Opinion
No. 04-17-00548-CR No. 04-17-00549-CR
05-09-2018
Rebekah JAMES, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the County Court at Law No. 12, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 519190 & 519191
Honorable Scott Roberts, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Irene Rios, Justice AFFIRMED
In two separate cause numbers, Appellant Rebekah James ("James") was convicted by a jury for making a terroristic threat and evading arrest or detention. On appeal, James argues: (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty on the charge of making a terroristic threat; (2) the trial court erred in denying James's motion to suppress evidence of her arrest; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a video of James sitting in the backseat of a police vehicle after her arrest. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
BACKGROUND
On June 1, 2016, San Antonio police officers Daniel Jones and Reed Hensley were dispatched to James's street in response to a disturbance between James and her neighbor.
Officer Jones was the first to arrive on the scene. He testified that when he first arrived, he saw James "standing at the end of her driveway near the street" and "yelling towards—away from her house towards other neighbors." As Officer Jones pulled up in his marked patrol vehicle, James turned around and began moving quickly towards her house. Officer Jones, who was already familiar with James, called out: "Rebekah, stop." James replied "fuck no" and continued towards her house at a faster rate. Officer Jones testified he ran towards James's house, grabbed James's arm as she was entering the house, and put his foot in the front doorway so the door could not close.
When Officer Hensley arrived at the scene, he saw James running towards her house and Officer Jones chasing her on foot. Officer Hensley testified that when he reached James's front door, he observed Officer Jones had ahold of James and was trying to detain her as James was yelling at him and trying to close the door on his arm. Officers Jones and Hensley eventually restrained James and placed her in the backseat of Officer Jones's patrol vehicle. James was charged with making a terroristic threat against her neighbor and evading arrest or detention.
On the morning of the trial on the merits, James urged a motion to suppress evidence of her arrest. James's counsel argued that because the police officers pursued James into her house in order to arrest her without a warrant or exigent circumstances, "all evidence of the evading should be thrown out. And as to the arrest, it was an illegal arrest." The trial court heard arguments from both sides and denied the motion to suppress. James re-urged her motion to suppress after the State rested its case, arguing: "[I]n this instance, there's no evidence other—inside the house that you can suppress . . . so the only real option you have is to invalidate [the] arrest." The trial court denied the re-urged motion.
The jury heard from three witnesses—Officers Jones and Hensley and Laurel Anderson, a neighbor of James. The victim, also a neighbor, died before trial in an unrelated accident. Anderson testified she was inside her house when she heard James and the victim yelling at each other. Anderson testified she heard James tell the victim that "she was going to burn down his house." After James threatened to burn down his house, Anderson testified the victim "was freaking out is all I can call it. He was just so upset." Officer Jones testified that when he spoke to the victim, the victim was "agitated" and "cooperative, but frustrated with the situation."
Over James's objection, the trial court admitted State's Exhibit 17, which is a video recording (with audio) of James in the backseat of Officer Jones's patrol vehicle after her arrest. The video depicts James angrily yelling and cursing.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In her first issue, James argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's verdict on the charge of making a terroristic threat.
A. Standard of review
In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). "The trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence and is permitted to draw any reasonable inference from the evidence so long as it is supported by the record." Ramsey, 473 S.W.3d at 809. We are mindful that we may not sit as a thirteenth juror and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
B. Terroristic threat
A person commits the offense of making a terroristic threat if she "threatens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property with intent to . . . place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury." TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.07(a)(2). "Imminent" means "near at hand; mediate rather than immediate; close rather than touching; impending; on the point of happening; threatening; menacing; perilous." Devine v. State, 786 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 676 (5th ed. 1979)). "Serious bodily injury" is "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(46).
It is not necessary that the victim actually fears imminent serious bodily injury, nor is it necessary that the defendant actually has the capability or intention to carry out the threat. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982); Williams v. State, 194 S.W.3d 568, 574-75 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006), aff'd, 252 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). "The desired and sought after reaction of the victim, regardless of whether the threat was real or was carried out, is some evidence of the defendant's intent to place the victim in fear of imminent serious injury." Williams, 194 S.W.3d at 575. Intent also can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant. Id.; Dues, 634 S.W.2d at 305.
C. Analysis
James argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support the verdict because her statements "were not [made] with the intent to cause fear of imminent serious bodily injury to anyone." James argues the evidence shows she "was not yelling at the complainant, standing more perpendicular, [and] yelling 'nonsensically' into the air." In support, James cites only the following testimony:
Q. [by James's trial counsel] When you arrived on scene and saw [James] standing by the edge of her driveway, to your knowledge was she facing towards the home of [the victim] or away from him?There was no testimony that James was "yelling 'nonsensically' into the air."
A. [by Officer Jones] To me, she appeared to be facing across the street at the time, facing away from that, like, more perpendicular.
Q. Okay. Did you see who she was yelling at?
A. Not when I first arrived, no, ma'am.
In contrast, the State presented uncontroverted evidence supporting the jury's verdict. First, evidence was adduced regarding James's acts, words, and conduct. James's neighbor Laurel Anderson testified she heard James tell the victim "she was going to burn down his house." Officer Jones testified that when he arrived at the scene, he observed James "standing at the end of her driveway near the street . . . yelling towards—away from her house towards other neighbors." State's Exhibit 17 showed James angrily yelling and cursing after being arrested.
Second, the witnesses testified regarding the reaction of the victim. Anderson testified that after James told the victim she was going to burn down his house, the victim "was freaking out is all I can call it. He was just so upset." Officer Jones testified that when he spoke to the victim, the victim was "agitated" and "cooperative, but frustrated with the situation."
In addition, the evidence demonstrates James attempted to flee. See Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ("Evidence of flight is admissible as a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn."). Officer Jones testified that as he pulled up to the scene, James "started to turn around and walk towards her house," which she "continued at a faster rate" after Officer Jones called her name and told her to stop. Officer Hensley also testified he observed James "running from Officer Jones."
After reviewing the record, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict. James's first issue is overruled.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
In her second issue, James argues the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence of her arrest. James argues the arrest should have been suppressed because the police officers pursued James into her house without a warrant or exigent circumstances.
When the validity of a defendant's arrest or detention is an element of the offense charged, a motion to suppress evidence on the basis that the arrest or detention was unlawful is improper. Woods v. State, 153 S.W.3d 413, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In Woods, the defendant was arrested and charged with evading arrest after fleeing from a police officer who instructed him to submit to a pat-down. Id. The defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the arrest on the basis that the police officer had no reasonable suspicion to detain him in the first place. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals held there is no constitutional or statutory authority for a trial court to determine, pre-trial, the legality of an arrest or a seizure in a prosecution for evading arrest or detention because such a determination would require a "mini-trial" on the sufficiency of the evidence to support an element of the offense. Id. at 415.
Like the defendant in Woods, James was charged with evading arrest. "A person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer or federal special investigator attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him." TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04 (emphasis added). Because James sought to suppress the arrest on the basis that there was no reasonable suspicion, she was "in effect asking the trial judge to rule on whether the prosecution had proof of an element of the offense"—i.e., the lawfulness of the arrest. See Woods, 153 S.W.3d at 415. "The purpose of a pre-trial motion is to address preliminary matters, not the merits of the case itself." Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence.
James's second issue is overruled.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
In her third issue, James argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting State's Exhibit 17—the video recording of James in the backseat of Officer Jones's patrol vehicle after her arrest. James argues the video is not relevant, has no probative value, and is highly prejudicial.
A. Standard of review
We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence in determining the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 401. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. TEX. R. EVID. 403. To determine whether relevant evidence is more prejudicial than probative, we consider four factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential to impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible, way; (3) the time needed to develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent's need for the evidence. Hernandez v. State, 390 S.W.3d 310, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence, and relevant evidence is presumptively more probative than prejudicial. Rayford v. State, 125 S.W.3d 521, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
B. Analysis
The State had the burden to prove James intended to place the victim in fear of imminent or serious bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.07(a)(2). Because the video recording of James immediately after her arrest shows her state of mind at the time, we hold it is relevant under Rule 401. See Ridings v. State, No. 04-16-00370-CR, 2017 WL 603636, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 15, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.) (holding testimony that defendant was cussing, kicking, and lunging at arresting police officers was probative of defendant's state of mind and circumstances of arrest); Fletcher v. State, 852 S.W.2d 271, 277-78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ ref'd) (holding evidence that defendant assumed "a fighting stance" when officers arrived to arrest him was probative of his state of mind). A defendant's aggressive behavior during an arrest is also admissible evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt. Ridings, 2017 WL 603636, at *3; see also Butler v. State, 936 S.W.2d 453, 457-59 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ ref'd) (upholding admission of evidence that appellant kicked out door of police car following arrest because evidence was relevant to state of mind and indicated guilty knowledge of offense).
As to the first and fourth factors, as discussed, the State had the burden to show James's intent to make a terroristic threat. The video is probative of James's state of mind and demonstrates that her behavior while under arrest was consistent with the charge that she had just threatened to burn down the victim's house. As to the third factor, James agrees that it did not take much time for the trial court or the jury to view the video. Finally, as to the second factor, James has not demonstrated that the video had any potential to impress the jury in an irrational or indelible way. Although the video shows James in an angry state, it accurately portrays her behavior and state of mind shortly after her arrest. See Conelly v. State, 451 S.W.3d 471, 477 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (upholding admission of defendant's booking photo after arrest for driving while intoxicated because the photo, "while perhaps unflattering as booking photos tend to be, does nothing more than portray the way appellant appeared shortly after his arrest"). Therefore, based on our review of the relevant factors, we hold the video is more probative than prejudicial.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling James's objection to admission of State's Exhibit 17. James's third issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgments.
Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice DO NOT PUBLISH