As a general rule, a state prisoner has no federal constitutional right to credit for time served prior to sentence absent a state statute granting such credit. Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1235 (5th Cir. 1976); Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir. 1970). But "[a]n exception to the general rule may be claimed by a criminal defendant who is confined before sentencing because his indigency prevents him from making bond.

Generally, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, "there is no federal constitutional right to credit for time served prior to sentence." Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir. 1970); see Boutwell v. Nagle, 861 F.2d 1530, 1532 (11th Cir. 1988); Palmer v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 253, 254 (11th Cir. 1987); Bayless v. Estelle, 583 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 938 (1979); Paprskar v. Estelle, 566 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 843 (1978); Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1236-37 (5th Cir. 1976). Texas courts have recognized that "there is no constitutional right to credit for the time served between an arrest and the sentence" and also "no federal constitutional right to time credit for any period of confinement pending a parole revocation hearing."

In some cases the statutory maximum exceeded the total of the sentence and the pre-sentencing imprisonment. Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1976); Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1970). For those cases we were able to establish a "conclusive presumption that the sentencing judge gave credit for the pre-sentence custody."

Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause does not require pre-sentence jail credit. See Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1235 (5th Cir. 1976). Petitioner has not shown that the State ordered him to serve 180 days in jail as a condition of his probation or failed to credit him for time served prior to imposition of probation because of purposeful discrimination or any impermissible motive.

The majority recognizes, in a footnote, that we are not the first court to address the precise issue presented in this case. See ante, at 253 n. 3. Of the federal cases, only the Fifth Circuit, over a strong dissent by Judge Godbold, has found no federal constitutional right to credit for time served prior to sentence in a case in which the maximum term was not given. Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1976); id. at 1241-45 (Godbold, J. dissenting). More persuasive, I believe, are the opinions holding, as I would, that an indigent defendant is entitled to credit for his preconviction confinement even when he is sentenced to less than the statutory maximum term. In King v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321, 323 (8th Cir. 1975), the Eighth Circuit recognized that

Our cases have limited an indigent prisoner's equal protection right to presentencing credit to situations in which the sentence given and the presentencing custody together exceed the statutory maximum for the particular offense. E.g., Matthews, 579 F.2d at 931; Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1236-37 (5th Cir. 1976). When the two periods combined still fall within the statutory limit, it is conclusively presumed that the sentencing body took the presentencing detention into consideration in arriving at the sentence.

The state offers the justification advanced by it to the Connecticut Supreme Court and accepted by that court, i.e., that retroactivity would impose an excessive administrative burden on it. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1971, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1976); Mirenda v. Ulibarri, 351 F.Supp. 676, 677 (C.D.Cal. 1972). We find this contention unpersuasive.

The Fifth Circuit has generally held that “‘there is no federal constitutional right to credit for time served prior to sentence.'” Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1235 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir. 1970)); see also Russo v. Johnson, 129 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1017 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (citing cases); Johnson v. Director, TDCJ, No. 4:15cv212, 2015 WL 6460416, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2015) (“There is no federal constitutional right to time credit for any period of confinement pending a state parole revocation.”); Patrick v. Dretke, No. 3:01-CV-1683-N, 2004 WL 915591, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2004) (“[N]either the Constitution nor federal laws require pre-sentence jail credit.”). The only exception is where the prisoner “is held for a bailable offense and is unable to make bail due to indigency . . . [and] he is upon conviction sentenced to the statutory maximum imposable sentence for the offense[.]” Jackson, 530 F.2d at 1236-37; see also Dewberry v. Director, No. 6:06cv124, 2006 WL 3759887, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2006) (“

The Fifth Circuit held that a state prisoner has "no absolute constitutional right to pre-sentence detention credit." Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1237 (5th Cir. 1976); Russo v. Johnson, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1017 (S.D. Tex. 2001) ("'[T]here is no federal constitutional right to credit for time served prior to sentence.'") (citations omitted).

Assuming Parker is correct in his assertion that he received no credit for the six years he served at Rusk State Hospital, this court still must conclude that he has demonstrated no right to relief.         In Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit recently restated its views on the issue of credit for presentence detention time. That decision is dispositive of this case.