Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3817-13T2
02-25-2016
CHRIS ANN JAYE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUDGE YOLANDA CICCONE, Defendant-Respondent.
Chris Ann Jaye, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Susan M. Scott, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, Ione K. Curva, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Haas and Manahan. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Mercer County, Docket No. C-00120-13. Chris Ann Jaye, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Susan M. Scott, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, Ione K. Curva, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Appellant Chris Ann Jaye appeals the trial court's dismissal of her complaint and denial of a motion for reconsideration. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the written decision of Judge Paul Innes of February 7, 2014. We add the following.
In her notice of appeal, Jaye stated that the order denying her motion for reconsideration was in error. However, she has not briefed that issue. An issue not briefed is deemed waived. See Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014).
Jaye filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Somerset County, Chancery Division, on October 1, 2013, against Judge Yolanda Ciccone. Jaye's complaint against Judge Ciccone is premised on her dissatisfaction with the judge's rulings in litigation Jaye instituted against a condominium association, its board members, and its legal counsel (condo litigation). In the complaint, Jaye alleged various constitutional violations based upon decisions the judge made after being assigned the case subsequent to the retirement of Judge Peter Buchsbaum. Jaye requested injunctive and declaratory relief, including voiding and vacating court orders entered in the condo litigation. Jaye further sought relief enjoining the judge "from putting forth orders in which no appealable rulings are given," and requiring the judge to "(1) [] abide by her administrative duties, (2) [] cease and desist from permitting parties without standing to make arguments, (3) [] cease and desist from permitting late filings, (4) [] ensure all parties obey the rules of court, and (5) [] treat all of plaintiff's filings with equity and equal consideration."
Judge Ciccone filed a motion pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), seeking to dismiss Jaye's civil rights suit for failure to state a claim. On January 10, 2014, Judge Innes heard oral argument; and on February 7, 2014, granted the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Jaye filed a motion for reconsideration, improperly captioned as "Clarifications for the Record." On March 6, 2014, Judge Ciccone opposed the motion for reconsideration, and included as an exhibit the order issued in the underlying property dispute. By order dated March 28, 2014, Judge Innes denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.
We affirmed the decision of Judge Buchsbaum dismissing Jaye's complaint and entering final judgment against her in an unpublished decision following Jaye's appeal of the condo litigation. Jaye v. Oak Knoll Vill. Condo Owners Ass'n, No. A-4856-12 (App. Div. January 28, 2015). --------
POINT [I]
FRAUD VACATES ORDERS.
POINT [II]
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO SEARCH COMPLAINT.
POINT [III]
FINDINGS OF FACT NOT PROVIDED.
POINT [IV]
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION LACKING.
POINT [V]
TRIAL COURT CLAIMED IT LACKED JURISDICTION.
POINT [VI]
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY IS NOT A BASIS FOR DISMISSAL.
POINT [VII]
"PLAIN LANGUAGE" OF THE LAW IS THE LAW.
Rule 4:6-2(e) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" This rule tests "the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989).
We review de novo the trial court's Rule 4:6-2(e) dismissal of plaintiff's claims, applying the same standard as the trial court. Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 366 (2011). Here, our decision turns on the controlling law.
"A motion to dismiss filed early in a proceeding is a particularly effective device to resolve any claim of immunity." Malik v. Ruttenberg, 398 N.J. Super. 489, 494 (App. Div. 2008). A court decides as a matter of law whether a party enjoys a common law or statutory immunity. Norris v. Borough of Leonia, 160 N.J. 427, 438 (1999).
"Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction." Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 196, 199, 106 S. Ct. 496, 499-500, 88 L. Ed. 2d 507, 513 (1985) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288, 294 (1967)). This immunity is absolute. K.D. v. Bazarth, 313 N.J. Super. 561, 568 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 425 (1998). "Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9, 14 (1991).
The immunity applies even to judicial acts that are wrong, malicious, or beyond the judge's authority. K.D., supra, 313 N.J. Super. at 568; Delbridge v. Schaeffer, 238 N.J. Super. 323, 334 (Law Div. 1989). As the New Jersey Supreme Court has explained:
The doctrine that an action will not lie against a judge for a wrongful commitment, or for an erroneous judgment, or for any other act made or done by him in his judicial capacity, is as thoroughly established as are any other of the primary maxims of the law. Such an exemption is absolutely essential to the very existence,
in any valuable form, of the judicial office itself; for a judge could not be either respected or independent if his motives for his official actions or his conclusions, no matter how erroneous, could be put in question at the instance of every malignant or disappointed suitor. Hence we find this judicial immunity has been conferred by the laws of every civilized people. That it exists in this state in its fullest extent, has been repeatedly declared by our own courts.
[Bedrock Foundations, Inc. v. Geo. H. Brewster & Son, Inc., 31 N.J. 124, 139-40 (1959) (quoting Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654, 656 (E. & A. 1882).]
In application of the foregoing principles, we hold Judge Ciccone was afforded absolute immunity in the judicial decisions that Jaye argues are actionable. As such, we conclude, as Judge Innes did, that the facts set forth in Jaye's complaint fail as a matter of law to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Jaye's remaining arguments regarding declaratory and injunctive relief, jurisdiction and fraud are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION