Opinion
KNLCV175015509S
07-11-2018
Latone JAMES v. Lt. HALLORAN et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Handy, J.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Latone James, a self-represented prisoner, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983 action), claiming alleged deprivations of his rights as an incarcerated inmate. He has sued three defendants in this action, in what appears to be in both their individual and official capacities: Lt. Halloran, Warden Santiago, and Counselor Lacy. In count one of his complaint, the plaintiff seeks monetary damages against these three named defendants. The remaining eleven counts incorporate the entirety of each and every other preceding count. Essentially, then, the plaintiff is seeking monetary damages in all counts. Further, the plaintiff concludes his complaint with "Amount in Demand ... greater than $15,000 ($25,000)." This is somewhat confusing in and of itself, but suffices to confirm that the plaintiff’s redress is money.
On December 13, 1996, the plaintiff was sentenced to a term of twenty years following a conviction at trial of robbery in the first degree with a deadly weapon. Then, on August 5, 1999, after trial to the crime of felony murder, the plaintiff was sentenced to a term of fifty years to be served concurrently with his earlier sentence.
Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983, provides in relevant part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any [s]tate ... subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [c]onstitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ..."
Although the plaintiff lists twelve counts in his complaint, those "counts" do not appear to be separate claims; rather, they appear to be numbered paragraphs, one through twelve, relating to his "U.S. 1983 Civil Suit."
By motion dated August 9, 2017, the defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff’s action on several grounds. The defendants first argue that this court lacks personal jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to provide proper service on the defendants pursuant to General Statutes § 52-57a. Second, the defendants claim the motion should be granted because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is seeking money damages from the defendants in their official capacities, and because such a suit is barred by both the federal and state constitutions and by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the present case must be dismissed.
The plaintiff filed a reply to defendants’ motion to dismiss on August 15, 2017. The court held a hearing on this matter on June 26, 2018; the plaintiff appeared via video conferencing from the prison and counsel for the defendants was present in court. At that time, all parties had the opportunity to be fully heard.
II. LAW AND DISCUSSION
A motion to dismiss is used primarily to challenge the jurisdiction of the court. Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009). Practice Book § 10-30(a) provides the grounds for dismissal: "(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) insufficiency of process; and (4) insufficiency of service of process." "[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). A motion to dismiss tests whether or not the court is without jurisdiction. MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court must decide "whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).
A. Personal Jurisdiction Over the Named Defendants
Jurisdiction over the person requires proper service of process according to the statutory rules. Defects in the process or the service of the process will render the case subject to dismissal. "Facts showing the service of process in time, form, and manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of mandatory statutes ... are essential to jurisdiction over the person ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport v. Debek, 210 Conn. 175, 179-80, 554 A.2d 728 (1989).
General Statutes § 52-57(a), which pertains to the method for serving process, provides: "Except as otherwise provided, process in any civil action shall be served by leaving a true and attested copy of it, including the declaration or complaint, with the defendant, or at his usual place of abode, in this state." In the present case, none of the three defendants were ever served individually. Instead, service in this case was only made upon Associate Attorney General Kimberly P. Massicote at the 55 Elm Street, Hartford, Connecticut address. (Marshal’s Return, 100.30.) Serving defendants by serving the attorney general constitutes official-capacity service only, and not individual-capacity service. See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dubois, 154 Conn.App. 448, 460 n.13, 107 A.3d 995 (2014) (trooper served only at Department of Public Safety not served in individual capacity). Our Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Harnage v. Lightner, 328 Conn. 248, 179 A.3d 212 (2018), wherein it affirmed a decision dismissing an action against state employees sued in their individual capacities because the plaintiff had failed to serve those defendants in hand or by abode service. As the Appellate Court noted, "§ 52-57 specifically enumerates exceptions to subsection (a), none of which provide that it is permissible to serve process in cases against state employees in their individual capacities by leaving a copy of the process with the attorney general of the Office of the Attorney General." Harnage v. Lightner, 163 Conn.App. 337, 346, 137 A.3d 10 (2016), aff’d, 328 Conn. 248, 179 A.3d 212 (2018).
Accordingly, this court lacks personal jurisdiction over all defendants in their individual capacities. All claims against the defendants in that regard are dismissed.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. The Federal Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment
The plaintiff captions his case "a 1983 action," in which he alleges violations of his constitutional rights. In count one of his complaint, he seeks money damages. Each subsequent count then incorporates each preceding count, in essence making the requested relief for each count money damages. The plaintiff also states, in his "amount in demand," money damages greater than $15,000.
As previously stated, the amount in demand states an amount "greater than $15,000" which is then followed by ($25,000).
The eleventh amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State ..." The eleventh amendment bars lawsuits against states absent consent from the state or abrogation of the immunity by Congress under section five of the fourteenth amendment. Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253-54, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 179 L.Ed.2d 675 (2011). A state may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 675-76, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999). "[I]n some circumstances Congress may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, ... courts may not entertain a private person’s suit against a State." (Footnote omitted.) Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, supra, 563 U.S. 253-54.
If an individual wants to bring an action for money damages against the state, that person is mandated to proceed through the Office of the Claims Commissioner, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-141 through 4-165. Prigge v. Ragaglia, 265 Conn. 338, 349, 828 A.2d 542 (2003); see also Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 318, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). The plaintiff did not follow the mandated procedure, and no waiver or abrogation of sovereign immunity exists in this case. As the plaintiff is seeking money damages against state employees in their official capacity, his claims are barred by the eleventh amendment.
2. Section 1983 Claims
In asserting a claim pursuant to § 1983, a party must allege a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right, and that such violation was committed by a "person" acting under color of state law. Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 762, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920 (2005); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). It has long been held that a state, which is an entity that has immunity under the eleventh amendment to the United States constitution, is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990). As such, a state is not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal or state court. Id. "This rule also extends to state officers sued in their official capacities." Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 311. "[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but is a suit against the official’s office ... As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself." (Citation omitted.) Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).
The plaintiff alleges that all three defendants in this case are employees of the State of Connecticut, all of whom are located at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Institution in Uncasville, Connecticut. These allegations appear first in count five of the plaintiff’s complaint, and are repeated again in counts nine, ten, and eleven. The plaintiff clearly states in counts nine, ten, and eleven that he is suing these defendants in their official capacities. As the defendants argue, the plaintiff’s claim for money damages against these three defendants in their official capacities are really claims against the state for money damages. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims for money damages against the defendants in their official capacity are barred under § 1983.
3. Sovereign Immunity
As previously articulated, the doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that a state is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued. Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 313. There are few and narrowly construed exceptions to this doctrine. Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 275, 21 A.3d 239 (2011); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d 675 (2007). Three exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity have been recognized by our Supreme Court: "1) when the legislature either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity ...; (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights ...; and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory authority." (Citations omitted.) Tuchman v. State, supra, 89 Conn.App. 753. Any exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity for actions by state officers in excess of their statutory authority applies only to actions evoking declaratory or injunctive relief and not to those seeking monetary damages. Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 312-13.
No such exception exists in this case. The only exception that would arguably save the present case, given that it seeks monetary damages, would be the first exception: "when the legislature has statutorily waived the state’s sovereign immunity." As previously stated, the plaintiff never received permission from the claims commissioner to sue the state for money damages. Rather, the plaintiff has merely alleged monetary damages against state employees who were acting in their official capacities. Accordingly, all such claims, to the extent that the plaintiff has alleged them, are dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in its entirety.