Opinion
No. 05-01-01238-CR.
Opinion Issued January 31, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH, Tex.R.App.P. 47.
Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F99-72372-UJ. AFFIRMED.
Before Justices MORRIS, JAMES, and FITZGERALD.
OPINION
In this case, Shedrick Bernard Jackson appeals his conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Appellant waived a jury trial and pleaded not guilty. The trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to one year in a state jail facility. In a single point of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to prove ownership as alleged in the indictment. We affirm. On August 11, 1999, Gary Crump, a used car dealer for Buster Lyon Auto Company, showed appellant around the dealership's lot after appellant asked to look at some cars. Crump walked around the lot with appellant for about fifteen minutes before appellant picked out a white Cadillac he wanted to see. Crump put the key in the Cadillac's ignition, started the motor, then stepped back so appellant could look at the vehicle. Appellant sat in the driver's seat, "slammed" the car into gear, and sped from the lot. Crump got into another vehicle, chased appellant for four blocks, then stopped because he was afraid they would have an accident. Crump reported the vehicle stolen to police. Two weeks later, Crump was shown a photographic lineup by police. Crump picked a photograph of appellant as the person who drove the Cadillac from the lot. At trial, Crump testified he had never seen appellant before the date of the offense and never gave appellant permission to drive the vehicle. Appellant denied he was the person who took the Cadillac and testified he had never been to the dealership. In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. See Sutherlin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). The trial court, as fact finder in this case, was the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647-48 (Tex.Crim. App. 1996). The State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly operated a person's motor vehicle without the owner's effective consent. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 31.07 (Vernon 1994). Appellant argues the evidence was legally insufficient because there was no proof at trial that Crump, the individual named in the indictment, was the owner of the vehicle. The State argues the evidence was legally sufficient because it showed Crump had a greater right of care, custody, and control over the vehicle at the time of the offense. We agree with the State. In this case, the indictment alleged appellant operated a motor vehicle without the effective consent of "Gary Crump, the owner thereof." The evidence showed the dealership owned the stolen vehicle. Under Texas law, when ownership rests with a corporation, it is the better practice to allege ownership in a natural person. See Granado v. State, 749 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1988, pet. ref'd). There are three ways in which ownership may be established in the named individual: (1) title to the property; (2) possession of the property; or (3) a greater right to possession than the defendant. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35) (Vernon 1994). Here, the State proved Crump, as an employee of the dealership, clearly had a greater right to possession of the vehicle than did appellant. We conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to prove ownership as alleged in the indictment. We overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.