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In Jarrell v. Seal, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, slip op. no. A-03-2737 (E.D.La., Feb. 10, 2004) (unpublished) (available on WESTLAW at 2004 WL 241712), aff'd 110 Fed.Appx. 455 (5th Cir., Oct. 21, 2004) (not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter), the plaintiff Chuck Jarrell, a pre-trial detainee, contended that his rights were violated when he was not taken to the restroom during a court appearance, causing him to urinate on himself in public.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2737, SECTION "S" (1)
February 10, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Chuck Louis Jarrell, a state prisoner, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as defendants Deputy John Seal, Deputy Eisha Lee, and Washington Parish Sheriff Aubrey Jones. Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated when he was not taken to the restroom during a court appearance, thereby causing him to urinate on himself in public. As relief, plaintiff requests monetary damages. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.
Rec. Doc. 23.
Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion.
Rec. Doc. 9.
Rec. Doc. 22.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court may grant judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), "Procedurally, the party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Taita Chemical Co., Ltd. v. Westlake Styrene Corp., 246 F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The party opposing summary judgment must then "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56); see also Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. God 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001).
"A claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must contain two elements: 1) that [the plaintiff has] been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) that the defendant acted under color of state law." Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1989). Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff cannot establish that they violated his federally protected rights. For the following reasons, this Court agrees.
For the purposes of this opinion, the Court will assume that plaintiff's claims implicate a constitutionally protected right. Another district court within the Fifth Circuit has noted:
Although this Circuit has never expressly addressed whether an individual has a Fourteenth Amendment right to urinate and defecate in reasonable privacy, there can be little denying that such a right exists. Indeed, there are few activities that appear to be more at the heart of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than the right to eliminate harmful wastes from one's body away from the observation of others. The activity is universally recognized as a private one.West v. Dallas Police Department, No. Civ. A. 3-95CV-1347P, 1997 WL 452727, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 1997). Nevertheless, even where a constitutional right has been implicated, it does not necessarily follow that the right has been violated. For the following reasons, plaintiff has failed to point to evidence indicating his constitutional rights were violated.
Plaintiff appears to characterize his claims as ones regarding the denial of medical care. That characterization appears imprecise at best. Nevertheless, even if the Court were to consider plaintiff's claims as medical claims, the result herein would be the same. To establish a valid medical claim, a pretrial detainee must show that his serious medical needs were met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining officials. Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of the named defendants.
A detainee's constitutional rights are violated by an official's episodic act or omission only where the official acted with deliberate indifference. Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2001). An official can be said to have acted with deliberate indifference only where:
1) the official was aware of facts from which an inference of substantial risk of serious harm could be drawn; 2) the official actually drew that inference; and 3) the official's response indicates that the official subjectively intended that harm occur.Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 458-59 (5th Cir. 2001). "[T]he failure to alleviate a significant risk that [the official] should have perceived, but did not is insufficient to show deliberate indifference." Domino v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "deliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm."Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459.
In this case, plaintiff has brought forth no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that defendants denied him a necessary restroom break with deliberate indifference. Plaintiff makes no allegations that Sheriff Jones was even present when the incident occurred, much less that he was in any way involved in denying plaintiff a restroom break. In his complaint, plaintiff indicates that Deputy Lee declined to take him to the restroom because she is a female officer and, therefore, it would be more appropriate for Deputy Seal to escort plaintiff. If that was indeed Lee's reason, it would appear to be a reasonable one in no way indicative of deliberate indifference. As to Seal, plaintiff indicates in his complaint that Seal's refusal was based on the fact that he had just returned from escorting two other inmates to the restroom. Seal allegedly stated: "No, I am not taking you to the restroom. I'm not going back up those stairs." While the Court could perhaps infer from that alleged response that Seal's refusal was based on arguably inappropriate factors or was even negligent in light of plaintiff's medical condition, the Court cannot make the leap to conclude that Seal acted with an awareness that his action posed a substantial risk of serious harm and that he subjectively intended that harm occur.
To the extent that plaintiff is seeking to hold Jones liable merely because of his supervisory position, such a claim must fail. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a supervisory official is not liable for the actions of his subordinates under any theory of vicarious liability. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987): see also Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Section 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior liability."). Accordingly, a supervisory official may be held liable for his subordinates' actions only if the official affirmatively participated in the acts that caused the constitutional deprivation or if he implemented an unconstitutional policy that causally resulted in plaintiff's injury. Mouille v. City of Live Oak, Texas, 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff has not alleged that any of his constitutional rights were violated as a result of the personal actions or policies of Jones.
While the Court acknowledges that what occurred in this case was unfortunate, that does not mean that defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional rights. It would be imprudent for this Court to hold that law enforcement officers violate a pretrial detainee's constitutional rights simply because they fail to provide restroom access immediately upon request. See West, 1997 WL 452727, at *8. Rather, something more must be shown, namely that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. In this case, plaintiff has pointed to no evidence whatsoever from which the Court could conclude that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. "If a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial, there ceases to be a genuine issue as to any material fact, such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Texaco, Inc. v. Duhe, 274 F.3d 911, 915 (5th Cir. 2001).
Defendants also correctly argue that plaintiff's claims are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which provides: "No federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." Plaintiff has brought forth no evidence of physical injury. Rather, plaintiff's claims are essentially ones for emotional damages stemming from the humiliation he suffered as a result of urinating on himself in public. Where a plaintiff has been humiliated but suffered no physical injury, his claims for monetary damages are barred by § 1997e(e). See Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.