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Jacques v. Connecticut Department of Corrections

Superior Court of Connecticut
Dec 12, 2017
KNLCV175015515S (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2017)

Opinion

KNLCV175015515S

12-12-2017

Jean JACQUES v. The CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al.


UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

Handy, J.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Jean Jacques, a sentenced prisoner, filed this action, appearing to claim violations of his constitutional rights, seeking money damages, against the Connecticut Department of Corrections (DOC), the University of Connecticut Health Center (UCONN), and Warden Antonio Santiago (Warden Santiago). The plaintiff claims that he contracted numerous medical issues from a fall from his top bunk and that those medical issues were either ignored or improperly treated.

The plaintiff was sentenced on June 6, 2016, to the crime of murder and received a sentence of sixty years to serve. There is currently both a pending appeal and sentence review brought by the plaintiff.

By motion dated August 8, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint. The defendants contend that the court does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Santiago, in that he was not served in his individual capacity. The defendants further argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all other claims against the DOC, UCONN, and any purported official capacity claims against Warden Santiago due to sovereign immunity.

The plaintiff did not file any objection to the motion to dismiss nor any memorandum of law regarding this issue. The court heard oral argument on the defendants’ motion on November 16, 2017, at which time all parties had an opportunity to be heard. Counsel for the defendants appeared in court; a Haitian-Creole interpreter was present in court to assist the plaintiff; and the plaintiff appeared by way of video conferencing from the jail.

II. LAW AND DISCUSSION

A motion to dismiss is used primarily to challenge the jurisdiction of the court. Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009). Practice Book § 10-30(a) provides the grounds for dismissal: " (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) insufficiency of process; and (4) insufficiency of service of process." " [A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). A motion to dismiss tests whether or not the court is without jurisdiction. MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court must decide whether the claim is one which the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide. Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).

A. Personal Jurisdiction Over Warden Santiago

Jurisdiction over the person requires the proper service of process according to the statutory rules. Defects in the process or the service of the process will render the case subject to dismissal. " Facts showing the service of process in time, form, and manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of mandatory statutes ... are essential to jurisdiction over the person. " (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport v. Debek, 210 Conn. 175, 179-80, 554 A.2d 728 (1989).

In this matter, General Statutes Section 52-57(a) pertains to the method for serving process and provides: " Except as otherwise provided, process in any civil action shall be served by leaving a true and attested copy of it, including the declaration or complaint, with the defendant, or at his usual place of abode, in this state." In the present case, Warden Santiago was never served individually. Instead, service on all defendants in this case was only made upon the Attorney General at the 55 Elm Street, Hartford, CT address. (Marshal’s Return, 100.32.) That service would only satisfy official-capacity service, not individual-capacity service. " Failure to comply with the statutory requirements of service renders a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction." Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 401, 21 A.3d 451 (2011).

The case of Harnage v. Lightner, 163 Conn.App. 337, 137 A.3d 10, cert. granted, 323 Conn. 902, 150 A.3d 683 (2016), was recently argued before our Supreme Court. That appeal specifically deals with this issue: whether or not service on the Attorney General for the state of Connecticut constitutes proper service on state providers in their individual capacities.

Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to the defendant, Warden Santiago, is granted.

B. Sovereign Immunity and Subject Matter Jurisdiction

1. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution

Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in general belong. Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Dept . of Public Utility Control, 261 Conn. 1, 21, 803 A.2d 879 (2002). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 527, 800 A.2d 1102 (2002). Once raised, the court must consider and decide the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding further. Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003).

In this matter, the defendants, the DOC, UCONN, and Warden Santiago, if sued in any official capacity, argue that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes this court from having subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the plaintiff’s complaint. " [T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007). In this matter, as the defendants correctly state, it is unclear whether the plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming violations of the United States constitution or if he brings them pursuant to Connecticut law.

The eleventh amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: " The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State ..." The eleventh amendment bars lawsuits against states absent consent from the state or abrogation of the immunity by Congress under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253-54, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 179 L.Ed.2d 675 (2011). A state may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 675-76, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999). " [I]n some circumstances Congress may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private person’s suit against a State." Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, supra, 563 U.S. 253-54.

In the present case, Connecticut never waived eleventh amendment immunity nor has Congress abrogated immunity in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if in fact, this even is such an action. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). Accordingly, the eleventh amendment deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims against the DOC and UCONN. As to this part of the defendants’ argument, their motion to dismiss is granted.

2. Connecticut Common Law

The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that the state is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued. Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 313, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). There are few and narrowly construed exceptions to this doctrine. Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 275, 21 A.3d 759 (2011); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d 675 (2007). Three exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity have been recognized by our Supreme Court: " (1) when the legislature either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity ... (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights ... and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory authority." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 753, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). Any exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity for actions by state officers in excess of their statutory authority applies only to actions evoking declaratory or injunctive relief and not to those seeking monetary damages. Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 312-13.

No such exception exists in this case. Absent such an exception, the plaintiff was required to first seek permission from the Connecticut Claims Commissioner before suing the state or any of its officials in their official capacities. General Statutes § 4-142. " [T]he claims commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim ... This legislation expressly bars suits upon claims cognizable by the claims commissioner except as he may authorize, an indication of the legislative determination to preserve sovereign immunity as a defense to monetary claims against the state not sanctioned by the [claims] commissioner or other statutory provisions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept . of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 352, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).

In this matter, the plaintiff seeks only money damages against the DOC, UCONN, and against Warden Santiago, in his official capacity, if any. Waiver is the only exception that allows monetary damages. There is no waiver from the Claims Commissioner in this case. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss against the defendants, the DOC, UCONN, and Warden Santiago, acting in his official capacity, if any, is granted.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint is granted.


Summaries of

Jacques v. Connecticut Department of Corrections

Superior Court of Connecticut
Dec 12, 2017
KNLCV175015515S (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2017)
Case details for

Jacques v. Connecticut Department of Corrections

Case Details

Full title:Jean JACQUES v. The CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al.

Court:Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Dec 12, 2017

Citations

KNLCV175015515S (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2017)

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