Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4856-12T2
01-28-2015
CHRIS ANN JAYE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OAK KNOLL VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Respondent, and ERICK P. SPRONCK, ROBERT STEPHENSON, BERMAN, SAUTER, RECORD & JARDIM, P.C., Defendants.
Chris Ann Jaye, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Steven R. Rowland argued the cause for respondent (Brown Moskowitz & Kallen, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Rowland, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Accurso and Manahan. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hunterdon County, Docket No. L-375-12. Chris Ann Jaye, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Steven R. Rowland argued the cause for respondent (Brown Moskowitz & Kallen, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Rowland, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Chris Ann Jaye (appellant) appeals from orders granting judgment in favor of Oak Knoll Village Condominium Association (OKV) for arrearages associated with common element assessments pursuant to N.J.S.A. 46:8B-17 and from an award of counsel fees to OKV in pursuit of its collection action.
After reviewing appellant's contentions in light of the record, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Peter Buchsbaum in his written decisions dated September 28, 2012, and March 8, 2013, as well as for the reasons stated in the order of April 10, 2013. We add only the following.
Appellant is, and at all relevant times was, a unit owner at Oak Knoll Village, a condominium community. Appellant failed to pay her common element expenses. As a result of the delinquency in those expenses, OKV instituted legal action seeking a judgment against appellant for the outstanding amount. Prior to the entry of judgment, a settlement was reached between the parties whereby in exchange for a "zero-out" of the claimed balance owed by appellant to OKV, appellant would commence payment of the common element charges. Notwithstanding the agreement, appellant ceased payments after a few months. Thereafter, OKV instituted another action by way of counterclaim seeking judgment for unpaid common element expenses and counsel fees. OKV filed a motion for summary judgment which appellant opposed on grounds other than OKV's entitlement to the outstanding fees and costs. The judge, after providing appellant with the opportunity to contest the quantum of fees and costs sought by OKV, granted the motion.
Appellant instituted a lawsuit seeking damages as a result of the alleged improper conduct of OKV, two of its members and OKV's outside law firm. Those claims were dismissed by the court on July 28, 2013. Appellant did not appeal that decision.
Among the powers assigned by law to a condominium association is the authority to assess and collect funds for the payment of common expenses. N.J.S.A. 46:8B-14. A unit owner's obligation to pay common expenses is unconditional. N.J.S.A. 46:8B-17. Here, the judge's finding that OKV was entitled to judgment for outstanding common expenses owed by appellant was both in accord with the uncontroverted facts and the controlling law.
N.J.S.A. 46:8B-21 authorizes a condominium association to charge a nonpaying member with "reasonable" attorney's fees. Here the judge determined that $8,000 in attorney's fees was reasonable. In this matter, the judge did not exceed his prerogative in awarding counsel fees. The fees were reasonably incurred through efforts by OKV to secure payment from appellant. Fee determinations by trial courts should be disturbed "only on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995). We detect no clear abuse of discretion. Indeed, the judge employed equitable principles by containing the fee award to less than that which OKV could arguably recover. In the order of April 10, 2013, the judge noted the bases for the award including the method of calculation. The fee award was fair. We find no basis to disturb it.
Finally, appellant raises several arguments on appeal which are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION