Opinion
Civil Action No: 03-0028, Section: "R" (1).
June 25, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant St. Charles Parish School Board moves the Court to dismiss plaintiff Diane Jaufre's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Jaufre opposes the motion. For the following reasons, the Court grants the School Board's motion to dismiss in part and denies it in part. The Court further denies the School Board's motion for summary judgment.
I. Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff Diane Jaufre's son, Ryan Jaufre, attends the St. Charles Parish "Court School." The Court School is a joint venture between defendant St. Charles School Board, the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Office, and the 29th Judicial District for the Parish of St. Charles. Students with disciplinary problems attend Court School. In the fall of 2001, a St. Charles Parish state court ordered Ryan Jaufre to attend Court School after he used a slingshot to shoot pebbles at a girl.
In January 2002, Diane Jaufre visited the Court School to drop off medication for Ryan. Jaufre informed defendant Clyde Taylor that Ryan had been a "real handful" over the weekend. ( See Pl.'s Compl., ¶ 5). Taylor then administered corporal punishment to Ryan with a wooden paddle, as he had done before at Jaufre's request and with her consent. ( See id., at ¶ 6). Jaufre alleges that on this occasion, the corporal punishment imposed by Taylor made Ryan nauseous, caused extensive bruising to his thighs and buttocks, and injury to his thumb.
In January 2003, Jaufre sued defendants in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jaufre alleges that Taylor violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when he administered the January 2002 corporal punishment. Jaufre also asserts Louisiana state-law intentional tort claims of battery and infliction of emotional distress against all three defendants, including the School Board. Jaufre claims that since Taylor acted within the course and scope of his employment with the School Board, the School Board is vicariously liable for Taylor's actions under the Louisiana state-law theory of respondeat superior. The School Board now moves the Court to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
II. Legal Standards
1. Motion to Dismiss
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court must also resolve doubts as to the sufficiency of the claim in the plaintiff's favor. Vulcan Materials Company v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. Id.; Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).
2. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) ( citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996)
III. DISCUSSION
1. Constitutional Violations and Respondeat Superior
The School Board argues that Taylor did not commit a constitutional violation when he administered corporal punishment to Jaufre's son. The School Board also argues that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the School Board cannot be liable under the theory of respondeat superior for the alleged federal violations committed by Taylor. Although Jaufre's complaint is less than clear, she admits in her opposition that she asserts only state-law claims against the School Board. ( See Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Mot. Dismiss, at 2). Jaufre alleges that the School Board is liable for the Louisiana state-law intentional torts of battery and infliction of emotional distress under the state theory of respondeat superior. Because Jaufre asserts no federal claim against the School Board, the Court need not address the School Board's arguments.
Jaufre appends her state-law claims against the School Board to her federal question claims against Taylor under the Court's supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a). Under Section 1367(a), the Court has jurisdiction over state-law claims against additional parties, which are so related to claims under its original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy. Id.
2. Qualified Immunity
The School Board further argues that Fifth Circuit decisions entitle it to qualified immunity against Jaufre's constitutional claims. However, since Jaufre makes no constitutional claim against the School Board, the School Board applies the wrong doctrine of qualified immunity.
The Court notes that it is well-established Fifth Circuit law that a School Board is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Minton v. St. Bernard Parish School Board, 803 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1986).
Nor may defendant School Board assert federal qualified immunity under Section 1983 against the state law claims. See Williams v. Thomas, 692 F.2d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 1982). In Williams, the plaintiff asserted Section 1983 claims and a pendent state law claim for assault and battery against the defendant. See id. at 1034. Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit held that "proof that a government official acted in good faith will not enable the official to avoid liability under state common law principles." Id. at 1035.
The Louisiana Constitution expressly allows suits for personal injury against political subdivisions. LA. CONST. art. 12, § 10(A). Louisiana defines a school board as a political subdivision. LA. CONST. art. 6, § 44( 2). Jaufre asserts state-law claims against the School Board and is authorized to do so by statute. Whether the School Board is entitled to any discretionary or qualified immunity under Louisiana law is a legal issue that the Court declines to address absent briefing by the parties.
Indeed, under Louisiana law, "[t]he fault of [a] School Board may also arise from the doctrine of respondeat superior for the acts of its employees." Landreneau v. Fruge, 676 So.2d 701, 707 (La.Ct.App. 1996).
3. Punitive Damages
Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages unless expressly authorized by statute. Mosing v. Domas, 830 So.2d 967, 973 (La. 2002). The Court has found no statutory authority for the recovery of punitive damages against an employer for the intentional torts of its employees. Indeed, Louisiana law authorizes punitive damages for incidents that involve drunk drivers and criminal sexual activity with a minor only. Donald C. Massey Martin A. Stern, Punitive Damages and the Louisiana Constitution: Don't Leave Home Without It, 56 LA. L. REV. 743, 746 (1996) (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.4 2315.7). Since no Louisiana statute authorizes punitive damages for Jaufre's intentional tort claims, the Court dismisses any claim for punitive damages against the School Board.
Jaufre alleges that "[b]ecause Taylor's actions were done maliciously, willfully, and wantonly, he is further liable to plaintiff for punitive damages." ( See Pl.'s Compl., at ¶ 11). In the next paragraph, Jaufre alleges that the School Board is liable under the Louisiana law theory of respondeat superior. ( See id., at ¶ 12). Because Jaufre's complaint is less than clear with regard to whether she asserts a claim for punitive damages against the School Board, the Court addresses the School Board's punitive damages argument.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the School Board's motion to dismiss to the extent that it dismisses any claim for punitive damages against the School Board. In all other respects, the Court denies the School Board's motion to dismiss. The Court also denies the School Board's motion for summary judgment.