Opinion
Civil Action 01-2972, Section "T"(4)
October 25, 2002
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Defendants, Donna Waguespack and Bio-Medical Applications of Louisiana, Inc. The Court, having considered the arguments of counsel, the evidence presented, the law and applicable jurisprudence, is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND:
The Plaintiff filed this action for damages for racial discrimination in the provision of medical services pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 2000d and for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Louisiana Law. The Court has jurisdiction of this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343 since this action arises under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 2000d. The Court has pendent jurisdiction over the related state law claims.
The Plaintiff, Bernadette Jackson, began having kidney problems in early 1996 and began dialysis treatment at the Defendant's, hereinafter "BMA," Utica Street Facility, in Metairie, Louisiana, in June 1996. The Plaintiff is an African-American woman in her early fifties. The Plaintiff has received treatment at BMA's Metairie facility from June 1996 until the present. On September 30, 2000, the Plaintiff was unable to attend her normally scheduled dialysis appointment. The Plaintiff had a standing appointment of 7:00 am until 11:00 am on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. The Plaintiff was unable to make her Saturday morning appointment on September 30, 2000 because her state-funded transportation service did not come to pick her up. At 6:30 am on Saturday September 30, the Plaintiff contacted BMA and informed the first-shift nurse, Gayle Gardner, that she would be unable to make her appointment. Gardner told the Plaintiff to come in for the third-shift, on which Defendant Waguespack served as the charge nurse. Saturday September 30 was the first time that the Plaintiff had to receive treatment on any shift other than the 7:00 am until 11:00 am shift, the first shift. This was also the first and only time the Plaintiff came into contact with the third-shift charge nurse, Defendant Waguespack. The Plaintiffs afternoon treatment, according to the Plaintiff, was supposed to last from 4:00 pm until 8:00 pm. BMA, however, allowed the Plaintiff to begin treatment early, at 3:45 pm.
Dialysis services at BMA's Uttica Street facility are all provided in one room. The room has 4 rows of chairs. The first two rows have 8 chairs and the last two rows have 11 chairs. There is a three-foot partition that separates the front rows, with 8 chairs total, and the back two rows, 11 chairs total. When the Plaintiff began her treatment, 6 of the 8 chairs in the first two rows were either in use by or reserved for use by the regularly scheduled third-shift patients. All of the third-shift patients present or scheduled for Saturday September 30, 2000 happened to be white (the Plaintiff is African-American).
The Plaintiff alleges that she was not allowed to sit in the first two rows because of her race. The Plaintiff alleges that she asked Defendant Waguespack why she was being seated in the last two rows instead of in the front and Defendant Waguespack responded, "that is where you are going to sit." When Plaintiff persisted, Defendant Waguespack informed the Plaintiff that she would be unable to treat her because she had to tend to her regularly scheduled third-shift patients. The Plaintiff also alleges that she overheard a conversation between Defendant Waguespack and Gayle Gardner, the first shift charge nurse, in which Gardner asked Defendant "why she was segregating (the Plaintiff) to the back." Defendant Waguespack allegedly walked away from Gardner and did not respond. The Plaintiff had no other contact with the Defendant on Saturday September 30, 2000.
Tammy Purcell, the patient care technician, tended to the Plaintiff instead of Defendant Waguespack. Defendant Waguespack tended to her regular third-shift patients. Purcell volunteered to work overtime to tend to Plaintiff even though she had worked the first two shifts. Other than Purcell, there was only one other patient care technician working the third shift. Defendant Waguespack was the only charge nurse on the third-shift. The Plaintiff was completely satisfied with Purcell's treatment of her.
II. ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES
A. Arguments of Donna Waguespack and BMA in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment:
1. Plaintiff's Race Discrimination Claims
a. Plaintiffs Title VI Claim
The Defendants argue that they are not liable to the Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, Title VI. The Title VI claim against the Defendant Donna Waguespack must be dismissed because there is no individual liability under Title VI (the Plaintiff concedes this).
The Defendant, BMA, argues that the Plaintiff cannot carry her burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence against Defendant BMA. The Plaintiff must follow the shifting evidentiary burdens of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in order to show indirect evidence of racial discrimination because she has no direct evidence of racial discrimination. According to McDonnell, the Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Once the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the burden shifts to the Defendant to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the treatment of Plaintiff. The burden then shifts back to the Plaintiff to prove that Defendants' stated reason is pretextual and that Defendants' real reason is discriminatory. The Plaintiff was not "excluded from participation" or "denied benefits" but alleges that she was subjected to discrimination in the provision of her federally financed dialysis treatment.
The Defendant argues that there are no facts in this case that would give rise to an inference of racial discrimination and that there is no case suggesting a prima facie case could be established on facts similar to these. Typically, the Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants. Since this case does not involve employment, the elements of prima facie case will vary based on the factual situations. The Plaintiff is Afro-American and the other patients were white. The Plaintiff, however, was not scheduled to sit in any particular chair or even for the shift in question. The Plaintiff, therefore, cannot present any facts that would give rise to an inference of race discrimination.
The Defendant argues that, even if the Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, the Defendants can articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for the treatment of the Plaintiff. When Plaintiff arrived for the third-shift, the Defendant Bio-Medical was already expecting six regularly scheduled patients but only had one patient care technician and one nurse, Defendant Waguespack, on duty. The Defendant Waguespack was unable to treat the Plaintiff because, along with her general supervisory duties as charge nurse, Defendant Waguespack had to monitor two patients and provide training for home homodialysis to one of them. The other four regularly scheduled patients were being monitored by the one technician scheduled for the third-shift. The Defendant Bio-Medical made a decision to accommodate the Plaintiff at the later time rather than refuse her treatment. In order to provide care for her, patient care technician Tammy Purcell stayed late despite the fact that she had already worked the first two shifts. The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Waguespack put her on the fourth row because of her race but she has no direct or indirect evidence that this in fact happened. In fact, Purcell was the person who decided to put the Plaintiff in that particular row/chair because it was immediately ready for use. Purcell had used the chair in the fourth row during the second-shift and it was her understanding that all of the other chairs were reserved for regularly scheduled patients or that they were in "heat-clean" mode and would be unavailable for another hour.
The Defendant further argues that the Plaintiff cannot establish that the decision to place her on this particular machine was pre-textual either directly, by showing that a discriminatory reason motivated Defendants, or indirectly, by showing that the reasons given for Defendants' actions are simply not believable. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the Plaintiff remains at all times with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff, however, has nothing to contradict Purcell's articulated reason for placing her on the dialysis machine in question. Even if the Plaintiff could produce evidence on the availability of the seats, the Plaintiff still has no evidence that she was placed on the fourth-row because of her race. Furthermore, even assuming Defendant Waguespack was the one who placed the Plaintiff on the fourth-row, the Plaintiff has no evidence to show Waguespack was motivated by racial animus. Speculation and belief are insufficient to create a fact issue as to pretext nor can pretext be established by mere conclusory statements of a Plaintiff that feels she has been discriminated against. The Plaintiffs evidence on this issue is entirely conclusory, she was the only black person seated there. The Plaintiff did not witness Defendant Waguespack make any racial remarks or racial epithets.
b. Plainiffs Section 1981 Claim:
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs 1981 claims must be dismissed for the same reasons as the Title VI claims because both statutes use the same analysis for individual actions. The Plaintiff, like her Title VI claim, is unable to prove that Defendant Waguespack, or Bio-Medical, had the requisite discriminatory intent.
The Defendant further argues that the Section 1981 claims must be dismissed because the Plaintiff did not have the requisite contractual relationships with the Defendants. The Plaintiff did not have a contractual relationship with either Defendant.
2. Plaintiffs Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff is unable to establish the requisite elements to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Plaintiff, in order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, must establish (1) that the conduct of the Defendant was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff was severe; and (3) that the Defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from his or her conduct. The threshold for a Plaintiff to establish "extreme and outrageous behavior" is quite high and the Plaintiff in the present action is unable to carry the burden based on the facts alleged.
B. Arguments of Bernadette Jackson in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment:
The Plaintiff, Bernadette Jackson, argues that she can meet her burden of proving a prima facie case under Title VI and Section 1981. The Defendants do not deny that the Plaintiff has met the first two requirements of her prima facie case, she is in a protected class because she is African-American and she participated in a program or activity receiving federal assistance. The third requirement, she was excluded on the basis of race, from participation in, . . . or subjected to discrimination in the program or activity, such as denial of equal enjoyment of medical services and facilities, is supported by the alleged facts. The evidence of discrimination comes from the Plaintiffs deposition.
The Plaintiff concedes that Defendants can, likewise, meet their burden of producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their action. Once the Defendant has met their burden, the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff to show that the Defendants' purported legitimate reason is a pretext for discrimination. The Plaintiff can make the pretext showing by showing that the proffered reason is an implausible explanation for the challenged decision. The ultimate fact of discrimination on a prohibited ground may be found both in the evidence establishing a prima facie case and from "sufficient" evidence that the employer's (Defendants Waguespack and Bio-Medical here) asserted legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is false. The Plaintiff, therefore, may survive summary judgment by offering the minimal to prove a prima facie case and evidence that is "sufficient," impeaching or contradicting, evidence tending to show the falsity of the Defendants' asserted legitimate non-discriminatory reason.
The Plaintiff argues, however, that she can meet her burden of proving pretext and that there are material facts in dispute which bar summary judgment. The Plaintiff does not retreat from her original deposition in which she claims she was put "in the back" and the other patients who were white were placed "in the front." A fact dispute, therefore, remains as to whether or not the Plaintiff was denied equal enjoyment of medical services and facilities. The Plaintiff has also submitted evidence, via the deposition of herself and the affidavit of Nurse Gayle Gardner, that she was separated from the other patients because of her race. In her affidavit, Nurse Gardner stated that Defendant Waguespack had never treated a white patient in the same manner as she treated the Plaintiff and that black employees had reported to her that the Defendant Waguespack treated black employees differently than white employees. . . Nurse Gardner also stated that she reported Defendant Waguespack's treatment of the Plaintiff to two management officials and that there was no investigation of either her complaint or the Plaintiffs complaint because she was never interviewed by Defendant about the incident complained of.
The Plaintiff argues that this evidence is sufficient to defeat the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment because the Defendants have failed in their burden of showing the absence of factual dispute. The Defendant has ignored the initial burden placed on them to show the absence of factual dispute. The conflicting evidence provided by the Plaintiff leaves a material fact for resolution and renders the summary judgment inappropriate. The Plaintiff argues that she has offered sufficient proof of mixed motive of race playing a role in her treatment to defeat Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant may state a legitimate reason for its actions but still discriminate unlawfully. The Plaintiff need only show that race was more likely than not a reason for Defendants' action. Race need not be the "determinative factor" but only a "motivating factor" in an employer's decision.
The Plaintiff further argues that the Defendants' conduct was egregious enough to support the Louisiana Law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Plaintiff cites a case in which the Eleven Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a verdict for damages due to intentional infliction of emotional distress. Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, 256 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2001).
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
A. Law on Summary Judgment:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
B. The Court's Analysis
The Plaintiff, Bernadette Jackson, seeks damages for racial discrimination in the provision of medical services pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 2000d and for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Louisiana Law. The Defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact. The Defendants, Donna Waguespack and Bio-Medical, have carried their burden by showing that, even if the Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the Defendants have a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for their actions. After the Defendant satisfies their burden, the burden then shifts to the Plaintiff to establish that the Defendants' stated explanation is pretextual and that the Defendants' real reason is discriminatory. The Plaintiff, however, has offered no evidence to rebut the Defendants' stated legitimate explanation for the placement of the Plaintiff in the fourth-row.
The Plaintiffs claim for damages against Defendant Donna Waguespack, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, Title VI, are dismissed. As the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment noted, Title VI does not allow for any individual liability. The Plaintiff conceded to this point in her Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Title VI claim against Donna Waguespack is hereby dismissed.
The remaining Federal Law claims, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 2000d, against both Defendants must also be dismissed. The inquiry into intentional discrimination based on race is essentially the same under both Section 1981 and Title VI. The Plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Assuming that the Plaintiff can satisfy this burden, the burden then shifts to the Defendant to put forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the their actions. The Defendants have stated legitimate reasons for placing the Plaintiff in the row to which she was directed. The Plaintiff was seated in the fourth row based on the decision made by Tammy Purcell. Ms. Purcell made this decision because she knew that particular seat was available and that the Plaintiff could start her treatment. The chairs in the other rows were either reserved for regularly scheduled patients or in "heat-clean" mode. The Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence to suggest that the Defendants' stated reason was pretextual. The claims, therefore, must be dismissed because the Plaintiff has not come forward with any facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
The Plaintiffs Louisiana Law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress must likewise be dismissed. The Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would suggest that the Defendants, Donna Waguespack or Bio-Medical, intended to inflict emotional distress on the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff directs the Court's attention to an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case but the conduct of the Defendant(s) in that case is distinguishable from the acts complained of in the present case.Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, 256 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2001). The acts in the present case are nowhere near as outrageous as the behavior in theMiddlebrooks case.
The Court, having considered the arguments of counsel, the evidence presented, the law and applicable jurisprudence, is fully advised of the premises and will hereby grant the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the Plaintiff.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants', Donna Waguespack and Bio-Medical, Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.