ot. The court properly instructed them that the jumping off the platform was the means by which the injury, if any was sustained, was caused; that the question was, whether there was anything accidental, unforeseen, involuntary, unexpected, in the act of jumping, from the time the deceased left the platform until he alighted on the ground; that the term "accidental" was used in the policy in its ordinary, popular sense, as meaning "happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place; not according to the usual course of things; or not as expected;" that, if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means.' United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 38 L.Ed. 60. "See, also, James v. State Life Ins. Co., 83 Ind. App. 344, 147 N.E. 533; Bryant v. Continental Casualty Co., 107 Texas 582[ 107 Tex. 582][ 107 Tex. 582], 182 S.W. 673, Ann. Cas. 1918A 517; Lewis v. Ocean Accident Guarantee Corp. of London, 224 N.Y. 18, 120 N.E. 56; Christ v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 312 Ill. 525, 144 N.E. 161; Brown v. Continental Casualty Co., 161 La. 229, 108 So. 464; Carter v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259; Hornby v. State Life Ins. Co., 106 Neb. 575, 184 N.W. 84; Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers' Association, 186 Iowa 454, 172 N.W. 454; Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n v. Lewis, 257 Fed. 241. "Several of these cases have a surprising similarity as to the facts, and, when carefully read, each and all support a holding that the infection was of itself an accident within the terms of the policy."
Ins. Co., 130 Wis. 10, 110 N.W. 246; 137 Fed. 1012; Thompson v. Columbian Ins. Co., 114 Me. 1, 95 A. 225; Hawkeye Assurance Co. v. Jenkins, 147 Ia. 113, 124 N.W. 199; National Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Singleton, 193 Ala. 84; Caldwell v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 156 Ia. 327; Rathjen v. Woodmen, etc., 93 Neb. 629; 113 Ark. 174; Vernon v. Iowa State, 158 Ia., 597, 138 N.W. 696; Rheinheimer v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 77 Ohio St. 360, 83 N.E. 491; Simpkins v. Hawkeye, etc., 148 Ia. 543; Farmer v. Mass. Mutual, etc., 219 Pa. 71, 67 A. 97; Horton v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 187 P. 1070; James v. State Life Ins. Co., 147 N.E. 533; 1 K.B. 587; Lewis v. Ocean Acc., etc., 224 N.Y. 18, 120 N.E. 56; Business Men's Acc. Assn. v. Schieferbusch, 262 Fed. 354; Md. Cas. Co. v. Massey, 38 F.2d 724; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brand, 265 Fed. 6; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wicker, 240 Fed. 398; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Still, 78 F.2d 748; Maloney v. Md. Cas. Co., 113 Ark. 174; Nax v. Travelers Ins. Co., 130 Fed. 985; Century Ind. Co. v. Carroll, 55 S.W.2d 873. Counsel argue that there can be no recovery here because a presumption cannot be based on another presumption.
" United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 38 L.Ed. 60. See, also, James v. State Life Ins. Co., 83 Ind. App. 344, 147 N.E. 533; Bryant v. Continental Casualty Co., 107 Texas 582[ 107 Tex. 582][ 107 Tex. 582], 182 S.W. 673, Ann. Cas. 1918A 517; Lewis v. Ocean Accident Guarantee Corp. of London, 224 N.Y. 18, 120 N.E. 56; Christ v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 312 Ill. 525, 144 N.E. 161; Brown v. Continental Casualty Co., 161 La. 229, 108 So. 464; Carter v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259; Hornby v. State Life Ins. Co., 106 Neb. 575, 184 N.W. 84; Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers' Association, 186 Iowa 454, 172 N.W. 454; Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n v. Lewis, 257 Fed. 241. Several of these cases have a surprising similarity as to the facts, and, when carefully read, each and all support a holding that the infection was of itself an accident within the terms of the policy.
The court will infer such facts as may be implied by fair and reasonable intendment. James v. State Life Ins. Co. (1925), 83 Ind. App. 344, 147 N.E. 533. Here, a reasonable person could infer a default had occurred.
It is a settled rule, in this state, that in determining the sufficiency of a pleading, the court will not only consider the fact directly alleged, but, in addition thereto, such facts 2. as may be implied by fair and reasonable intendment, and such facts, so impliedly averred, will be given the same force as if directly stated. James v. State Life Ins. Co. (1925), 83 Ind. App. 344, 147 N.E. 533, and cases therein cited. Construing the complaint in the instant case in the light of our Code and the rule above stated, appellee evidently attempted, by the several allegations of his complaint, to charge the violation of the following sections of the statute: Sec. 47-505 Burns 1933, § 11158 Baldwin's 1934, which provides that when any motor vehicle is parked or left standing in the street of any city or incorporated town, a rear light shall be kept burning at all times during the period from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise. Sec. 47-531 Burns 1933, § 11205 Baldwin's 1934, which provides that whenever the load on any vehicle operated or moved upon any public highway shall extend more than four feet beyond the rear of the bed or body thereof, there shall be displayed at the end of such load in such position as to be visible at all times from the rear of such load a red flag not less than twelve inches both in length and width, and between one-half hour aft
We must also bear in mind that, "in construing a complaint where a demurrer is interposed, it will be deemed sufficient whenever the necessary allegations can be fairly gathered from all the averments, and all facts will be deemed stated that can be implied from the allegations made by a fair and reasonable intendment and facts so impliedly averred will be given the same force as if directly stated." Fauvre Coal Co. v. Kushner, supra; James v. State Life Insurance Co. (1925), 83 Ind. App. 344, 147 N.E. 533. We must also be cognizant of the several decisions of the Supreme and Appellate Courts that it is sufficient, as against a demurrer, in pleading negligence to allege that the defendant "negligently" did the act complained of without stating the particulars of the negligence or the circumstances which made it negligent.