Opinion
C/A 1:23-6046-HMH-SVH
06-18-2024
Isiah James, Jr., Petitioner, v. Director S.C. Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Isiah James, Jr. (“Petitioner”) was incarcerated at the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) until he was released on parole on December 2i, 20i7. Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 224i concerning the calculation of his sentence while at SCDC and concerning his denial for a pardon.
The petition has been reconstrued as filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner is a parolee and not an inmate. [See ECF No. i3 at i n.i].
This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Respondent's motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. i7]. Also before the court is Petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings. [ECF No. 2i].
On May i3, 2024, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation “(R&R”), recommending this case be dismissed for Petitioner's failure to prosecute. [ECF No. 24]. On May 30, 2024, Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R [ECF No. 26], and the district judge thereafter declined to adopt the R&R, noting that “Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R and addresses Respondent's motion for summary judgment,” recommitting the matter to the undersigned. [ECF No. 29].
Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends Respondent's motion be granted and Petitioner's motion be denied.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On June 18, 1979, Petitioner pled guilty and was sentenced by the Honorable Dan F. Laney, Circuit Court Judge, in the Sumter County Court of General Sessions on two counts of voluntary manslaughter and one count of armed robbery. James v. Stirling, C/A No. 1:17-1837-TLW-SVH, 2017 WL 10276909, at *1 (D.S.C. Nov. 6, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 1:17-1837-TLW, 2018 WL 4566687 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2018), aff'd, 763 Fed.Appx. 325 (4th Cir. 2019).Judge Laney sentenced Petitioner to a total of 85 years. [See ECF No. 17-1 at 2].
The Court takes judicial notice of the record in Petitioner's prior case. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Petitioner was released on parole on December 21, 2017, and his supervision was subsequently transferred to Georgia through the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. See id. His parole will expire on December 23, 2027. See id.
II. Discussion
A. Federal Habeas Issues
Petitioner raises the following grounds in his federal habeas petition:
Ground One: Cruel and unusual punishment (Eighth Amendment) violation.
Supporting Facts: Where the statutory laws granted petitioner 20 days a month in 1979 changed based on 360 to 365 days a year; subsequently, new no-parole laws 85% with less goodtime and earn work credits (EWC's) ex post facto; petitioner was not and still not getting statutory goodtime (SGT) for the 365 and 366 days which he served, did over a period of time nearly 40 years.
Ground Two: Due process and ex post facto violation(s).
Supporting Facts: There were SCDC policies changes with regards to SGT and EWC's credit(s) under old and new CrL of South Carolina and penal laws change(s); petitioner was reclassified and relegated in custody in 1996 transferred from minimum to medium/max security prison based on ex post facto policies changes which contained saving clause(s) against emotion(s) The is is not moot for he still suffers the collateral consequence(s) of such action by the agency.
Ground Three: Due process violation (5th and 14th amendments).
Supporting Facts: SCDC wrongfully calculated the sentence from Sumter County Court of General Sessions (criminal court); therein the existing penal laws which
mandated due process of laws, matter of law(s), erred; he paraphrases and reiterates all stated therein his initial pleadings (claims) in 2017.
Ground Four: Does due process cover pardon application for one wrongfully sentenced
Supporting Facts: Anyway petitioner pardon application was denied in 2023 and they stated there is no review or judicial review?[ECF No. 10 at 6-7 (errors in original)].
B. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. At the summary judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255. However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
C. Habeas Corpus Standard of Review
“[I]t is well established that defendants convicted in federal court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through § 2255.” Rice v Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997)). In contrast, a motion filed under § 2241 is typically used to challenge the manner in which a sentence is executed. See In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n.5.
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of this petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Court,the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b).
D. Analysis
1. Grounds One, Two, and Three
Respondent argues that Plaintiff's grounds one, two, and three should be dismissed for three reasons: first, Petitioner has unsuccessfully asserted these grounds previously in this court against a respondent responsible for the calculations; second, these grounds are barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and third, these grounds are barred by res judicata.
Previously, Petitioner has challenged the computation of his good time and earned work credits in a habeas petition submitted to this court naming the SCDC director as the respondent. James v. Stirling, C/A No. 1:17-01837-TLW. This petition was dismissed on September 24, 2018, and a motion to reopen the petition was denied on August 14, 2023.
In the instant petition, Petitioner again challenges the computation of his sentence while in SCDC custody, although he now names the director of the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services as the respondent. Respondent argues Grounds One, Two, and Three all relate to alleged actions or omissions by SCDC, over which Respondent has no authority. Respondent further argues he has no knowledge of the allegations made by Petitioner regarding his sentence calculations, beyond what is indicated in reviewing his previously-dismissed petition. [ECF No. 17-1 at 5, see also id. at 6 (“To allow Petitioner to raise the same claims that were unsuccessfully adjudicated under § 2241 as a petition under § 2254 against a Respondent that was not involved in the underlying actions would be against the writ's purpose of achieving finality of a court's judgments.”)].
Respondent additionally argues that Petitioner's challenge to the computation of his sentence while he was incarcerated is outside the one-year period of limitation within which to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus found in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As noted above, Petitioner was released from SCDC custody to parole, and therefore into Respondent's custody, in 2017. The record before the court provides no indication how the applicable statute of limitations would be tolled such as to render the instant petition timely.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides in part that “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court ....” See also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 148 & n.9 (2012) (explaining that § 2254 petitions are subject to one-year statute of limitations, running from latest of four commencement dates enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)).
Finally, Respondent argues Petitioner's challenge to the computation of his sentence calculations should be dismissed on the grounds of res judicata, noting the matters of James v. Stirling, C/A No. 1:17-01837-TLW, are firmly resolved and decided against Petitioner. As explained by the Fourth Circuit:
The general rule of res judicata applies to repetitious suits involving the same cause of action.... The rule provides that when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound “not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.”Crowe v. Leeke, 550 F.2d 184, 186-87 (4th Cir. 1977) (citing Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948)).
The court need not resolve the res judicata issue, where it appears that the petition is barred by the other reasons set forth by Respondent. For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends dismissal of Petitioner's Grounds One, Two, and Three.
2. Ground Four
Although somewhat unclear, Petitioner's Ground Four appears to raise a due process right to a pardon and/or challenges his inability to appeal a denial of a pardon. Petitioner indicates that he received some kind of pardon procedure that was denied, and cites no case law, nor is the court aware of any, supporting a due process claim regarding the denial of a pardon. Cf. Creech v. Idaho Comm'n of Pardons & Parole, 94 F.4th 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Our review of state commutation proceedings is limited. [P]risoners have no liberty interest in clemency proceedings because the decision to grant or deny clemency rests wholly in the discretion of the executive. If a state provides a commutation proceeding, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires only minimal procedural safeguards ....”) (citations omitted)).
As explained by Respondent, Petitioner qualifies for a pardon because he has successfully completed five years of parole. See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-950(A)(3). However, though he qualified for a pardon, he is not guaranteed a pardon. He may apply again after waiting one year from the date of denial. S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-960(B); see also, e.g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981) (“The ground for a constitutional claim, if any, must be found in statutes or other rules defining the obligation of the authority charged with exercising clemency.”); see also id. (“In terms of the Due Process Clause, a Connecticut felon's expectation that a lawfully imposed sentence will be commuted or that he will be pardoned is no more substantial than an inmate's expectation, for example, that he will not be transferred to another prison; it is simply a unilateral hope.”).
Nor does it appear this court has the authority to review the state's decision to deny Petitioner's pardon, particularly where he has failed to offer any reason, argument, or case law supporting his position that he is entitled to such a review. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (allowing habeas review only for adjudication of claim by state court that “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); Stokes v. Akinbayo, C/A No. 19-1011-CFC, 2022 WL 671076, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 7, 2022) (“Petitioner's vague assertion about his inability to obtain a pardon also fails to assert an issue cognizable on federal habeas review.”); Dean v. Legrand, C/A No. 3:13-00112-RCJ, 2014 WL 996307, at *5 n.9 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2014) (“Nothing in the state statute relied upon allows a state court, much less a federal court on habeas review, to supplant the state pardons board and award a pardon or commutation of a sentence.”).
In response to all of Respondent's arguments for dismissal of the petition, addressed above, Petitioner states only as follows:
Petitioner objects to the R&R, respondent did not file affidavit(s)[.] They relied on the pleadings which suggests the fundamental aspect(s) of State and Federal law(s) Law of the case; res adjudicata no appeal lower court ruling(s) binding right of wrong[.] There were sentencing guidelines in effect n the 1900[.] Petitioner pleads court action on the severance motion result law of the case[.] [N]o appeal the government's attorney statement “these two people for murder[.”] Moreover, the 14th Amendment liberty interested herein[.][ECF No. 26 (errors in original)].
The court is unable to discern the specific grounds Petitioner challenges Respondent's pending motion. Accordingly, and for the reasons already stated, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment and deny Petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner, in his motion for judgment on the pleadings, states in full as follows, also attaching what appears to be two pages from a trial transcript occurring on June 1, 1979, before the Honorable Ernest A. Finney, Jr., prior to Petitioner pleading guilty and being sentenced on June 18, 1979: “Comes now petitioner moves the court in accordance with Rule 12(b) FRCP for judgment on the pleadings: 1. Law of the case; 2. Res ajudicata; SCDC Inmate Record OP-21.09-12.22 p 31 of 62[;] 4. See attached supporting material(s)[.]” [ECF No. 21 (errors in original), see also ECF No. 21-1]. The court is unable to discern, based on Petitioner's submissions, the bases for his motion.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the court grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 17] and deny Petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings [ECF No. 21], dismissing the petition.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).