Opinion
No. 4-05-00907-CR
Delivered and Filed: October 11, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 7, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 920680, Honorable Monica Guerrero, Judge Presiding. Dismissed As Moot.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Anthony Salvador Jasper was convicted by a jury of misdemeanor assault. While his appeal was pending, Jasper served his complete sentence and has been released from jail. The State contends this appeal should be dismissed as moot because Jasper has fully completed his sentence. Jasper concedes that neither the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" nor the "collateral consequences" exception to the mootness doctrine apply because Jasper did not challenge his conviction and is seeking only a new punishment hearing. However, Jasper contends that a third exception to the mootness doctrine, called the "public interest" exception applies. The Texas Supreme Court has not recognized the public interest exception, and the intermediate appellate courts are split on whether such an exception should be recognized. See Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 196 S.W.3d 396, 399-400 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (noting split). Assuming, without deciding, that the public interest exception should be recognized, the public interest exception allows appellate review on an issue of considerable public importance if that issue is capable of repetition between either the same parties or other members of the public, but for some reason evades appellate review. See In re Guardianship of Keller, 171 S.W.3d 498, 501 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed); Ngo v. Ngo, 133 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.). An issue does not evade appellate review if it has been addressed on the merits by appellate courts. Keller, 171 S.W.3d at 501; Ngo, 133 S.W.3d at 692. The issues Jasper raises on appeal, failure to admonish with regard to self-representation and whether the stacking of the fine violated article 43.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, have both been addressed on the merits in numerous cases. See, e.g., Burgess v. State, 816 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (addressing self-representation); Ex parte Sheppard, 548 S.W.2d 414, 415-16 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977) (addressing effect of article 43.03 on fine); Williams v. State, 194 S.W.3d 568, 577 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (addressing self-representation); Halliburton v. State, 928 S.W.2d 650, 652-53 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, pet. ref'd) (addressing self-representation); Foster v. State, 633 S.W.2d 326, 327-28 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1982, no pet.) (addressing effect of article 43.03 on fine). Accordingly, if a public interest exception exists with regard to the mootness doctrine, the exception would not apply to the instant case. The appeal is dismissed as moot.
We have determined that Jasper's notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the reasoning set forth in Villarreal v. State, Nos. 04-06-00022-CR 04-06-00023-CR, 2006 WL 1152343 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May 3, 2006, no pet.).