Opinion
99 Civ. 5854 (SHS)
April 27, 2000.
OPINION ORDER
Adam A. Jamison, an inmate at Clinton Correctional Facility, brings this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that two hearing officers violated his right to due process by improperly conducting disciplinary proceedings against him. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) on the grounds that the action implicates the deprivation of good-time credits and is thus not cognizable as a section 1983 action until the invalidity of his sentence has been established either by an administrative body or upon direct appeal or through a habeas corpus proceeding. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
I. Background.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Harold Dee — who conducts hearings for the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") — violated Jamison's right to due process during the course of two separate Tier III hearings. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Donald Seisky — who conducts appeals from DOCS hearings — violated plaintiffs due process rights by failing to uphold his appeal from the decision in each hearing. See Complaint, at 4.
The different tiers of prison hearings are defined at 7 N YC.R.R. § 270.3. The procedure to be followed in a Tier III (or superintendent's) hearing is set forth at 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 254. A prisoner may be deprived of good-time credits only subsequent to a Tier III hearing. See 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 260.4.
During the two hearings — each involving a separate incident — Dee allegedly refused to call certain witnesses, accepted certain false evidence, refused to accept evidence plaintiff sought to adduce, and failed to provide plaintiff with certain documentation relating to the charges. See id.
As a result of the hearings, Jamison was allegedly transferred to another prison, kept in keeplock for 18 months, lost his telephone privileges, suffered harassment and psychological harm and was deprived of one year's good-time credits. See id., at 4. A prisoner who accumulates good-time credits while in prison is eligible for early release from incarceration.
Keeplock is a type of housing unit in New York prisons where the conditions are more restrictive than those for the general prison population. Prisoners may be placed in keeplock awaiting disciplinary or superintendent's hearings, pursuant to the disposition of such hearings, or awaiting transfer to another facility. See 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 301.6(a).
At the time of the hearings, Jamison was ineligible to accumulate good-time credits on the grounds that his sentence was 20 years-to-life. In January of 1999, he was resentenced in New York Supreme Court, Bronx County, to a sentence of 9-to- 18 years for reasons that are not relevant to this action. As a result, his current sentence makes him eligible for a sentence reduction due to the accumulation of good-time credits once he has served two-thirds of the maximum sentence. See 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8001.3(b)(2)(ii).
II. Discussion.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint and must view the pleadings in the light most favorable to and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1993). Dismissal of the complaint is only proper when "it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
A prisoner may not bring a section 1983 action which implies the invalidity of his conviction or sentence unless he has already brought a successful challenge to that conviction or sentence through appropriate channels. "[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254."Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). By contrast, a suit "challenging the validity of a disciplinary or administrative sanction that does not affect the overall length of the prisoner s confinement is not barred by Heck andEdwards." Jenkins v. Raubert, 179 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 1999).
In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the Supreme Court applied the rule of law articulated in Heck to a prisoner's loss of good-time credits — exactly the question raised by plaintiff in this case. In that action, a state prisoner brought a section 1983 claim that he was denied due process when the hearing officer at his disciplinary proceeding concealed exculpatory information and refused to adduce certain information of witnesses requested by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that where a successful section 1983 action by a plaintiff "necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits" id. at 646, the cause of action "is not cognizable under § 1983"id. at 648.
Jamison's challenge to the two Tier III hearings would, by his own admission, implicate the decision to deprive him of good-time credits. He argues that his action is proper because at the time of the hearings, he was not eligible for good-time credits. He admits, though, that he is currently eligible for such credits, since he was resentenced to a term of 9-to-18 years.
Jamison's argument is unavailing. Regardless of whether such a suit would have affected his overall sentence at the time of the hearings, this section 1983 action now implicates the length of his sentence. It is thus not cognizable under section 1983 until the sentence is impugned by some other proceeding. The fact that the good-time credits were revoked prior to the resentencing in no way prevents the government from administering the decision.See Freeman v. New York Correction Dep't, 20 A.D.2d 825, 247 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416 (3d Dept. 1964).
III. Conclusion.
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
SO ORDER
Date April 26, 200.