Opinion
C. A. 9:23-cv-01610-JDA-MHC
04-16-2024
Stanley D.C. Akar James, Jr., also known as Stanley D.C. Akar James, #1076800, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Charleston County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Kristin R. Graziano, Wellpath Incorporation Medical Provider, Director Abigail Duffy, Jane Doe, and John Doe, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Charleston County Sheriff's Office, Abigail Duffy, and Sheriff Kristin R. Graziano (collectively, “the Sheriff Defendants”). ECF No. 26. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the Sheriff Defendants' Motion. ECF Nos. 27 & 28. The deadline for Plaintiff to file a Response was March 1, 2024, see ECF No. 27; however, Plaintiff has not filed any Response or contacted the Court in any way. Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). Because the Motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
BACKGROUND
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims for violations of his First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the following Defendants in their official capacities only: (1) Sheriff Kristin R. Graziano; (2) Director Abigail Duffy, “Director of Charleston County Detention Center”; (3) “Charleston County Sheriff's Office Jane Doe or John Doe”; and (4) “Wellpath Incorporation Medical Provider . . . (Jane Doe John Doe).” ECF No. 14 at 2-3, 15-16. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries from a car accident that led to his arrest, but the Wellpath Inc. medical staff at Charleston County Detention Center refused to give him medical attention. Id. at 4-6. He alleges that when he was booked into the Detention Center and for over a year thereafter, he complained of pain in his arm and left leg, but his crutches were taken away and he was given only Tylenol or Ibuprofen. Id. at 10. He claims it took six months for him to get an x-ray, which showed he had a broken arm, and over a year to get surgery. Id. at 5-6, 11. Plaintiff appears to allege that the lack of treatment was the result of racial discrimination. Id. at 5, 11.
Plaintiff alleges that he wrote about these issues to Sheriff Graziano and Director Duffy, but he never heard back. Id. at 6. He states that he is suing the Charleston County Sheriff's Office because it, or its Jane or John Doe employees, contracted with Wellpath Inc. to be the medical provider for the Detention Center. Id. at 7. He seeks only monetary damages. Id. at 10-11.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.” Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC, 17 F.Supp.3d 528, 531 (D.S.C. 2014) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)); see Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”). Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant will have “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he facts alleged ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard is not analogous to a “probability requirement,” rather “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the Court “need not accept the [plaintiff's] legal conclusions drawn from the facts, nor need it accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
The Sheriff Defendants argue that they should be dismissed from this action because they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. ECF No. 26. Plaintiff did not file any response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Upon review, the undersigned finds that the claims against the Sheriff Defendants should be dismissed.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are barred from hearing claims for damages against a state or its instrumentalities, unless the state has consented to the suit. Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279 (4th Cir. 2020); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled that [the Eleventh Amendment's] reference to ‘actions against one of the United States encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”). Accordingly, unless South Carolina has consented to suit or Congress has waived South Carolina's immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, South Carolina (and its agencies) may not be sued for damages in federal or state court. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1989).
Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983, id.; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e) (“Nothing in this chapter is construed as a waiver of the state's or political subdivision's immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States....”); see Pringle v. S.C. Ret. Sys., No. Civ. A. 2:06-3294-PMD, 2007 WL 295626, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2007).
The Charleston County Sheriff's Office and both Sheriff Graziano and Director Duffy, in their official capacities, are considered instrumentalities of the state. Sheriff Graziano is the elected Sheriff, and Director Duffy is as an employee of the Charleston County Sheriff's Office. “It is well-established in South Carolina that a sheriff's office is an agency of, and a sheriff ‘dominated by,' the state, such that a suit against the sheriff in his official capacity is a suit against the State.” Stewart v. Beaufort Cty., 481 F.Supp.2d 483, 492 (D.S.C. 2007) (citing Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1988), aff'd 878 F.2d 379 (1989)). A sheriff's deputies are also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. McCall v. Williams, 52 F.Supp.2d 611, 615 (D.S.C. 1999) (“As an arm of the State, a deputy sheriff is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from civil damages suits in federal court, unless the State expressly waived this immunity.”).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks only money damages and explicitly states that he is suing the Charleston County Sheriff's Office (including a Jane Doe and John Doe employee), Sheriff Graziano, and Director Duffy only in their official capacities. ECF No. 14 at 2-3, 10-11. As such, the claims against the Sheriff Defendants are claims for damages against the State of South Carolina itself. Stewart, 481 F.Supp.2d at 492 (citing Carroll v. Greenville Cnty. Sheriff's Dept., 871 F.Supp. 844, 845-46 (D.S.C. 1994)); see Will, 491 U.S. 58 at 71 (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.”). As a result, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's claims against the Sheriff Defendants. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (holding that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” amenable to suit for damages under § 1983). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Sheriff Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted and that the Sheriff Defendants be dismissed from this action.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 26) be GRANTED and that Defendants Charleston County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Kristin R. Graziano, and Director Abigail Duffy be DISMISSED from this action.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).