Opinion
7:20-CV-117 (WLS)
02-03-2022
JEREMIAH JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. Lieutenant ASHLEY TRAWICK, Defendant.
RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS Q. LANGSTAFF, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brought the above-styled action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 18, 2020. (Doc. 1). In the Court's initial review of the Complaint, the Court permitted Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to safety claim against Defendant to proceed. (Doc. 5, p. 6). Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 37). Plaintiff filed a Response. (Doc. 45). Plaintiff also filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction to obtain access to Baldwin State Prison's law library. (Doc. 42).
Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff's Allegations
Plaintiff sets forth the following allegations in his Complaint concerning his incarceration at Valdosta State Prison (“VSP”). (Doc. 1). On June 17, Defendant Lieutenant Ashley Trawickplaced Plaintiff in solitary confinement with another inmate until sometime in November. Id. at 4. When Defendant initially attempted to place Plaintiff in the cell, there was another inmate already confined there who did not want Plaintiff placed with him. Id. Defendant spoke to the other inmate and convinced him to allow Plaintiff to stay in the cell with him. Id.
Plaintiff's Complaint does not indicate the year in which these events took place.
Defendant Ashley Trawick is referred to as Lt Treywick on the Court's docket. The Court will refer to Defendant Trawick as indicated in her Brief. (Doc. 37-1). The Clerk is DIRECTED to make this change to Defendant Trawick's name on the docket.
In the months that Plaintiff was in that cell, the other inmate verbally, physically, and sexually abused Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff's food trays were taken, and he was forced to wash his face from, and brush his teeth in, the toilet. Id. The cellmate beat Plaintiff with a lock, threatened him with a knife, and told Plaintiff he would kill him if Plaintiff screamed or tried to tell anyone what was happening. Id. Plaintiff alleges that, days later, he was told Defendant had told the cellmate to beat Plaintiff and take his food. Id. Plaintiff said that he never had a previous problem with Defendant. (Doc. 47, p. 2). Plaintiff alleges he should not have been placed with that inmate in the first place because Plaintiff had previously been a victim pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act. (Doc. 1, p. 4).
Standard of Review
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cruz v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 428 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir. 2005).
As the party moving for summary judgment, Defendant has the initial burden to demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact remain in the case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1991). The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, ” and identifying those portions of the record, including pleadings, discovery materials, and affidavits, “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court to consider the entire record when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
Defendant has supported her Motion for Summary Judgment by submitting her own Declaration and the transcript of Plaintiff's deposition. (Docs. 37-4, 37-3, respectively).
Plaintiff filed an unsworn and unverified Response to Defendant's Motion. (Doc. 45).
Evidence
According to Plaintiff's deposition testimony, at some point in the weeks after he had a hernia operation in September 2017, Plaintiff had a “cussing argument” with Defendant. (Doc. 37-3, pp. 17-18). Then, on June 17, 2018, Plaintiff was assaulted by his previous cellmate in general population. Id. at 16, 19. Defendant was alerted by an unnamed officer that Plaintiff was refusing housing with his previous cellmate. Id. at 19-20. Plaintiff was sent to meet Defendant at medical. Id. at 20. After Plaintiff was examined at medical, Defendant escorted Plaintiff to E1 dorm without any confrontation between the two parties. Id. at 20-21.
Plaintiff testified that when he arrived at ¶ 1 dorm with Defendant, the inmate already in the cell to which he was being assigned, Gillison, refused to have him as a cellmate. Id. at 21. Defendant informed Gillison that she was going to have to spray him and left to make a phone call from inside the control booth, leaving Plaintiff and Gillison with another unnamed officer. Id. While Defendant was on the phone, Gillison told the unnamed officer that Plaintiff could come into the cell. Id. When Defendant returned, the unnamed officer told Defendant that Gillison would allow Plaintiff in the cell, to which Defendant said “okay.” Id.
Plaintiff said that Defendant then opened the cell door and stepped into the cell, leaving the cell door open. Id. at 22, 25. Defendant was in the cell with Gillison for “about three seconds.” Id. at 25. Plaintiff testified that he did not know “what was said or what was told” at that time, and when Defendant came back out of the cell, she told Plaintiff to step in. Id. at 22, 48 (“Q: You did not hear [Defendant] say that[?] A: Right.”). Plaintiff entered the cell and said that he was going to “flood the cell out” by putting a “cup in the commode and flush[ing] the toilet.” Id. at 22, 27-28. Plaintiff said that Defendant smiled as she closed the cell door. Id. at 28-29.
Plaintiff testified that, before he walked into the cell, another inmate told Gillison to not let Plaintiff in the cell because he was “dragon, ” which means “gay people” in prison. Id. at 28. The other unidentified inmate called Gillison “blood, ” which “automatic[ally] told [Plaintiff] that [Gillison] was [in] a gang.” Id. Plaintiff said that once he was inside the cell, Gillison said, “get your bitch ass in the bed, you fucking with me.” Id. at 22, 29.
According to Plaintiff, later that same day, Gillison told him that Defendant told Gillison to stab him, take Plaintiff's food tray, and told Gillison why Plaintiff was in prison. Id. at 30. Plaintiff also testified that he told an investigator that Gillison was never going to tell the truth. Id. at 46. According to Plaintiff, a pattern of verbal, physical, and sexual abuse, occurring often when Gillison used drugs, began that evening and continued until Plaintiff was discovered on October 28, 2018. Id. at 31-44.
During that time period, Plaintiff stated that he did not disclose the abuse to anyone because he was afraid for his life. Id. at 38. Plaintiff testified that he tried to tell a nurse about the abuse during a medical encounter that occurred while Plaintiff was housed with Gillison, but ultimately did not disclose the abuse to her. Id. at 36-37. During the escort to medical for said appointment, Plaintiff did not disclose the abuse to the unnamed officers because “they were too busy talking to [his] roommate.” Id. at 37. Plaintiff did tell a male nurse that his “eye [was] swollen, ” but did not disclose that he was being abused. Id. at 38. Plaintiff testified that he never complained to the Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment. Id. at 41. Plaintiff said that officers on rounds would not have seen injuries to his face because Gillison had Plaintiff lay on his stomach and facing the wall so that the officers could not see what Gillison had done to Plaintiff. Id. at 44.
Plaintiff testified that he was discovered on October 28, 2018, after Gillison refused to allow Plaintiff to use the toilet in the cell and Plaintiff was forced to use his mattress instead. Id. at 44-45, 52. When an officer came to replace the mattress, Plaintiff said that he jumped out of his bed and ran to the door to be cuffed up. Id. at 45. Plaintiff stated that Gillison was “saying that [Plaintiff] was pissing all over the place, [Plaintiff was] mental health.” Id. Plaintiff was escorted to the shower by another officer and Plaintiff told her that he had been raped and beaten. Id. Plaintiff was then taken to medical where a rape exam was performed. Id.
Plaintiff also testified that Defendant's only “role she played . . . [was] just putting [Plaintiff] in that cell and telling Gillison what to do to” Plaintiff. Id. at 54. Plaintiff said that by the time he arrived, he “already [had his] room and everything . . . [b]y the time [he got] there, they already [knew] what room [he was] going to.” Id. at 55. However, Plaintiff stated that he did not know who made that decision. Id. Plaintiff said that he did not know whether Defendant played any role in his continued assignment in the cell with Gillison. Id. at 55-56.
In her Declaration, Defendant said that an inmate would be in a cell she assigned the inmate to for “at most” seventy-two (72) hours, after which time the Classification Committee determined the inmate's housing assignment. (Doc. 37-4, p. 3). Defendant stated that she was not a member of the Classification Committee. Id. Defendant does not recall escorting Plaintiff, or assigning him, to the cell with Gillison, but she does not dispute that she could have done so because it was part of her routine responsibilities. Id. at 3-4. Defendant stated that she would never disclose Plaintiff's criminal history to another inmate because it was her job to maintain order and security. Id. at 4. Defendant declared that she never disclosed Plaintiff's criminal history to Gillison and that she did not instruct Gillison to abuse Plaintiff. Id. Defendant said that, in her experience, inmates often refused to have other inmates as cellmates in order to manipulate housing assignments. Id. at 5. Defendant never instructed Gillison to assault Plaintiff. Id.
Discussion
Defendant argues that she is entitled to summary judgment for the following reasons: (1) in her official capacity, she is immune from claims for money damages because of the Eleventh Amendment and the text of § 1983, (2) she was not responsible for Plaintiff's housing assignment, (3) Plaintiff cannot prove an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, and (4) she is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 37-1). The Court will first discuss Defendant's argument as to her alleged Eleventh Amendment immunity. Next, the Court will address Defendant's argument that Plaintiff cannot show an Eighth Amendment violation, followed by her argument that she was not responsible for Plaintiff's housing assignment. The Court will conclude by considering whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendant argues that she is immune in her official capacity from any damages claims against her. (Doc. 37-1, p. 6). Plaintiff does not address this issue in his Response. (Doc. 45).
“Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden it, . . . a State cannot be sued directly in its own name regardless of the relief sought.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam)). This immunity also extends to state agencies and state officers. “[A] judgment against a public servant ‘in his official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he represents[.]” Id. at 169 (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)). The Court has repeatedly held that “§ 1983 does not override a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-45 (1979); Graham, 473 U.S. at 169 n.17. Further, the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia considered the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity in § 1983 official capacity damages claims against state prison official defendants and found that such claims were barred. Ramey v. Ga. Dep't of Corrs., 153 F.Supp.2d 1382, 1387 (M.D. Ga. 2001). Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant should be granted summary judgment as to any official capacity money damages claims against her.
Eighth Amendment Violation
“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). “A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment if [she] is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate who suffers injury.” Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016). “[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners . . . It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into [a] constitutional liability.” Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994)). To establish a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, a plaintiff must “produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant['s] deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Id. (citation omitted).
1. Substantial Risk of Serious Harm
A court uses an objective standard to determine whether a plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Caldwell v. Warden, F.C.I. Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To satisfy this component, a plaintiff “must allege a prison condition that is so extreme that it poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the prisoner's health or safety.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). “There must be a ‘strong likelihood' of injury, ‘rather than a mere possibility,' before an official's failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference.” Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)).
Here, Plaintiff testified under oath that Gillison said that Defendant told him to stab Plaintiff, take Plaintiff's food tray, and told him why Plaintiff was in prison. (Doc. 37-3, p. 30). Defendant argues that such testimony is hearsay. (Doc. 37-1, pp. 10-12). In support thereof, Defendant cites Hudson v. Middle Flint Behav. Healthcare, 522 Fed.Appx. 594, 596 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) and Macuba v. DeBoer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 1999).
There are exceptions to the general rule that “inadmissible hearsay ‘cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.'” Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322 (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)). For example, hearsay may be admissible at the summary judgment stage if the declarant could testify directly to the matter at trial. Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285, 1296 n.6 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones v. U.P.S. Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2012)). There are two limitations to the exception, one of which is relevant here.
Courts cannot consider “hearsay evidence when there is only a hypothetical witness who might come forward to testify at trial.” Lewis v. Residential Mortg. Sols., 800 Fed.Appx. 830, 834 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Jones, 683 F.3d at 1294). When asked at his deposition whether he had asked anyone to be a possible witness for him if the case were to go to trial, Plaintiff responded “[t]he only person I would ask is Officer Allen.” (Doc. 37-3, p. 53). Plaintiff has given no indication that Gillison can or would be called to testify if this matter were to go to trial. See Robertson v. Interactive Coll. of Tech./Interactive Learning Sys., Inc., 743 Fed.Appx. 269, 273-74 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (finding that the district court properly excluded hearsay testimony, in part, because “nothing in the record indicates that Ramirez or anyone else with personal knowledge . . . was going to testify at trial so as to reduce the hearsay testimony into an admissible form.”) (citing Jones, 683 F.3d at 1293-94).
Moreover, Plaintiff did not address Defendant's arguments as to hearsay. (Doc. 45). Where, as here, a party makes a Rule 56(c)(2) objection that material used to support a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence, “the burden is on the proponent to show that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 Fed.Appx. 874, 879 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2), advisory committee's note to 2010 amendments). As the proponent of the testimony that Gillison told Plaintiff that Defendant told Gillison to stab Plaintiff, Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the material is admissible as presented or explaining the admissible form that is anticipated. Plaintiff has not done so. What is before the Court at this time is that Plaintiff did not name Gillison when asked at his deposition about possible witnesses. While pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard, a pro se party must still carry their respective burdens of persuasion. See Springer v. First Call Pregnancy Ctr., 831 Fed.Appx. 475, 476 n.1 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990)) (“a pro se litigant does not escape the essential burden under summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's testimony is inadmissible hearsay as it relates to any alleged statement by Gillison to Plaintiff.
The remaining evidence shows that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to overcome Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff did not hear what, if anything, was said between Defendant and Gillison. Plaintiff did not testify that prison officials were aware of any violent tendencies of Gillison or that Gillison had previously been involved in any violent acts against other prisoners. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a “‘strong likelihood' of injury.” Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1301.
2. Deliberate Indifference
The second element has “both a subjective and an objective component.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). A plaintiff must show that “[s]ubjectively, the ‘official [was] aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and . . . also [drew] the inference. Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Sec. for Dep't of Corrs., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007)). Objectively, a plaintiff must also show that “the official . . . responded to the known risk in an unreasonable manner, in that he or she ‘knew of ways to reduce the harm' but knowingly or recklessly declined to act.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 620).
Plaintiff has put forward no evidence that Defendant was subjectively aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed when she allegedly assigned Plaintiff to a cell with Gillison. Plaintiff did not testify that prison officials were aware of any violent tendencies of Gillison or that Gillison had previously been involved in any violent acts against other prisoners. Indeed, Plaintiff testified that, other than Plaintiff thinking Gillison was in a gang and that it was thought that Plaintiff was gay, he did not have an issue with Gillison when he was initially assigned to Gillison's cell. (Doc. 37-3, pp. 28-29). While Plaintiff testified that Gillison said that he did not want to let Plaintiff into his cell “in an aggressive way, ” Plaintiff did not testify that Gillison made threats against Plaintiff in the presence of Defendant. (Doc. 37-3, p. 21).
To the extent that Gillison's refusal to allow Plaintiff into the cell could, itself, be considered a threat, “threats between inmates are common and do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.” Woodyard v. Ala. Dep't of Corrs., 700 Fed.Appx. 927, 933 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 1996)). Finally, Plaintiff never complained to Defendant, or anyone else, that he was in danger or in fear for his safety. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant was subjectively aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed when she allegedly assigned Plaintiff to a cell with Gillison.
3. Causation
To show causation, “the plaintiff must show a ‘necessary causal link' between the officer's failure to act reasonably and the plaintiff's injury.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 622-23).
Plaintiff testified that Defendant's “only role she played . . . [was] just putting [Plaintiff] in that cell[.]” (Doc. 37-3, p. 54). Plaintiff said that by the time he arrived, he “already [had his] room and everything . . . [b]y the time [he got] there, they already [knew] what room [he was] going to.” Id. at 55. However, Plaintiff stated that he did not know who made that decision. Id. Plaintiff said that he did not know whether Defendant played any role in his continued assignment in the cell with Gillison. Id. at 55-56. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown the necessary causal link between Defendant's alleged placing of Plaintiff in the cell with Gillison and the resulting injuries.
Housing Responsibility
Defendant argues that she cannot be found liable because she was not responsible for Plaintiff's housing assignments. (Doc. 37-1, pp. 7-8). Plaintiff testified that he did not know who made the decision as to his housing assignment. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege evidence sufficient to show that Defendant was responsible for Plaintiff's housing assignment.
As Plaintiff “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof[, ]” Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Qualified Immunity
Defendant also raises the defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 37-1, p. 17). “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).
As the Court finds no constitutional violation, Defendant is also entitled to qualified immunity. Baltimore v. City of Albany, Ga., 183 Fed.Appx. 891, 896 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
Motion for Preliminary Injunction
On July 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction to obtain access to Baldwin State Prison (“BSP”)'s law library. (Doc. 42). In his Motion, Plaintiff alleges that BSP suspended access to the law library for a period of three weeks. Id. Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring BSP to immediately reopen the law library. Id.
BSP is not a party to this action. The Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction against a non-party. Infant Formula Antitrust Litig., M.D.L. 878 v. Abbott Labs., 72 F.3d 842, 842-43 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Bowman v. Crosby, 2005 WL 1278173 at *1 (N.D. Fla. 2005) (“the persons from whom injunctive relief is sought must be parties to the underlying action.”). As BSP is not a party to this action, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief against BSP. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 42) should be denied.
Conclusion
Therefore, for the above stated reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 37) be GRANTED, and it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 42) be DENIED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination as to those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made; all other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed by the district judge for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED.