Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC348279, Helen I. Bendix, Judge.
Wayne Yee, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant.
Barry Fischer, in pro. per., for Respondent.
COOPER, P. J.
Wayne Yee, an attorney, appeals from an order awarding attorney fees to his opponent following relief from default judgments. Appellant challenges the amount of those fees but demonstrates no error. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Duck Han Jang sued New Star Realty, Inc. (New Star), Chris Moonkey Nam, and Jenny Nam. The first amended complaint (complaint) alleges causes of action for breach of contract, fraud, money had and received, constructive trust and accounting, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and unfair business practices.
New Star Realty, Inc., was sued as Era New Star Realty, Inc., and Era New Star Realty & Investments. The complaint names Moon Kee Nam also known as Mun Ki Nam, Chris Nam, and Jenny Nam.
According to the complaint, New Star is in the business of real estate, and Jang worked at New Star from 2000 to 2004. Jang alleged that New Star and the Nams failed to comply with the terms of the broker-agent agreement and withheld money owed to the agents. Jang sought class action status on behalf of approximately 1,000 real estate agents.
On June 13, 2006, Jang filed a motion for class action status. On June 30, 2006, default judgments against New Star and the Nams were entered. On October 4, 2006, Jang requested entry of default in the amount of $23,915,973. On October 6, 2006, Jang filed another motion to certify the class action. On October 19, 2006, Jang moved for attorney fees.
On October 24, 2006, New Star and the Nams moved to set aside the default judgments pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473. Wayne Yee, counsel for New Star and the Nams, stated that the failure to file a response was the result of his neglect. Finding relief mandatory, the court granted relief from the default.
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
The court set a hearing on fees and costs. Jang’s counsel, Barry Fischer, sought $49,218 in attorney fees as a result of the default judgments. New Star and the Nams opposed the request, arguing that they should not be required to pay fees that would have been incurred regardless of the defaults and that not all costs were allowable by statute.
The court found New Star and the Nams were “partially correct.” The court deducted fees incurred in preparation of the class certification motion and those related to a protective order. The court found that Jang could not include costs of serving the complaint, or the Lexis-Nexis costs because the court could not determine the subject of the legal research. The court ordered Wayne Yee to pay $37,146 in fees and costs to Fischer. Wayne Yee appeals from that order.
DISCUSSION
A trial court may order attorney fees as sanctions when it grants relief under section 473. (Hearst v. Ferrante (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 201, 204.) Appellant does not challenge the propriety of the award of attorney fees, but instead argues the court abused its discretion in the amount of fees awarded.
We find no abuse of discretion. The trial court considered appellant’s argument that not all fees initially requested were related to the default judgments. The trial court reduced the fee award from the $49,218 requested to $37,146. The record shows that the court considered which fees and costs were attributable to the defaults, and reduced the fees from those requested because not all were related to the defaults.
The only specific fees appellant challenges are three parking fees. Two are for appearances on an ex parte motion regarding the prove up hearing. The last is for a hearing on the motion to set aside the default. The total amount is $53. Appellant provides no authority for the proposition that the $53 fee is inappropriate. Section 473, subdivision (c)(1)(C), allows the trial court to “[g]rant other relief as is appropriate” when it grants relief from a default judgment. (See Daley v. County of Butte (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380, 395 [under section 473 trial court is authorized “to do substantial justice. . . .”].) Appellant does not show that the $53 award is inappropriate in this context.
We need not review those fees sought by counsel but found inappropriate by the trial court. Appellant’s argument that there was a discrepancy in the amount sought and the amount indicated on the bills, is irrelevant because the trial court reduced significantly the amount of fees from that reflected both in the attorney declaration and the bills. Appellant fails to show that any of the fees ordered were improper. It is appellant’s burden on appeal to show error and they have not satisfied this burden. (See Brewster v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 701, 716 [appellant’s burden to show specific error to set aside attorney fee awarded].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
We concur: RUBIN, J., FLIER, J.