Opinion
No. 14-07-00919-CV
Memorandum Opinion filed January 6, 2009.
On Appeal from the 113th District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2006-54227.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices ANDERSON and SEYMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In two issues, appellants, James and Mary Smith Prince As The Property Owners and The Property Owners (collectively "the Princes"), appeal a summary judgment in favor of appellee, Harris County Appraisal District ("HCAD"), on the Princes' claim that their property was excessively and unequally appraised. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion and affirm. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
The Princes also named the Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal District as a defendant and appellee. However, the record indicates, and it is apparently undisputed, this party was not served. Although only HCAD moved for summary judgment, the judgment is final for purposes of appeal. See Sondock v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 231 S.W.3d 65, 67 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (recognizing summary judgment was final in same circumstances).
I. BACKGROUND
HCAD appraised the value of certain property owned by the Princes at $1,300,000 for tax year 2006. Through an agent, the Princes timely filed a protest with the Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal District ("the Board"). The Princes' agent and an HCAD representative appeared at a hearing conducted by a panel of the Board. According to a transcript of the hearing, the Princes' agent explained his assessment and opined the value of the property was $950,000. Subsequently, the following exchanged occurred:
Chairman: At this time, we're going to [HCAD] for their presentation and recommendation.
[very long pause]
[HCAD Representative]: We concur with the agent.
Chairman: Okay, You all concur?
Board Member: I concur.
Chairman: Do you have any _________ [word inaudible]?
[The Princes' Agent]: Nothing further.
Chairman: Thank you. Okay. On Account ending 0020, it is the _________ [phrase inaudible] value of this property of $1,300,000 is the testimony of the property owner's representative and the testimony of [HCAD]. Now property owner's rep recommended a value for the year 2006 $950,000. [HCAD] concurs. The panel concurs. So value for 2006 is placed at $950,000. That ends the hearing.
The Board entered a written order reducing the appraised value from $1,300,000 to $950,000. In the order, the Board stated the Princes had a right to appeal the decision to a district court. The Princes filed a petition for judicial review in the trial court, contending the property was excessively and unequally appraised. HCAD filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court signed an order granting the motion and dismissing the Princes' claims.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party moving for traditional summary judgment must establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Provident Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215-16 (Tex. 2003). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if it conclusively negates at least one element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or pleads and conclusively establishes each element of an affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). We review a summary judgment de novo. Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 215. We take all evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in favor of the nonmovant. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
HCAD moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Princes were precluded from appealing the $950,000 appraised value via judicial review because they (through their agent) reached an agreement with HCAD regarding this value. HCAD relied on section 1.111(e) of the Texas Tax Code, which provides in pertinent part:
An agreement between a property owner or the owner's agent and the chief appraiser is final if the agreement relates to a matter:
(1) which may be protested to the appraisal review board or on which a protest has been filed but not determined by the board;
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 1.111(e)(1) (Vernon 2008).
In two interrelated issues, the Princes contend the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because their appeal was not precluded under section 1.111(e). Specifically, the Princes argue no legally binding agreement existed because neither party "acted upon" their oral concurrence regarding the property value by announcing or submitting an agreement to the Board; instead, the parties allowed the Board to issue an order determining the protest. In addition, the Princes suggest that this subsequent order vitiated any agreement and rendered section 1.111(e) inapplicable. The Princes emphasize the portion of section 1.111(e) providing that an agreement is final if it relates to a matter "on which a protest has been filed but not determined by the board." Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 1.111(e) (emphasis added). The Princes also rely on Tax Code section 42.01 which provides in pertinent part, "A property owner is entitled to appeal: (1) an order of the appraisal review board determining: (A) a protest by the property owner as provided by Subchapter C of Chapter 41. . . ." Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.01 (Vernon 2008) (emphasis added). In essence, the Princes contend they maintained an absolute right to appeal because their protest was resolved by the Board's order, as opposed to any agreement between the Princes and HCAD. Finally, the Princes assert the trial court denied their constitutional rights to due process by ruling their appeal was precluded.
In Sondock v. Harris County Appraisal District, we considered the same issue and rejected arguments virtually identical to those raised by the Princes. 231 S.W.3d 65, 67-71 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). The Sondocks' agent appeared at their protest hearing and rendered an opinion regarding the value of their property. Id. at 67-68. HCAD's representative stated, "The District concurs," although she recommended the amount be rounded down to an even number. Id. at 68. A Board member then orally announced the value at this amount. Id. Subsequently, the Board entered a written order setting the value accordingly and stating the Sondocks had a right to appeal. Id. The Sondocks filed suit in district court, claiming the property was excessively and unequally appraised. Id. at 67-68. The trial court granted HCAD's motion for summary judgment on the ground the Sondocks were precluded under section 1.111(e) from appealing the appraised value via judicial review based on their agreement with HCAD at the hearing. Id. at 68-69.
When affirming the summary judgment, we concluded the Sondocks and HCAD reached an agreement regarding the property value. Id. at 69. Because the Tax Code does not define "agreement," we used the ordinary meaning: "the act of agreeing; harmony of opinion; accord." Id. (citing Tex. Gov't Code § 312.002; Martin v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 44 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2006)). The Sondocks and HCAD were in harmony of opinion based on the exchange at the protest hearing. Id.
We also stated that section 1.111(e) does not require the parties to "act upon" or "announce" the agreement before it is considered final. Id. (citing Tex. Tax Code § 1.111(e)). Further, we noted that the Legislature, in enacting the current version of section 1.111(e), deleted a previous requirement that the Board must approve an agreement before it became final; thus, the Legislature intended to make it easier for parties to reach agreements in property-tax disputes. Id. (citing Act of May 28, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 796, § 2, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 3591, amended by Act of May 26, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1031, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 4440 (codified at Tex. Tax Code § 1.111)). Our conclusion that the Sondocks and HCAD reached an agreement regarding the property value, based on a clear meeting of the minds, furthered the Legislature's purpose. Id.
Moreover, we held that the agreement became final at the moment it was reached because it related to a matter in which a protest had been filed but not determined by the Board. Id. (citing Tex. Tax Code § 1.111(e)). Consequently, any subsequent determinations by the Board regarding the value, including the Board's order, were rendered irrelevant. Id. (citing Tex. Tax Code § 1.111(e)).
Further, we rejected the Sondocks' due-process contention. Id. at 69-71. We recognized that a property owner's right to due process relative to collection of taxes is satisfied if he is given an opportunity to be heard before an assessment board at some stage of the proceedings. Id. at 70 (citing ABT Galveston Ltd. P'ship v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 137 S.W.3d 146, 155 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Denton Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. CIT Leasing Corp., 115 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Lal, 701 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Accordingly, the Sondocks were not deprived of due process because they were given the opportunity to present their arguments to the Board and they reached an agreement with HCAD regarding the property value which fully satisfied their contentions. Id.
Finally, in Sondock, we found instructive a sister court's opinion expressing the same conclusion when addressing a remarkably similar issue. Id. at 70-71 (citing BPAC Texas, LP as the Property Owners and the Property Owners v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., No. 01-03-01238-CV, 2004 WL 2422033 (Tex. App-Houston [1st Dist.] October 28, 2004, no pet.) (mem.op.)). Additionally, our court and the sister court have since cited Sondock when rejecting contentions substantially similar to those raised by the Princes. See Verm v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., No. 14-06-01046-CV, 2008 WL 2580041 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); Mann v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., No. 01-07-00436-CV, 2008 WL 1747807 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem.op.); Hartman v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 251 S.W.3d 595 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
Nevertheless, the Princes contend that the above-cited cases are not controlling because they conflict with Matagorda County Appraisal District v. Coastal Liquid Partners, L.P., 165 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. 2005). According to the Princes, the Texas Supreme Court held that an appraisal board, by entering an order on a protest, impliedly rejected the appraisal district's claim it had reached an agreement with the taxpayer. However, Matagorda County is distinguishable from the above-cited cases; the supreme court merely upheld the board's determination that a lessee's protest regarding the value of certain properties had not been resolved by the property owner's agreement with the appraisal district regarding other properties. See id. at 331-32; see also Mann, 2008 WL 1747807, at *5 (holding Matagorda County does not stand for general proposition that an appraisal board, by entering an order on a protest, impliedly rejects appraisal district's claim that an agreement has been reached). Therefore, we will follow Sondock and the other above-cited cases.
We hold that (1) pursuant to section 1.111(e), the Princes and HCAD reached a final agreement at the hearing when the HCAD representative "concur[red]" with the Princes' agent regarding the value of the property, (2) this final agreement precluded appeal of the appraised value, despite the Board's subsequent order, and (3) the Princes were not deprived of their rights to due process by application of section 1.111(e). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting HCAD's motion for summary judgment.
We overrule the Princes' two issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.