Opinion
Civil Action No. S09A-10-002.
Submitted: May 11, 2010.
Decided: May 19, 2010.
On the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's Decision to Deny Claimant Unemployment Benefits: AFFIRMED.
Steven E. Jacobs, Mardela Springs, Maryland.
Charles A. McCauley, III, Esquire, Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell Hippel, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware.
Dear Mr. Jacobs and Counsel:
Steven E. Jacobs appeals the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("the Board") that found Mr. Jacobs is not entitled to unemployment benefits because he was discharged from work for just cause in connection with his employment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Board's decision is affirmed.
Procedural Factual Background
Mr. Jacobs filed for unemployment benefits on April 5, 2009. On May 5, 2009, a Claims Deputy concluded Mr. Jacobs' employer, Crystal Steel Fabricators ("Crystal Steel"), had met its burden of proving Mr. Jacobs had been discharged for just cause in connection with his employment because Mr. Jacobs had tested positive for drug use in violation of a company policy of which he was aware. Mr. Jacobs appealed the Claims Deputy's decision and a hearing was held before an Appeals Referee on June 16, 2009. By way of written decision mailed June 17, 2009, the Appeals Referee upheld the Claims Deputy's determination that Mr. Jacobs was not entitled to unemployment benefits. Mr. Jacobs appealed that decision and a hearing was held before the Board on September 22, 2009. Thereafter, the Board upheld the Appeals Referee's decision by way of an opinion mailed October 7, 2009. Mr. Jacobs filed a timely appeal to this Court.
Discussion
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing the decisions of the Board, this Court must determine whether the Board's findings and conclusions of law are free from legal error and are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Martin, 431 A.2d 1265 (Del. 1981); Pochvatilla v. United States Postal Serv., 1997 WL 524062 (Del. Super. Jun. 9, 1997); 19 Del. C. § 3323(a) ("In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the [Board] as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be confined to questions of law."). "Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Gorrell v. Division of Vocational Rehab., 1996 WL 453356, at *2 (Del. Super. July 31, 1996), aff'd, 693 A.2d 1082 (Del. 1997) (TABLE). The Court's review is limited: "It is not the appellate court's role to weigh the evidence, determine credibility questions or make its own factual findings, but merely to decide if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings." McManus v. Christiana Serv. Co., 1997 WL 127953, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 1997).
Section 3314 of Title 19 of the Delaware Code provides, in pertinent part, that one shall be disqualified for unemployment benefits if he has been "discharged from [his] work for just cause in connection with [his] work." 19 Del. C. § 3314(2). "Generally, the term `just cause' refers to a wilful or wanton act in violation of either the employer's interest, or of the employee's duties, or of the employee's expected standard of conduct." Abex Corp. v. Todd, 235 A.2d 271, 272 (Del. Super. 1967). Where a decision to terminate an employee is based upon misconduct, the employer has the burden of establishing the misconduct. McCoy v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 1996 WL 111126, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 7, 1996). "Violation of a reasonable company rule may constitute just cause for discharge, but the employee must be aware that the policy exists and may be cause for discharge." Id.
B. Merits
Mr. Jacobs was subject to a random drug test on March 30, 2009, at Crystal Steel's factory. His urine tested positive for the presence of cocaine via a "rapid test". The sample was then packaged and sent to MedTox Laboratories, which conducted a second screen on the specimen. The second test confirmed the presence of cocaine in Mr. Jacobs' urine. MedTox Laboratories informed Crystal Steel that the results of the second test mirrored those of the first test. Mr. Jacobs was discharged as a result of the positive drug screen on April 3, 2009. The Board concluded Mr. Jacobs was discharged for just cause in connection with his employment.
Mr. Jacobs challenges the Board's decision and asserts, in essence, that its decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Mr. Jacobs alleges he was not under the influence of drugs at the time of the test and, therefore, his termination was wrongful. As noted, supra, this Court's role is limited when it reviews an administrative agency's decision. In this case, the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error and must be affirmed.
At the Board hearing, Crystal Steel elected to rest upon the record as presented to the Appeals Referee. At the hearing before the Appeals Referee, Bill Kaeser, Vice President of Operations for Crystal Steel, testified that the company has a drug-free workplace policy. Mr. Kaeser also testified that Mr. Jacobs was aware of the company's drug-free workplace policy, as indicated by Mr. Jacobs' signature acknowledging the receipt of a copy of the policy on February 27, 2009. At no point in the proceedings has Mr. Jacobs contested the existence of the policy, his knowledge thereof, or his awareness of the fact that a violation of the policy would result in his termination. Accordingly, a violation of Crystal Steel's drug-free workplace policy constitutes just cause for termination under Delaware case law.
Before the Appeals Referee, Crystal Steel introduced testimony that significantly undermines Mr. Jacobs' argument that it was "impossible" his urine was tainted by drugs at the time of the test. Ralph Trolian, the owner and operator of Chesapeake Advanced Testing, described in detail the procedure he used when obtaining the urine sample at issue from Mr. Jacobs on March 30, 2009. Mr. Trolian testified that he unsealed a collection container, handed it to Mr. Jacobs, received the specimen from Mr. Jacobs, and immediately tested it, all in the presence of Mr. Jacobs. At the time of the test, Mr. Jacobs signed a statement reading, "I hereby certify that the specimen provided is my own and has not been substituted or adulterated. I further agree and grant permission for the testing of my specimen for drug metabolites and or alcohol." Mr. Trolian testified he was not left alone with Mr. Jacobs' urine sample until after it had been sealed and packaged for shipping via United Parcel Service to MedTox Laboratories. On the other hand, Mr. Jacobs testified he left the restroom and did not see what Mr. Trolian did with the urine sample. As always, when the testimony of witnesses contradict each other, the Board, as the fact-finder, is in the best position to make a determination as to credibility. The Board adopted the Appeals Referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Appeals Referee found "[Crystal Steel] has established, through multiple witnesses, that the drug testing followed standard procedures with no flaws in the integrity of the process." That finding is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error.
Although Mr. Jacobs did not challenge the chain of custody of the sample once it left Mr. Trolian's possession for a second test, the Court notes the chain of custody was established by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to the testimony of Mitchell LeBard, Associate Director of Forensic Toxicology at MedTox Laboratories. The positive results of the confirmation test were testified to by Dr. Michel Franz, a medical review officer for Doctor's Review Services.
Mr. Jacobs also suggested to the Appeals Referee that his test may have been skewed by the prescription medication he was taking at the time the test was given. No supporting evidence was introduced at the hearing before the Appeals Referee to support this theory. Before the Board, Mr. Jacobs again raised the issue of whether the test results were impacted by any of several prescription medications he was taking at the time of the test. Crystal Steel supplemented the record below with Mr. Trolian's testimony that the prescription medications identified by Mr. Jacobs would not have skewed the results. The Board concluded Mr. Jacobs' allegation that the results of the drug test may have been positive due to prescription medication he was taking was unsubstantiated and had been refuted by Mr. Trolian's testimony.
At the time Mr. Jacobs tested positive for cocaine, a drug-free workplace policy of which Mr. Jacobs was aware was in place, and, therefore, the Board's finding Mr. Jacobs was discharged for just cause in connection with his employment is free from legal error. The Board's decision is also supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, will not be disturbed by this Court.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the Board's decision that Mr. Jacobs is not entitled to unemployment benefits is AFFIRMED.