Opinion
C. A. 5:23-476-JD-KDW
05-30-2024
Bennie Jackson, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County Detention Center; Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office; Sheriff Chuck F. Wright; Deputy M. Plummer; Deputy D. Bryant; Deputy T. Keeling; Deputy C. Cantrell; Deputy B. Letterman; Deputy J. Guest; SCSO Narcotics Inv. Nathan Rapp; Deputy J. Burrett; Deputy S. Peters; Deputy K. Hammett; Deputy S. Nix; and Deputy J. Ruve, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAYMANI D. WEST, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights afforded under the Fourteenth, Eighth, Fourth, Fifth and First Amendments. This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 58. Plaintiff filed a Response on January 11, 2024. ECF No. 64. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court now issues the following Report and Recommendation (“R&R”).
I. Factual Background
According to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Plaintiff is or was a pretrial detainee at the Spartanburg County Detention Center (“SDC”) during the relevant time period of the allegations he complains have occurred. Plaintiff alleges that the named Defendants violated his constitutional rights on or about July 7, 2022, while he was both at his home and when he arrived at the SDC. ECF No. 14 at 8. According to Defendants, on July 7, 2022, several Spartanburg County deputies went to Plaintiff's home to conduct a welfare check for a woman named Donna Hamrick. ECF No. 58-1 at 1. After being allowed access by Plaintiff to enter the home, the deputies found Ms. Hamrick deceased. ECF No. 58-1 at 2. Plaintiff was placed in investigative detention and transported to the Sheriff's Office to be interviewed. Id.
According to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Plummer applied handcuffs so tightly on Plaintiff that it cut into his arm leaving permanent handcuff prints. ECF No. 14 at 9. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Plummer popped Plaintiff's knuckles out of place. ECF No. 14 at 9. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants Plummer, Bryant, Keeling, Cantrell, Letterman, Guest, Rapp, Burrett, Peters, Hammett, Nix and Ruve, allowed Plaintiff “to sit with a popped knuckle and handcuffs that were so tight they for over thirty min were cutting into my skin.” Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Rapp, Letterman and Cantrell conspired to steal his money, red seal silver notes, gold and silver coins, and jewelry out of his safe. ECF No. 14 at 10. Similarly, he alleges Defendants Bryant, Keeling and Plummer seized his wallet (which had money and credit cards inside). ECF No. 14 at 10. As a result, Plaintiff contends he is limited in his ability to “stock trade.” Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendants destroyed his property and the personal items in his home. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges that when he was taken to the hospital, Defendant Keeling used abusive tactics to ensure he could not speak to hospital staff without feeling threatened. ECF No. 14 at 11.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant SDC, at the hands of Defendant Chuck Wright, violated his First Amendment rights by creating “an indifference to practice my religion,” which Plaintiff identifies as Islam. Id. at 11. Plaintiff further alleges his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because certain unnamed Defendants neglected to feed pretrial detainees a mandatory 2300 calories per meal resulting in physical and mental anguish. Id. at 11. Plaintiff also appears to allege he was placed in a room that was too small for the number of inmates in that room, which he alleges is a constitutional violation. Id. at 11-12. Plaintiff alleges inmates were not given enough tablets and were banned from receiving law books. Id. at 12. Plaintiff alleges he has been denied phone calls and visits from family. Id. Plaintiff alleges it is a violation of his attorney-client privilege that he is required to use the kiosk to communicate with his attorney. Id. at 12. Finally, Plaintiff alleges mental anguish due to the gross indifference of the officer-to-inmate ratio leading to violence and theft in the facility. Id.
II. Standard of Review
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact solely with conclusions in his or her own argument, affidavit, or deposition that are not based on personal knowledge. See Latif v. The Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore, 354 Fed.Appx. 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment, noting plaintiff's affidavit, which offered conclusions not based on his own knowledge, did not create genuine issues of material fact).
Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc.Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
Defendants present a variety of arguments in favor of summary judgment. The undersigned will consider each in turn. However, it is worth noting that Plaintiff's response, in which he asks this court to deny summary judgment, he solely focused his argument on his unlawful seizure claim and bases his entire argument on the fact that the inventory sheet provided by Defendants, noting what they removed from his residence, “proves” there was an unlawful seizure. ECF No. 64 at 1. Plaintiff otherwise does not respond to the substance of the rest of Defendants' arguments.
A. Defendant Spartanburg County Detention Center and Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office are entitled to dismissal
Plaintiff brought suit against both the Spartanburg County Detention Center (“SDC”) and the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office (“SCSO”). Plaintiff alleges these entities have prevented him from accessing the law library by not allowing enough tablets per pretrial detainee, and by disallowing detainees from receiving law books. ECF No. 14 at 12. Plaintiff further alleges that the SDC has denied him phone calls or visits from family. Id. Plaintiff further alleges the SDC violated his attorney-client privilege right by making the use of the kiosk open to the facility for viewing. Id. at 12. He further alleges the SDC caused him mental anguish due to the “gross indifference” to the officer-to-inmate ratio which increased violence and threats. Id. at 12-13. Plaintiff alleges the SCSO used excessive force against him, destroyed his property, unlawfully seized his property, and was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's need to access a law library. See ECF No. 14 at 9; 12.
It is well-settled law that detention centers and medical facilities cannot be sued under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating “[t]he medical department of a prison may not be sued, because it is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”); Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at * 1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (“Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to establish that Defendant Detention Center, as a building and not a person, is amenable to suit under § 1983”). Therefore, Defendant SDC is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.
Likewise, Defendant SCSO is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (explaining that neither the state nor its agencies is a “person” within § 1983); Ramirez v. Anderson Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 1:14-cv-3217-TMC-SVH, 2016 WL 4394505, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2016) (explaining the sheriff's office, as an arm of the state, is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4266130 (D.S.C. Aug. 12, 2016). SCSO is also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because it has not consented to suit. Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are barred from hearing claims for monetary damages against a state or its agents, instrumentalities, and employees, unless the state has consented to the suit. Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279 (4th Cir. 2020); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled that [the Eleventh Amendment's] reference to actions ‘against one of the United States' encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”). Thus, Defendant SCSO is not subject to suit.
This Defendant also argues that, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to bring any state law claims, the claims must be exempt as a matter of law. Defendant SCSO argues that the officers were all individual employees of the SCSO acting within the course and scope of their employment duties. Thus, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70, the claims could not be brought against individual defendants and would have to be brought against the agency. This Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has not alleged injuries or damages sufficient to rise to the level of a constitutional claim. Plaintiff does not file a response to these allegations. The undersigned does not find that Plaintiff sought to bring any state law claims; however, to the extent he is, the undersigned agrees these claims should be dismissed as not properly before the court.
Moreover, while Plaintiff alleges his rights were violated by these Defendants denying him access to the law library, denying him phone calls or visits and violating the right to attorney-client privilege, Plaintiff provides no support for these allegations. As to Plaintiff's argument that pretrial detainees do not have enough tablets to access the law library, there is no constitutional right to a law library or law books; the constitutional right is for access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2008). See also Jones v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., 586 F.Supp.2d 444, 447-48 (D.S.C. 2008) (“[T]he law is quite clear that those being temporarily detained in county facilities awaiting criminal trials do not have a constitutional right to a law library.”). Assuming Plaintiff is arguing his constitutional right to access the court is being denied, Plaintiff has not alleged a specific injury resulting from the alleged denial to state a constitutional claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 349 (holding that an inmate alleging denial of access to the courts must be able to demonstrate “actual injury” caused by the policy or procedure in effect at the place of incarceration in that his non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded). Plaintiff also does not allege what phone call or what visit he attempted to make that he was prevented from making or what interaction he had with his attorney that allegedly resulted in the information being viewed on a public kiosk. Nor does Plaintiff provide any additional allegations regarding what the officer-to-inmate ratio is and what injury he suffered as a result. Thus, for all of these reasons, the undersigned recommends dismissing these claims.
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The individually named Defendants (Plummer, Bryant, Keeling, Cantrell, Letterman, Guest, Rapp, Burrett, Peters, Hammett, Nix and Ruve) argue that they are immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to “arms of the State” and state employees acting in their official capacity. Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., 359 F.Supp.3d 367, 378 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2019). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Moreover, a state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a District Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon the claim that the case is one that arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663. The State of South Carolina has not consented to be sued in this case. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).
Here, these named Defendants argue that they are all state officials and therefore not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Further, Defendants argue that they were acting in their official capacity at the time the incident in question took place. Plaintiff does not dispute this argument. Further, in South Carolina, a county Sheriff and the Sheriff's Department are entitled to protection afforded by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a sheriff, in his capacity as a state official, is immune from suit under § 1983 for money damages). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants in their official capacity.
C. Respondeat Superior as to Defendant Chuck Wright
Defendant Sheriff Chuck Wright alleges that, to the extent Plaintiff brought suit against him under a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff failed to establish that the named officer Defendants were personally involved in any way in the purported deprivation of his rights. Defendant Wright argues that “personal participation” is a necessary element in any § 1983 claim against government officials in their individual capacities; thus, Plaintiff is required to show that Defendant Wright personally deprived him of his constitutional rights. Liability under § 1983 involves a showing that “the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in these cases. Id.; see Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). However, supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances upon a “recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their case.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1984)). To establish supervisory liability under § 1983 one must show: (1) the “supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a ‘pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury”; (2) the “supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,'”; and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link between the supervisors inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (internal citation omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that under the “direct supervision of Sheriff Chuck E. Wright,” he was subjected to “excessive force, destruction of property, mental anguish, physical anguish, cruel and unusual punishment, unlawful seizure of property, abusive tactics and abuse of process.” ECF No. 14 at 9. Plaintiff does not provide any additional allegations regarding this claim, including whether Defendant Wright knew or had any knowledge of whether any of the individually named Defendants were involved in these alleged constitutional violations. The only other allegations Plaintiff makes against Defendant Wright are that “under the direct supervision of Sheriff Chuck F. Wright,” the detention center violated his rights by creating an indifference for him to practice his religion, neglecting to feed pretrial detainees a certain number of mandatory calories per meal, and keeping detainees in their bunks for 18 hours a day in a room that is overcrowded. ECF No. 14 at 12. Again, Defendant Wright argues that Plaintiff fails to establish liability on his part as to these claims.
Plaintiff did not respond to this argument in his response. In reviewing Plaintiff's pleadings, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts sufficient to establish a claim against Defendant Wright. Plaintiff did not allege either implicitly or expressly that Defendant Wright had actual or constructive knowledge of any conduct in which Plaintiff alleges violated his rights. Nor does Plaintiff allege any response or lack thereof by Defendant Wright was so inadequate that it would amount to deliberate indifference. Finally, Plaintiff fails to allege or otherwise show any link whatsoever between any alleged inaction on the part of Defendant Wright and the injuries suffered by Plaintiff. In his Response, Plaintiff provides no argument to the contrary. Thus, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Chuck Wright.
D. § 1983 Claims Against the Officer Defendants
Plaintiff also appears to bring several claims against the officer Defendants in their individual capacity for alleged § 1983 violations. Plaintiff brought suit against the following officers: Defendants Plummer, Bryant, Keeling, Cantrell, Letterman, Guest, Rapp, Burrett, Peters, Hammett, Nix and Ruve. These Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted in their favor as to all of Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants. Plaintiff argues that one or more of these Defendants engaged in a variety of alleged unconstitutional conduct. The undersigned will consider each claim below.
1. Excessive Force Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Plummer violated his rights by using excessive force in applying handcuffs too tightly onto Plaintiff's wrists. ECF No. 14 at 9. Plaintiff further alleges that the handcuffs cut into his arm and popped his knuckles out of place. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Plummer, Bryant, Keeling, Cantrell, Letterman, Guest, Rapp, Burrett, Peters, Hammett, Nix and Ruve all violated his constitutional rights by allowing Plaintiff to “sit with a popped knuckle and handcuffs that were so tight.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff further alleged that he was bleeding profusely from the handcuffs, and that he begged the officers to “loosen these cuffs.” Id.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relief may be sought when a plaintiff alleges the violation of a right secured by the Constitution by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Askins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Because Plaintiff is or was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged violation, Plaintiff's excessive force claim is properly brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Coney v. Davis, 809 Fed.Appx. 158, 159 (4th Cir. 2020). The Fourteenth Amendment “protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). To succeed on such a claim, Plaintiff, as a pretrial detainee, need only show that the alleged use of force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97. In determining whether the force applied was objectively unreasonable, a court considers the evidence from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges a multitude of Defendants violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force in handcuffing him. Defendants, in turn, have provided several videos which show Plaintiff being handcuffed to support their claim that none of the Defendant officers applied excessive force when handcuffing Plaintiff.
Defendants provided the Affidavit of William Parris, the Chief Deputy of the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office, who testifies that he reviewed the video evidence of the incident in question, as well as the reports, and does not believe the evidence establishes the officers used excessive force. See Exhibit A to Defendants' Motion; ECF No. 58-2 at 2. Defendants have attached the video as exhibits to Mr. Parris' Affidavit. Within the video provided by Defendants, Plaintiff lets the officers know on more than one occasion that the handcuffs were tight. The video evidence shows that each time Plaintiff indicated as such, the officers worked to loosen the handcuffs, while also indicating that the police officers were able to place their fingers in between the handcuffs and his wrists. Specifically, the officers adjusted his handcuffs at the initial scene where Plaintiff was detained, when they swapped his handcuffs to put him in the patrol car, and again when he was questioned at the precinct. Indeed, Plaintiff indicated that the handcuffs felt better once loosened. The officers ensured proper fit when they transferred Plaintiff to a patrol car at the scene. Further, when the officers who were interviewing him asked about his wrists being swollen, he told them he woke up this morning with them being swollen.Thus, Plaintiff himself indicated that his wrists were swollen prior to any arrest being made, and further, Defendants have brought forth evidence that supports their contention that they did not use excessive force in applying the handcuffs. Indeed, the video shows that the officers quickly responded when Plaintiff indicated that handcuffs were tight and worked to ensure they fit him properly. Plaintiff does not refute the video evidence, nor does he make any argument in his Response to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the alleged use of excessive force by these Defendants. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on this ground.
When Plaintiff is initially handcuffed, he tells the officers the handcuffs are tight. See Exhibit A; Video 1 at 6:18. Once they loosen the handcuffs, he lets them know they feel better. See Exhibit A; Video 1 at 6:40. During the handcuff exchange, when they place Plaintiff in the patrol car, the officers ensure the handcuffs are not too tight on him and explain to him not to twist his wrists. See Exhibit A; Video 2 at 1:32; 2:30-2:45.
See Exhibit A; Video 5 at 47:35-55. During the entirety of this interview, Plaintiff does not appear to be in any physical or mental distress or pain.
Plaintiff also alleges in his Amended Complaint that Defendant T. Keeling caused him mental anguish “due to the abusive tactics” used when Plaintiff claims the hospital staff asked him “how did this happen” and by not allowing Plaintiff privacy to implicate the Sheriff's office. ECF No. 14 at 11. However, aside from this vague assertion, the undersigned is unable to determine what exactly Plaintiff is referring to, and he does not offer any argument in his Response to this claim. The undersigned assumes he is referring to the alleged injuries to his wrists; however, the only evidence in the record establishes that Plaintiff himself told two officers that his wrists were in that condition the morning prior to his arrest.
2. Unlawful Seizure of Property & Destruction of Property
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bryant, Keeling, and Plummer unlawfully seized his money and wallet totaling $9,572, as well as credit cards. ECF No. 14 at 10. He further alleges Defendants Rapp, Letterman, and Cantrell conspired to steal approximately $38,970 from Plaintiff, along with “red seal silver notes, gold and silver coins” and jewelry. ECF No. 14 at 10. Relatedly, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Plummer, Bryant, Keeling, Cantrell, Letterman, Guest, Rapp, Burrett, Peters, Hammett, Nix and Rove destroyed his property at his home resulting in damages in excess of $30,000.00. ECF No. 1 at 10-11. Plaintiff alleges these Defendants destroyed his property listed in the search warrant. Defendants provide video evidence and documentation to refute these claims. Specifically, Defendants provide a video, attached to the affidavit of Mr. Parris, wherein Defendant Letterman counts the money taken off Plaintiff's person the day of the arrest, totaling $321.00.Other video evidence reflects that Plaintiff alleges that another individual stole money from his home.In this recorded conversation with Plaintiff and an officer, he never indicates that they took any or all of his property without returning it. Finally, Defendants provided the Search Warrant for the property address of Plaintiff's residence associated with the investigation of the death of Ms. Hamrick. The Return, attached to the Search Warrant, details what property was seized. See ECF No. 58-3. According to the Return, it appears the officers who carried out the search warrant took items that were potentially related to the death of the individual in Plaintiff's home. In his Response, Plaintiff argues that this Return shows there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the unlawful seizure of his monies, and that it shows a failure to “properly document them.” ECF No. 64 at 1. This encompasses the entirety of Plaintiff's argument.
See Exhibit A, Video 4 at:40-1:05.
See Exhibit A, Video 7 at 2:25-2:50.
See Exhibit A, Video 7.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The “central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials.” United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) (citations omitted). “The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff is not alleging the search was unreasonable; he simply alleges that his personal property was stolen from him by the officers conducting the search warrant of his residence. Plaintiff provides no factual support for his allegations, pointing only to the Return from the search warrant as “proof” of his claims. However, the Return, provided by Defendants, includes inventory seized pursuant to an investigation. Further, Defendants have produced video evidence that directly contradicts Plaintiff's allegations of what was taken, as well as video evidence where Plaintiff alleges another individual stole his belongings. Even viewing the facts in a light more favorable to Plaintiff, there is simply no evidence in the record to support Plaintiff's allegations or refute Defendants' evidence. Thus, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment as to the claims.
3. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff alleges that while in the SDC, under the direct supervision of Defendant Wright, he was not fed a mandatory 2300 calories per meal. ECF No. 14 at 11. He further alleges that Defendants violated the Supreme Court which recommends “a lot area of 30 sq. feet per inmate in a room of four that is only 83 sq. feet” which causes an escalation in violence due to being in their rooms for 18 hours a day. Id. He further alleges he was not provided adequate bedding, he was denied phone calls and visits, his attorney-client privilege rights were violated because the kiosk was “open to the facility for viewing,” and the officer-to-inmate ratio is inadequate, leading to increased theft and violence. ECF No. 14 at 12-13. Defendants argue that these claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff fails to allege any sort of actual injury related to these allegations. Plaintiff does not offer any argument in response.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff makes all of these claims against the SDC which, as previously mentioned, is not subject to suit under § 1983. Further, one of the claims is made against Defendant Wright, who, as previously mentioned, Plaintiff has failed to establish responsibility under a theory of supervisory liability. Nonetheless, even considering the standard for establishing a successful claim, Plaintiff's claims fail. First, Plaintiff provides no evidence that there is constitutional violation grounded in any of these claims. For example, while Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of meals totaling 2300 calories, dietary guidelines in the United States suggest adults should consume, on average, 1,600 to 3,000 a day, rather than in one meal.Further, while Plaintiff alleges the rooms are too small, he does not provide proof of their actual size or whether his claims that the size “increases violence,” has any actual merit. Plaintiff alleges he was denied phone calls and family visits, but he provides no details surrounding such claims, such as the reason for the alleged denial how many times he was denied a phone call or visit, or who denied him these calls or visits. Finally, he alleges the kiosks were available for public viewing and violate attorney-client privilege, but he does not allege whether he had any alleged information subject to the attorneyclient privilege unlawfully retrieved or whether he actually communicated with an attorney in this manner. Typically, a pretrial detainee challenging general conditions of confinement is alleging a due process claim. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 174 (4th Cir. 2018). The inquiry becomes whether the conditions imposed constitute “punishment.” Id. To prevail, a pretrial detainee must show that the restriction imposed was either: (1) imposed with the expressed intent to punish; or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate, nonpunitive governmental objective. Id. Plaintiff does not allege or otherwise establish that the alleged restrictions he claims were put in place were done so with an intent to punish or were not otherwise related to a legitimate, nonpunitive governmental objective. Thus, the undersigned agrees that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to these claims.
See Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2020-2025, available at https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/sites/default/files/202103/DietaryGuidelinesforAmericans=2020=2025.pdf (last accessed May 24, 2024).
4. Access to Courts
Plaintiff alleges he was denied access to the courts because Defendant SDC did not provide enough tablets for inmates to use, and inmates were not able to get law books to use. Defendants refute this claim and argue Plaintiff has failed to provide any facts to support such a claim. Specifically, Defendants argue Plaintiff does not argue that he has missed any filings or court deadlines, and indeed, Plaintiff has been able to litigate his claims. Generally, courts cannot interfere with administrative matters within a prison. See generally Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 288 (4th Cir. 1980); Sweet v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 859 (4th Cir. 1975) (describing federal court's deference to prison administrators and administrative matters unless the condition arises to the level of a constitutional violation). At the same time, the constitutional right of access to the courts contemplates prison authorities assisting inmates in the preparation and filing of legal papers by providing adequate law libraries. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). Plaintiff does not provide any response to Defendants' claims, nor does he provide any evidence that the number of tablets were related to the ability to access the courts or that he personally was deprived of law books. Indeed, Plaintiff has been able to consistently file documents in his case. Further he brought this claim against a Defendant not subject to suit under § 1983. Thus, the undersigned finds that summary judgment is appropriate as to this claim.
E. Qualified Immunity
Finally, the Defendants also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). When a qualified immunity defense is raised, the courts apply a two-part test. First, the court must determine whether the facts viewed in the plaintiff's favor make out a violation of one's constitutional rights, and second, whether the violated right was clearly established at that time. Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 231 (2009)). The Fourth Circuit employs a split burden of proof for the qualified immunity defense. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the first prong, and the [officer] bears the burden on the second prong. Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233 (citing Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377-78 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2007)). Here, the undersigned has determined that Plaintiff has failed to establish any constitutional violation on the part any of the officer Defendants. Thus, the undersigned alternatively recommends granting summary judgment on this ground.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons explained above, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 58, and entering summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's claims for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).