. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) We review the court's section 361.5, subdivision (c) determination for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
"To determine whether reunification is in the child's best interest, the court considers the parent's current efforts, fitness, and history; the seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency; the strength of the parent-child and caretaker-child bonds; and the child's need for stability and continuity. [Citation.] A best interest finding requires a likelihood reunification services will succeed; in other words, 'some "reasonable basis to conclude" that reunification is possible.'" (In re Allison J. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1116; see Lana S., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.)
We reject Mother's claim that providing reunification services was in the twins' best interest. (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1125.) There is no evidence in the record to support her claim. On the contrary, the record shows that it was not in the twins' best interest to provide the parents with reunification services. The parents fled Illinois to California to avoid IDCFS intervention. They also avoided contact with California child protective services for approximately eight months, from August 2018 until April 2019.
Moreover, the parents have an extensive history of physically abusing young children. S.B. was only three months old when she suffered multiple fractures throughout her body and severed toes. Jgs.B. was five years old when he was removed from the parents' custody after being physically abused by Father. When Jgs.B. was removed, he had "bruising and cuts on his face, as well as cigarette burns on his ankles." The CAN examination for Jz.B. revealed that he had mild deformity to his right and left ulna which was questionable for old healed fractures. In addition, despite receiving over six years of reunification services, the parents' parental rights were terminated to their four children. They had failed to complete and benefit from the services they had received. The parents admitted they had not benefitted from their services. Mother admitted to being in services in Illinois for "eight years" and felt that therapy was no longer beneficial. Mother has a long history of mental health issues of hearing voices, depression, and cutting herself, but she still had not addressed her mental issues. And Father had failed to participate in a sex offender's program as ordered. When asked about his sexual abuse charges, Father merely stated "'sexual abuse is a tricky subject.'" Further, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating the parents' bond with the twins. The twins were five months old when they were removed from parental custody.
Mother argues that she participated in services, visited the children with no reported concerns, and that she has a strong, loving bond with the twins. Certainly, the bond between the children and Mother is a consideration, as well as the other factors Mother raises. However, Mother and Father failed to demonstrate that reunification services would be in the children's best interest. There is no evidence in the record suggesting the juvenile court abused its discretion by concluding reunification services were not in the children's best interest within the meaning of section 361.5, subdivision (c). (In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 524.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to order services for the parents.
IV
DISPOSITION
Mother and Father's petitions for extraordinary writ are denied on the merits. The requests for a temporary stay are also denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. MENETREZ
J.