Opinion
2013-02-27
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Lucinda H. Alfieri and Patrick Lawless of counsel), for appellant. Rheingold, Valet, Rheingold, McCartney & Giuffra, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Thomas Valet, Thomas P. Giuffra, Sherri L. Plotkin, and Jeremy A. Hellman of counsel), for respondents.
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Lucinda H. Alfieri and Patrick Lawless of counsel), for appellant. Rheingold, Valet, Rheingold, McCartney & Giuffra, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Thomas Valet, Thomas P. Giuffra, Sherri L. Plotkin, and Jeremy A. Hellman of counsel), for respondents.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., PLUMMER E. LOTT, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant H.P. Greenfield Real Estate, Ltd., also known as Greenfield 21 HP Greenfield Real Estate, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bayne, J.), dated March 23, 2012, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
This action arises out of alleged elevated levels of lead in the infant plaintiff's blood. For at least part of the time during which the infant plaintiff resided in the building where he was exposed to lead, the appellant, the defendant H.P. Greenfield Real Estate, Ltd., also known as Greenfield 21 HP Greenfield Real Estate (hereinafter Greenfield), allegedly was the building's managing agent. While a managing agent may be subject to liability for nonfeasance under certain circumstances ( see James v. Greenpoint Fin. Corp., 34 A.D.3d 644, 645, 825 N.Y.S.2d 114;Hagen v. Gilman Mgt. Corp., 4 A.D.3d 330, 331, 770 N.Y.S.2d 890;Ioannidou v. Kingswood Mgt. Corp., 203 A.D.2d 248, 249, 610 N.Y.S.2d 277), here Greenfield moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that it was not, in fact, the building's managing agent. The Supreme Court denied its motion, and Greenfield appeals.
In support of its motion, Greenfield met its initial burden by demonstrating prima facie that it was not the building's managing agent. Nonetheless, in opposition, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Greenfield was the building's managing agent ( see James v. Greenpoint Fin. Corp., 34 A.D.3d at 645, 825 N.Y.S.2d 114;Santiago v. John J. Lease Realtors, 304 A.D.2d 743, 743, 757 N.Y.S.2d 800). Greenfield's remaining contention is without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied Greenfield's motion.
The plaintiffs' remaining contention need not be addressed in light of our determination.